PERIODICALS

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A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 45, Number 1, Winter 2001

Walter A. McDougall
On Turkish "What Ifs"

TURKEY, WHERE WORLDS COLLIDE

Raphael Israeli **on the Turco-Israeli Entente**

Aslan Gündüz **on Turkey's Bid to Join Europe**

Paul B. Henze **on the Caucasus**

Svante E. Cornell **on the Kurdish Minority**

Michael Radu **on PKK Terrorism**

The United States and the South Asian Crisis
Mohammed Ayoob and Joel E. Starr

The United States and the Balkan Bog
Douglas A. Macgregor

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

For centuries, Western imaginations placed Turkey at the heart of the Levant, the Orient, the "mystic East." Today, however, Turkey aspires to be not an alien neighbor, but a part of—and partner in—Europe. The image above ("The Mosque at Eyub," by J. Carter) depicts the shrine outside Istanbul where Ottoman sultans, upon their accession, ceremonially demonstrated their commitment to Islam. Can the Turkish republic today reconcile its Islamic legacy with the secular vision of Kemal Atatürk?

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

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Editor's Column

So the world did not end this January 1 either, even though 2001 marks the true beginning of the new millennium. But if the most fevered of spiritual speculations about the thousand-year reign of the saints were not reified, neither were the most fevered of secular speculations about the evolution of humankind and our material works. In his brilliant technological (and precociously New Age) fantasy *2001: A Space Odyssey*, film director Stanley Kubrick imagined immense space stations in earth orbit, Hilton hotels on the moon served by regularly scheduled tourist flights, and a manned expedition to Jupiter. Whether through lack of vision, lack of funding, or the dearth of creativity in a bureaucratized NASA and aerospace industry, Kubrick's notion of spaceflight in the year 2001 is as remote today as it was in 1968. Only HAL, the evil on-board computer, seems plausible due to the fact that cybernetics, not rocketry, proved to be the truly revolutionary breakthrough of our lifetime.

As for me, the year 2001 will be one of peering intently at the past in hopes of making some sense of the most revolutionary political novelty of the past three hundred years: the birth and growth of the United States of America. By grace of the University of Pennsylvania and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, I shall take academic leave in order to begin researching and writing a history of the United States. Accordingly, I shall be attending to duties at *Orbis* with a lighter hand than usual, confident that Managing Editor Steve Winterstein, the FPRI's new permanent fellow Will Hay, and the rest of the institute's staff can more than compensate for my preoccupation.

In These Pages

Once, the Ottoman Turks were the terror of Christendom, encircling then destroying the Byzantine Empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, conquering the entire Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkan peninsula, and besieging Vienna in 1529 and 1683. Later, the Ottoman Empire was the "sick man" of Europe whose long retreat from myriad strategically pivotal provinces sparked serial crises among the European powers and ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the First World War. Since 1923, when a national republic arose in Anatolia on the ruins of the Ottoman sultanate, Turkey has played another important role as

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model for a modernizing, secular, mostly Muslim state. In the twenty-first century the Turks (and we learn below the significance of that very term—"the Turks") aspire to membership in the European Union, and if they succeed in that quest they will be historical trailblazers again.

Europeans recognize the old and new reasons why Turkey is so worthy of close attention and the many stakes they have in its future. But have Americans ever granted Turkey the appreciation and attention it deserves? Do they today? In these pages, expert observers of Turkish politics, culture, economics, and diplomacy explain to us what Turkey is and is not, why human rights policies there command such attention, and what the United States needs to know in order to nudge Ankara in directions most healthy for the West and itself. Aslan Gündüz begins with a keen analysis of how well Turkey measures up to the rigid legal standards of the European Union, and what reforms it still needs to make to satisfy them. The biggest worry, of course, is Turkish treatment of the Kurdish minority. Svante Cornell's article on this subject is especially educational because the Kurdish conundrum, while real, is of a much different character than most casual readers in the West assume. Ankara's crackdown has had as its principal purpose to defang the Kurds' most radical and violent exponents, the terrorist PKK. That is the subject of Michael Radu's report. Turning to diplomacy after the Cold War, Raphael Israeli describes the surprising (to some) entente between Turkey and Israel, the opportunities and risks to which it gives rise, and the prospects for its continuation. Finally, Paul Henze examines the Turks' initiatives toward the newly independent Caucasian states where many interests, including those of American oil companies, collide. Not since the Reagan administration, when Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé was posted in Ankara, has the United States paid sufficient attention to Turkey. Let us hope the next U.S. administration ends the neglect.

A mere five hundred miles northwest of Istanbul, American and European armed forces are deeply engaged in the troubled ex-Ottoman sanjaks of Bosnia and Kosovo. Last year the U.S. Senate was dissuaded from passing a time limit for the withdrawal of American troops from the Balkans lest they remain there indefinitely, at considerable cost and to no evident purpose. Is peacekeeping, peacemaking, or statebuilding working in the Balkans? Douglas Macgregor, a military expert with extensive "in country" experience, offers a skeptical and highly authoritative answer. Skeptical concern is also the proper attitude to take toward the nuclearized standoff in the Indian subcontinent according to congressional aide Joel Starr and academic expert Mohammed Ayoob. To be sure, the danger of escalation in the Indo-Pakistani clash over Kashmir is chilling. But so, too, is the danger that Pakistan itself could become a "failed state," which could trigger a

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chain reaction of catastrophes. What is the natural international system that ought to define South Asia, why has it not prevailed in the past, and what needs to happen before stability can be achieved there? Ayoob's answers will surprise you.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

This past summer I had the pleasure (albeit it was no easy task) of reviewing two thick books of historical counterfactuals.[1] Though considered a disreputable parlor game by most professional historians, contemplation of what might have, could have, and in some cases should have happened at key junctures in the past is often highly illuminating and always highly disturbing. Many historians of Christian, liberal, or Marxist persuasion have made up for history's lack of a scientific epistemology by imposing a teleology. Whatever happened in the past had to happen the way it did because certain laws or forces were at work to ensure that human society evolved toward some predetermined or retrospectively observable end. But most historians of whatever proclivity suspect, at least in their night thoughts, that human events are subject to wild, inexplicable contingencies to which various cultures give the names luck, fate, karma, destiny, or providence.

What if, for instance, King Charles I had not foolishly overestimated the size of the Scottish militia in 1639 and negotiated a futile "compromise," instead of pressing on to certain victory? The great English Revolution of the seventeenth century might never have happened, royal absolutism might have triumphed over parliament in Britain as it was doing on the continent, and the United States might not exist today. Likewise if the Spanish Armada had earlier succeeded in subduing England, which by all objective measures it should have. In that case, as on D-Day in June 1944, the vagaries of weather mocked "the best laid schemes of mice and men." The onset and success of the American Revolution also would never have happened but for one twist of fate after another at critical junctures. Just imagine, for instance, that the redcoat Captain Ferguson, inventor of the first breech-loading rifle, had squeezed off a round when he had General George Washington in his sights at close range near the Brandywine River in 1777. What if Robert E. Lee's secret orders for the invasion of the North in 1862 had not, by the wildest chance, fallen into the hands of a Union soldier? Instead of being blocked at Antietam, Lee might well have won a stunning success on Northern soil and persuaded the British and French to recognize the Confederacy.

Niall Ferguson, the Oxford historian of World War I, has re-

[1] Niall Ferguson, ed., *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); and Robert Cowley, ed., *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1999).

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cently demonstrated how near the British cabinet was to declaring neutrality in August 1914 and has argued that the world would have been better off if it had. One may challenge his supposition that continental domination by militant, imperial Germany would have resulted in nothing more frightening than a premature version of the European Union. But it is hard to imagine a twentieth century worse than the one that did unfold, including a bloody trench war of attrition, the Bolshevik takeover in Russia, the rise of fascism, World War II and the Holocaust, and the Cold War with its threat of nuclear annihilation.

But our subject this issue is Turkey, so let us revisit another famous "what if": what if Suleyman the Magnificent had been granted the victory he had every reason to expect outside the gates of Vienna in 1529? The story is told by Theodore K. Rabb, a dean of military history in the United States.[2] He begins by asserting that the decade of the 1520s was as "fraught with consequences" as any in history, and demonstrates it by reminding us that Luther's "Protestant" defiance of pope and emperor, the Turkish sweep into the Balkans, Henry VIII's break with the papacy and founding of the Anglican Church, the invasion of Italy and sack of Rome by the Holy Roman Emperor (and king of Spain) Charles V, Magellan's discovery of the Pacific Ocean and his crew's circumnavigation of the globe, and Cortés's conquest of Mexico all occurred in one decade. But the great trends to which those events gave rise in religion, culture, science, technology, economics, war, and politics might have been reversed, or played out far differently, if the last summer of the 1520s had not happened to be unusually wet.

The greatest of Ottoman sultans, Suleyman the Magnificent, had resumed the empire's drive to the north in 1521, capturing Belgrade. After turning aside to the Island of Rhodes to evict the Knights Hospitaler of St. John, he invaded the Magyars' great kingdom of Hungary. On the fields of Mohács in 1526, the sultan's crack janissaries not only defeated but slaughtered (during and after the battle) the entire Magyar elite, including the king, the top aristocracy and knighthood, two archbishops and five bishops, as well as Hungary's army of thirty thousand. "Thanks to the Most High!" exulted Suleyman. "The banners of Islam have been victorious. . . . Thus God's grace has granted my glorious armies a triumph, such as was never equaled by any illustrious Sultan, all-powerful Khan, or even by the companions of the Prophet. What was left of the nation of impious men has been extirpated." The Ottoman military system, superior cannon and gunpowder, and clever tactical leadership once again proved themselves invincible, and it seemed the entire Danubian plain was destined to fall before this "scourge of God."

[2] In *What If?* pp. 107–18.

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There is no telling what might have happened if Suleyman had resumed the offensive the following spring. Ottoman momentum was never stronger, but the same could be said of Vienna's defenses inasmuch as the Holy Roman Emperor and some German princes hurriedly deployed their knights and levies to Austria in anticipation of the threat. But Suleyman relaxed after Mohács, and in the three years that followed, Ferdinand of Habsburg (the emperor's brother) staked his claim to the vacant Hungarian crown of St. Stephen and stood up as the champion of the Christian resistance. The losing claimant to the Hungarian throne, John Zapolya of Transylvania, accordingly offered himself as an ally to Suleyman, whereupon the sultan determined to crush the Habsburgs and conquer the upper Danube once and for all. To that end he marshaled his greatest host yet, numbering 75,000, with many horse and heavy cannons, and moved north from Constantinople in May 1529.

Winter in the harsh Balkan highlands was over, but the spring rains never ceased. Indeed, "so continuous and torrential" were the storms that raged throughout the summer of 1529 that the Ottomans lost their customary advantage in mobility, had to leave behind their heavy artillery, and allowed the Germans time to reinforce Vienna. The Christian order of battle on September 30, when the Turks finally arrived, thus numbered 23,000, and over a third of those soldiers arrived just a few days before the siege. The campaigning season was already nearing its end, and after four furious assaults failed to breach the defenses Suleyman ordered a general retreat. The Turks torched their own camp, "massacring or burning alive all their prisoners from the Austrian countryside, except those, of both sexes, young enough to qualify for the slave market."[3] In 1532 Suleyman advanced once more, but this time Charles V appeared in person and even rallied the German Protestants in exchange for "postponement" of the Catholic-Protestant conflict. Sensing another frustration, the sultan chose to divide Hungary between Ferdinand and Zapolya, and the Ottoman threat to the heart of Europe receded for 150 years.

Assume, however, that the summer of 1529 had been normal. How then might history have unfolded? Rabb makes a plausible case that Vienna could not have held out, and that once in possession of the Danubian plain Suleyman would have been approached by a queue of Christian princes seeking to curry his favor. Germany's Lutherans might well have been first in line, in which case the Catholic cause would have been lost in the mid-1500s, sparing Germany a century of catastrophic warfare. Or those same princes might have been so terrified by the advance of the Turk that they would have begged, not bargained, for the emperor's protection on condition that

[3] Lord John P. D. B. Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), p. 192.

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they renounce their flirtation with the "crazy monk" Luther, nipping the Reformation in the bud. The other enemies of the mighty Charles V, including the king of France and the papacy itself, might also have played for a Turkish alliance, in which case the beleaguered emperor would have been in no position to launch his invasion of Italy, and the pope would have been free to grant Henry VIII the divorce he desired from Catherine of Aragon (an aunt of Charles V). England might have remained Catholic. And what of the New World? As the editors of both these counterfactual volumes stress, the further one gets from the "what ifs" at hand the more fanciful the "if thens" become. But it would seem to follow that a Habsburg Spain freed of its wars against Protestants in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might have found better uses for the silver pouring in from its New World empire. Such a Spain might have invested in vigorous new exploration and colonization in Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and California, and so confined the English and French to much smaller portions of North America.

So much for the glory days of the Ottomans. What "what ifs" and "may bes" came into play during the centuries of their decline? The answers then depended mostly on the Europeans, the prey turned predator in the Balkans and Middle East. In the 1820s the Greek war of independence erupted, and the British and French Philhellenes were sympathetic. But the architect of the post-Napoleonic "Vienna System" of 1815, Austria's foreign minister Klemens von Metternich, turned a cold shoulder to nationalist movements. He realized that once nationalism triumphed in the Ottoman provinces it would inevitably spill over into the Habsburg empire and tear it asunder. The Austrian and Ottoman Empires were long and bitter enemies, but their relationship was symbiotic in that each depended on the other to crush the power of nationalism. The swing vote vis-à-vis Greece, and later vis-à-vis Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, was Russia's. What if the tsars and their ministers had loyally seconded Metternich's conservatism, as their ideological interest would indicate? But instead, in 1827 and in all subsequent Balkan wars, the Russians succumbed to ambition and supported the Orthodox cause, the Pan-Slavic cause, or just the Russian imperial cause in hopes of smashing Ottoman power and seizing Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. The serial Russian intrusions into the Balkans in turn forced the British and French (though rivals themselves in the Levant) to defend their interests and "lifelines" in the eastern Mediterranean, sparking the Crimean War of 1854–56, the dangerous "Eastern Question" crises that followed, and ultimately World War I.

In the latter case, the powers already mentioned were powerfully aided in their mischief by a new player, Germany. After unification of the German states north of Austria, Chancellor Otto von Bis-

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marck devoted himself to keeping peace in the Balkans. They were "not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier," he famously said, and Germany's diplomatic position had always been strong thanks to its lack of interest in the fate of Turkey. So he brokered a series of compromises designed to bolster the Austro-Hungarian Empire while letting Turkey-in-Europe dissolve peacefully. Bismarck's liege, Kaiser Wilhelm I, was content to take his advice, and the imperial heir Frederick was equally prudent in foreign affairs. But Frederick died of cancer in 1888, only months after inheriting the German throne. Leadership passed to the grandson, Wilhelm II, who promptly dismissed Bismarck, charted a "new course" for Germany aiming at world power, and later leaped into the competition for influence in the Ottoman Empire under the slogan "From Berlin to Baghdad." But what if Frederick had lived out his normal span? What if young Wilhelm II had not been so ambitious and foolish? Germany might never have pushed Austria into war in 1914, which was what forced the British to face the awful choice Ferguson now laments.

Nevertheless, the German threat to the Turkish Straits and the kaiser's provocative blue-water navy led the British as well to act foolishly. For a century they had shielded the Ottomans from the Russians and French and urged the sultan's court to modernize and reform. But fearing the Germans, the Liberal cabinet in London made an entente with St. Petersburg in 1907, secretly promising, for the first time in history, to support Russia's drive toward Constantinople. Thus was the stage set for all the disasters of the twentieth century. When Serbian terrorists agitated to "liberate" Bosnia-Herzegovina from Austria and assassinated the Habsburg heir to the throne in 1914, the Germans fought for Austria's survival while dreaming their own dreams of Middle Eastern empire, the Russians backed the Serbs while eyeing Constantinople, and the French and British backed the Russians in order to contain Germany.

That war, of course, toppled the German, Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, with catastrophic political results everywhere—except Turkey! There the war hero and former Young Turk reformer Mustafa Kemal rallied the Anatolian peasants to topple the sultanate and forge a Turkish national state. He did not have to contend with the Ottomans. They had chosen the losing side when they allied with Germany, and their capital, Constantinople, was placed under Allied occupation in 1918. But Kemal did have to contend with the British and French, who imposed the Treaty of Sèvres on the sultan and restored all the "capitulations" the Ottoman Empire had been obliged to make over the course of the previous century. Chief among them were loss of sovereignty over the straits and foreign trade, and the granting of special rights for foreigners and ethnic and religious minorities in the empire. But after the Great War's bloodletting the Allies did not have the

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stomach to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres on Kemal's nationalists in the interior, so Prime Minister David Lloyd George committed another British folly: he unleashed the Greeks. Full of hatred for their old Turkish oppressors and flushed with ambition now that the sultan was captive, the Greek government offered to send an army deep into Anatolia, suppress the Turkish nationalists, and carve out a pro-Allied Greater Greece on the far side of the Aegean Sea. For a while the Greek army advanced almost unopposed, but in August 1922 the Turkish army routed the invaders and chased them all the way back to Smyrna (Izmir). Frantic Greek soldiers and residents fled by sea under cover of the Royal Navy, while the French, facing reality, withdrew their occupation force from the straits. The following year, after long negotiations in the Swiss Alps, the powers concluded the Treaty of Lausanne with Kemal's new regime in which the Turks gave guarantees that European interests and transit rights in the straits would be respected in peacetime and the Europeans recognized the new Turkish national state with its capital at Angora (Ankara). Kemal Atatürk, as he now called himself, then set out to separate the state from Islamic religion, liberate women, define Turkish citizenship by residence rather than ethnicity, Westernize the legal system, promote economic development, and pursue peaceful relations with all of its neighbors.

So it was that the Turks first terrorized Europe, after which Europe bullied the Turks, after which Turks and Europeans alike sought mutual respect. Even Hitler and Stalin thought better of challenging Turkish neutrality during World War II, and one would expect that present relations between Turkey and the West would be exceptionally warm given that Turkey stood up to the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, supported with blood the United Nations war effort in Korea, held down NATO's southeastern flank throughout the Cold War, made serious sacrifices to support the Gulf War, cracked down on political Islam inside Turkey, and now offers a rare hand of friendship to Israel. One would expect that, but one would be mistaken.

Today's champions of Kemal's secular nationalist vision of a modern, Westernized Turkey still govern in Ankara, still outdo most other non-European regimes in their commitment to international standards of human rights and democracy, and indeed aspire to membership in the European Union. Turkey, once the scourge or plaything of Europe, wants to join it. But now that Turkish political reform (the dream of every Victorian Englishman) and Turkish economic progress (the fantasy of every nineteenth-century French technocrat) are close to realization, the Europeans are determined to bar the door. They scrutinize Turkey closely in search of violations and irregularities that can serve as pretexts for postponing indefinitely Turkey's acceptance within the EU. They fret over the anomaly that the Turkish

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army has intervened several times to insure the survival of secular, modern government in the face of "democratic" forces pressing for an Islamic state. They scold the Turks for alleged persecution of the Kurdish minority notwithstanding the fact that Ankara targets only separatists and terrorists (supported by Iraq and Iran) and upholds a definition of citizenship as blind to ethnicity as that of the United States. Hence one scholar concludes that Turkey seems "doomed to remain on the fringes of Europe in the post-cold war period" and that the chances of Turkey's being "accepted as a European country appear quite remote." German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel was so undiplomatic as to announce in 1997 that "it is clear that Turkey will not become a member of the European Union in the foreseeable future."[4]

Clearly, the materialist, post-Christian Europe of the twenty-first century cannot object to Turkey on the grounds that most of its people are Muslim. Clearly, the West, which proclaims its ideals and principles of human rights to be universally valid and insists that all the world adhere to them, cannot pretend that Turks are somehow incapable of "civilized" governance. Why then the resistance to a closer Euro-Turkish relationship? The real answers will not appear in the speeches of European politicians or the earnest reports of EU committees. But they nonetheless scream from the headlines in newspapers and the numbers in almanacs. The headlines tell of an increase in racially motivated violence across Europe, nativist parties in France, skinheads in Germany, anti-immigration sentiment in Austria, and panic in Italy over its naked coastlines and in Spain over the ease of transit across the Straits of Gibraltar. This was no doubt part of the motivation behind the EU's sanctions against Austria following the success of the nativist Freedom Party, whose leader, Jörg Haider, occasionally sounds sympathetic to the Nazis. Accordingly, the German government registers all organizations and persons deemed to be "neo-Nazi" (by its own definition, presumably), and German banks and businesses, concerned for their images, are now refusing to traffic with such parties. But cracking down on overt racism toward non-Europeans in Europe is only half of the EU's policy: the other is to minimize the source of resentment by restricting the influx of im-

[4] Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), p. 116. The dilemma of modern Turkey was revealed as early as 1930, when Atatürk was "sufficiently disturbed by the absence of a parliamentary opposition to ask an old associate, Fethi Bey (Okyar), to found an opposition party . . . which would offer constructive criticism and perhaps occasionally check the government's absolute power, while Atatürk's own Republican People's Party ruled. The experiment failed, however. Okyar's Free Republican Party quickly became a platform for various disaffected elements—including political and religious conservatives opposed to the government's westernizing and secularizing reforms, and economic liberals anxious to protect the primacy of private enterprise in the face of growing state interventionism. This was more than the government had bargained for, and it quickly moved to quash the opposition." Irvin C. Schick and Ertugral Ahmet Tonak, eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp 374–75.

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migrants, refugees, and guest workers, most of whom originate in—Turkey.

That brings us to the statistics. Turkey currently has an estimated population of 66 million. France, by contrast, has 59 million. About 30 percent of Turks are under the age of 15 and only 6 percent are over 65. In France, only 18 percent are under 15 and 16 percent are over 65. Moreover, Turkey's population continues to grow at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per annum and may reach 95 million by the year 2025. Most Europeans of Caucasian descent are experiencing zero, or even negative, population growth. Finally, Turkey's area of 300,870 square miles is larger than that of any EU state (France covers 209,970 square miles). In sum, Turkey would not just be an ancillary member of the EU and a trophy for the West's campaign for "enlargement." It would be one of the loudest voices in European councils, flood the continent with workers, and become by far the largest recipient of EU subsidies for members with lower per capita national incomes. Turkey is Europe's Mexico.

One would understand perfectly should the Europeans decide to fill the moat around their elegant castle and pull up the drawbridge. But so long as they proclaim themselves the legislators, judges, and executors of universal doctrines of human rights while at the same time telling the Turks that nothing they do will ever be good enough, then Western hypocrisy will become more grating, and the heirs to Atatürk will find it harder and harder to answer the protests of anti-Western Islamists. And should Turkey someday suffer an Iranian-style revolution, turn militant and pan-Turkic in the Ottoman mode, or become so demoralized that the nation cracks up, Europeans (and Americans) will again inherit a passel of trouble and historians will again be left to speculate about the consequences of decisions not made.

Curiously, the conundrum Turkey faces today was present at the creation of the state in 1923, as the famous historian Arnold J. Toynbee observed at the time. Assessing the establishment of European relations with the new nationalist Turkey, he wrote: "The Treaty of Lausanne will be judged in history by its effect upon the internal development and the mutual relations of the nations between whom it has been made." He noted that the European powers raised far more impediments to peace than did the Turks, whose envoy at Lausanne, Ismet Pasha, proved to be as skilled in diplomacy as Kemal was at war. But "the real struggle of wills" would begin when

> Turkey has started to put her own house in order. She cannot reconstruct her economic life without borrowing fresh capital and technique from the west . . . [but] if western enterprise is alarmed and outraged by Turkey's new policy toward foreigners (whether theoretically legitimate or not) beyond a certain degree, it will boycott Turkey and prefer to invest its energies in China, Mexico or any other field where

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> the risks and difficulties are only slightly less great than in the dominions of Angora. Will Nationalist Turkey pay the price at which alone such assistance will be forthcoming? She has suffered so much during the last century and a half from the abuse of special privileges by foreign interests and residents. . . . It is conceivable that she might sacrifice her economic recovery to her political principles and might sink to the economic level of Afghanistan.

And so to Toynbee's conclusion: "The west has, in fact, inspired the oriental peoples with the two ideals of economic progress and political sovereignty, which (whatever their relationship in their place of origin) are incompatible if pushed to extremes in undeveloped non-western countries which have taken them at second hand. Turkey's present programmes of sovereignty and progress can hardly both be realized to the full, but it is unlikely that either will be pushed to the wall by the other. . . . Theoretical sovereignty, after all, is a somewhat negative blessing."[5] Since World War II, Europeans themselves have finally learned that lesson. The Turks are proving that non-Europeans, even Muslims, can too. But it seems they will never receive their diploma.

[5] Arnold J. Toynbee, "The East after Lausanne," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept. 1923, pp. 84–98 (quotes pp. 87, 95–97).

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

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The Land of Many Crossroads

An Ambassador's Reflection

by Robert Strausz-Hupé

I am delighted that *Orbis* is devoting a large part of this issue to the Republic of Turkey. Many strategic observations have been written and will continue to be written about this vital country, its status as the key to eastern Mediterranean security, and its new-old influence in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. I do not propose to add to them. Suffice to say that all of these observations are true.

Another truism is to remind ourselves and, more importantly, those who dispose over our affairs in the capitals of the West, that secure balances of power in the regions adjacent to Turkey are very difficult to sustain. The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Balkans are all bywords for deadly quarrels. Turkey once ruled most of them, and their successor states have not covered themselves with glory since the Turkish defeat in World War I set them free. A thriving Turkey may not answer all of the regional problems, but in its absence none of them can be managed, much less resolved.

Acutely aware of their dangerous neighborhood, the Turks have sought their future in Europe. But the Europeans do not see, nor do they wish to see, Turkey in their future. There will always be reasons why Turkey, even if *with* Europe, will not be *of* Europe. We should not disguise from ourselves that the real obstacle is history—the weight of seven centuries of conflict and the burning antagonisms that still divide Greek from Turk, Armenian from Turk, Slav from Turk. Too many of these nationalisms are defined by an enmity to Turkey, which the Turks themselves reciprocate.

Americans are not free of this history. Anyone who deals with U.S.-Turkish relations soon acquires a profound education in the ways and wiles of ethnic politics in the Congress. Few of us who have been bloodied in these

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transactions can be optimistic that anything will change soon. As a consequence, American presidents will continue to find warm relations with Turkey politically expensive. In other words, the conduct of U.S. relations with Turkey requires unusual statesmanship, precisely because the domestic political rewards will be few.

This having been said, I would commend to Washington two approaches in its dealings with Ankara. The first is always to reinforce the NATO relationship, the true and best anchor for Turkey. NATO unites the pragmatists in Europe and the United States who understand the strategic verities and have the weight and influence to keep Turkey close to the West. The second is to urge the Turks to use their most valuable natural resource—water—as a force for change in the region. From a peace pipeline that nourishes the thirsty Jordan River valley, many good things will flow.

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The Land of Many Crossroads

Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe

by Aslan Gündüz

Democracy and human rights in Turkey have been a prominent subject of discussion in many international forums over the past ten years due to that country's unique domestic difficulties and geopolitical importance. Hardly any other country in the world has been so criticized for its human rights record, nor is the future of any other country so dependent on the promotion of human rights. And therein lies an irony: because the criticism stems not from what is appalling about Turkey, but what is laudable about it; not from what it has been in the past, but what it aspires to be.

Turkey's constitution, like those of other European countries, guarantees a long list of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The major codes and enforcement mechanisms of Turkey's legal system were taken verbatim from various European states in the early 1920s, and almost all actions of the state are subject to judicial review. Turkey has also accepted multidimensional international accountability with respect to the protection of human rights, most notably by becoming a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (for purposes of this article referred to as "the Convention") and incorporating into its judicial system the so-called Strasbourg institutions—that is, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which decides on applications concerning human rights violations, and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which (among other responsibilities) supervises the implementation decisions of the ECHR.[1] Turkey is also a party to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, with its European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), as well as the European Social

[1] The "Strasbourg institutions" formerly included the European Commission of Human Rights, which ceased to function in 1999.

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Charter and the U.N. Convention for the Prevention of Torture. Further links to European institutions include Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), its customs union with the European Union, and its candidacy for full membership in the EU.

In sum, the spotlight is on human rights in Turkey precisely because its government and people aspire to the highest standards of humanity and full membership in the Western club of nations. And yet, because it has grappled with virtually every kind of terrorism over the last three decades, the Turkish state has confronted considerable difficulties in meeting its international obligations in the field of human rights. The terrorism campaign of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK) alone has left more than 30,000 dead. Moreover, since 1960 Turkey has experienced three military takeovers or interventions, and has not fully recovered from the most recent coup, which occurred in 1980. It is against this violent background that a portrait of democracy and human rights in Turkey must be painted.

The Anarchic Nature of the International System and Human Rights

Contemporary human rights doctrine is designed primarily to protect men and women from their own governments. It begins with the premise that the state is the main potential source of evil and must be supervised and controlled if human rights are to be protected. It ignores, however, the potential for nonstate actors to violate human rights, as well as imperfections in the institution of extradition.[2] If universal human rights are to be served, a state in custody of a murderer must either punish or extradite him. Certainly, a murderer's status should not improve when he escapes to another jurisdiction. In the real world, however, states pay lip-service to legal norms while their actions bespeak political motivations: over the last fifteen years, other European states have failed to extradite a single terrorist to Turkey.

While human rights doctrine protects the individual, it can also undermine the effective functioning of a state. Because the doctrine requires transparency, democracy, freedom of speech, and governmental accountability, it may expose a state's weaknesses. Particularly if the state is internally unstable, a hostile party can easily use human rights as a pretext to stir up domestic dissent and discontent.[3] The dilemma faced by Turkish authorities

[2] Cf. Nigel S. Rodley, "Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?" in *Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge*, ed. Kathleen E. Mahoneey and Paul Mahoneey (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 313–14; Bülent Tanör, "Human Rights Problems in Turkey", in *Human Rights Education Project, Activity Report* (Izmir: Izmir Bar Association, Jan. 1, 1997–Dec. 31, 1997), p. 35.

[3] The Western states used the then-CSCE human dimension mechanism approximately 100 times between 1989 and 1990 against the Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the latter they lost their enthusiasm. See A. Gündüz, *Security and Human Rights in Europe: The CESCE Process* (Istanbul: M. Ü. Ayrupa Topiulugu Enstitüsü, 1994), pp. 211–13.

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today is that the still-anarchic international system is helpless to protect the threatened state against such intrusions.[4]

Human Rights and Turkey's Relations with the EU

A strange consensus exists across the Turkish political spectrum in favor of full integration of Turkey into the EU. Separatists, political Islamists, and the establishment all support efforts for full membership, albeit for sometimes contradictory reasons. Islamists and separatists hope that membership will bring a liberal democratic political environment in which they might freely campaign for their cause, while the establishment desires membership because it would anchor Turkey permanently in the West and *pari passu* reinforce secularism.

Relations between the EU and Turkey were institutionalized by the Ankara Agreement of 1963. After many ups and downs in their relations, due mainly to tensions with Greece and disagreement over democracy and human rights,[5] Turkey and the EU established a customs union in 1995. Today, Turkish goods move freely within the EU, Turkey and the European member states have a common tariff and commercial policy, and the Ankara Agreement is part of the EU's legal system.

On the question of Turkish membership in the European Union, however, no meaningful progress has been made, nor appears likely in the near future. In 1997 the Luxembourg European Council decided that the EU should enlarge to include the former socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, but not Turkey, whereupon Ankara suspended its political relations with the EU.[6] Then, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 changed its policy and declared Turkey to be a candidate for EU membership, agreeing to treat it on the same basis as other candidate states.[7] In practice, however, this did not make any real difference, since the EU has not even begun negotiations with Turkey for membership. It explains this delay on the grounds that Turkey has not yet satisfied the political part of the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which states that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities."[8]

[4] A. Gündüz, "The Dilemma of Human Rights and Security in Combating Terrorism: An International Law Perspective" (in Turkish), in *Hukuk Devletinde Terör ve Örgütlü Suçla Mücadele*, ed. Umut Vakfi (Istanbul: BETA, 1996), pp. 190–207.

[5] See Karen Smith, "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Summer 1998, p. 253.

[6] "Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997," *Bulletin of the European Union*, vol. 12 (1997), point 1.5.

[7] "Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council," *Bulletin of the European Union*, vol. 12 (1999), point 4.

[8] "Copenhagen European Council, Copenhagen, 21 and 22 June, Conclusions of Presidency," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, vol. 26, no. 6 (1993), point I.13, p. 13.

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Turkey is bound to have difficulties in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, but the difference from the previous position is that the ball is now in Turkey's court. If the country satisfies the criteria, negotiations with the EU will presumably begin.

Since the Luxembourg European Council, the EU has issued two reports on Turkey's progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the conclusions of which Turkey is now hotly discussing.[9] Turkey's Supreme Coordinating Human Rights Council, working under the Ministry of State for Human Rights, has recently issued its own comprehensive report wherein it identifies fifty-three key legal areas in need of reform.[10] If and when it is admitted to the EU, Turkey will have to adopt and apply all of the accumulated rules, regulations, and practices of the EU (the so-called *acquis communautaire*), which will require a high degree of stability and competence from its administrative and judicial bodies.

The Role of the Strasbourg Institutions

In 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership in the European Community (EC), it also recognized the competence of the now-defunct European Commission of Human Rights to receive individual petitions from Turkish citizens with regard to violations of their human rights as guaranteed by the Convention. In 1990 Turkey recognized the competence of the ECHR as well. Although the commission was abolished in 1998, the court has become permanent and exercises a decisive, if indirect, influence on the Turkish legal and political system. Anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the Turkish government may apply to the ECHR if he believes that his rights under the Convention have been violated by the state organs after he has exhausted all the relevant effective local remedies. The number of such applications before the court against Turkey has already exceeded 2,500.[11] For many years, however, applications originating from the districts of southeastern Turkey stricken by terrorism have gone directly to the ECHR before applicants have exhausted legal channels within Turkey. In other words, the ECHR has been functioning as a court of first instance with respect to such cases, on the grounds that the local remedies in the southeast are not effective. Moreover, the commission and the ECHR have virtually reversed

[9] See European Commission, "Regular Report 1998 from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession," *Bulletin of the European Union*, supplement 16/98 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 1999); and "Regular Report 1999 from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession," *Bulletin of the European Union*, supplement 16/19 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2000).

[10] Supreme Coordinating Human Rights Council of the Prime Ministry, *Measures Which Turkey Has to Take in Light of the Political Copenhagen Criteria: Calendar for Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights* (in Turkish) (Ankara: n.p., 1999).

[11] Statistics supplied to the author from the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, valid for the period Nov. 1, 1998, to June 29, 2000.

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the principle of the burden of proof in Turkish cases, in particular where the commission itself established the facts. Applicants were not required to prove their allegations against the government; instead, the Turkish government was in effect required to prove its innocence. A glance at numerous recent cases immediately reveals the weaknesses in that legal process.[12] In one typical case, a judgment was entered against the government (in spite of a host of exculpatory evidence) on the basis of allegations from applicants whose spouses were fighting on the side of the PKK against Turkish security forces. Thus, the resulting condemnation of Turkey was based solely on allegations by individuals with links to the PKK. Indeed, the ECHR seems to have formed an *a priori* opinion of Turkish culpability. On one notable day, it decided fifteen cases and gave the government's counsel only thirty minutes to defend the first eleven of them.[13]

In the highly publicized case of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the ECHR—perhaps swayed by the prevailing political mood in Europe—seemed to exceed its powers altogether. Within hours of Öcalan's arrest, an application was made to the ECHR on his behalf that alleged violations of several articles of the Convention and requested that the court order the Turkish government to comply with the terms of the Convention. The court informed the government of the application and invited it to respond. Before the government could do so, however, the CPT informed Ankara that it intended to visit Imrali Island, where Öcalan was detained. The government granted the request, as required by law. Shortly after the CPT's return to Strasbourg, the ECHR—without waiting for the government's comments—called for interim measures to ensure a fair trial and the protection of Öcalan's health.[14]

The ECHR seems to have formed an *a priori* opinion of Turkish culpability.

The Strasbourg institutions seem thus to have politicized what ought to be judicial functions. It is the duty of Turkey, under the Convention and its own laws, to ensure that all detainees or suspects under its jurisdiction

[12] See, for example, *Case of Aydin v. Turkey* (application no. 57/1996/676/866), judgment: Strasbourg, Sept. 25, 1997; *Case of Mentes and Others v. Turkey* (application no. 58/1996/677/867), judgment: Strasbourg, Nov. 28, 1997; *Case of Kurt v. Turkey* (application no. 151/1997/799/1002), judgment: Strasbourg, May 25, 1998.

[13] On July 8, 1999, the ECHR decided the following cases: *Case of Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey* (application nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94); *Case of Polat v. Turkey* (application no. 23560/94); *Case of Tanrikulu v. Turkey* (application no. 23763/94); *Case of Sürek v. Turkey (No 4)* (application no. 2472/94); *Case of Aslan v. Turkey* (application no. 23462/94); *Case of Sürek v. Turkey (No 2)* (application no. 24122/94); *Case of Erdogan and Ince v. Turkey* (application nos. 25067/94 and 25068/94); *Case of Okçuoglu v. Turkey* (application no. 24246/94); *Case of Baskaya and Okçuoglu v. Turkey* (application nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94); *Case of Sürek v. Turkey (No 3)* (application no. 24735/94); *Case of Sürek v. Turkey (No 1)* (application no. 26682/95); *Case of Karatas v. Turkey* (application no. 23168); *Case of Gerger v. Turkey* (application no. 24919/94); *Case of Ceylan v. Turkey* (application no. 23556/94); *Case of Cakioi v. Turkey* (application no. 23657/94).

[14] *Öcalan-Turkey* (no. 4622/99), European Court of Human Rights, *Information Note on the Case Law of the Court*, Mar. 1999, p. 25.

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receive a fair trial before its courts. If the trial is not fair, the defendant may seek a remedy from the ECHR. In fact, more than half of all applications made to the court from some forty nations involve complaints of unfair trials. But all applications of that nature are made after the conclusion of the trial in the national court. In the Öcalan case, the CPT and ECHR acted in advance, giving the impression that they were responding to requests from EU members' governments. Nevertheless, the ECHR continues to exercise an intrusive and deep-penetrating influence on the Turkish political and legal system, although the Turkish establishment is not yet aware of it. In fact, the court has further demonstrated, in the case of the United Communist Party of Turkey, that no part of the Turkish state organization or law, including the constitution, is exempt from European supervision.[15] Quite apart from the question of whether or not the ECHR is exceeding its jurisdiction, it is also important to point out that its decisions might lead to the erosion of the Turkish constitution, to the extent that the latter is not in accord with the Convention.[16] Yet the government has so far complied with the ECHR's judgments.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

The Copenhagen document of the CSCE rightly states that democracy and the rule of law are fundamental to the protection of human rights. As the European Commission's 1998 regular report acknowledges, Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty parliament, a president, a government, a public administration, and a judicial system. Its political structure is laid down by the 1982 constitution, which was drawn up by the military after the 1980 coup and approved by referendum. The constitution characterizes the republic as "a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law." Secularism and the unitary nature of the state are the hallmarks of the entire politico-legal system, so much so that, in the eyes of many, they constitute Turkey's Achilles' heel.

The European Commission concluded in its December 1989 opinion on the Turkish application for full membership that successive reforms had resulted in "a parliamentary democracy closer to Community models." In its "Agenda 2000," the commission further observed that "Turkey has a government and a Parliament resulting from multi-party democratic elections and an administration capable of framing and applying legislation compatible with *acquis communautaire*."[17]

As in other European states, the public institutions of Turkey are

[15] *Case of the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey* (no. 133/1996/752/1151), judgment: Strasbourg, Jan. 30, 1998.

[16] A. Gündüz, "Has the European Court of Human Rights Become Our Constitutional Court?" (in Turkish), *Yeni Türkiye*, vol. 4, no. 22 (1998), p. 1367.

[17] "Agenda 2000 for a Stronger and Wider Union," *Bulletin of the European Union*, vol. 7/8 (1999), point I.1.

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accountable to the law for their actions. Acts of parliament are subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court and those of the administration by the Council of State. Article 125 of the constitution reads: "Recourse to judicial review shall be available against all actions and acts of the administration." However, decisions of the Supreme Military Council and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, independent decisions of the president, and some acts dating from the 1980 coup are exempt from judicial review.[18] Such exceptions may lead to a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, which requires a member state to make available to everyone under its jurisdiction an effective remedy against grievances by any other party. Scholars, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Supreme Coordinating Council are agreed that the constitution should be so amended as to extend judicial review to those acts that have been previously exempt.

In addition, the electoral law that establishes a national threshold of 10 percent for the representation of political parties in the parliament needs to be reformed. The 1998 regular report on Turkey's application for membership to the EU states that the 10 percent threshold is responsible for nonrepresentation in the parliament of approximately 4 million voters, out of 28 million votes cast in the last election.[19] The Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Haik Partisi—CHP) is now a victim of the law in question. The Supreme Coordinating Council's report suggests lowering the threshold to a more reasonable 5 percent.

Civilian Control of the Military

As stated above, the Turkish military has intervened three times since 1960 to reestablish law and order when civilian authorities proved unable to control civil strife. In fact, the military has had a strong influence over the governing of the country since the republic was established, because it views itself as the protector of Atatürk's secular, modernizing agenda. Therein lies another irony of the Turkish human rights imbroglio: the military elite is the most pro-Western force in the country.

The EU's two regular reports point to some anomalies in relations between the military and civilian authorities.[20] They note, for example, that the chief of general staff is not responsible to the minister of defense but to the prime minister, and that the National Security Council exercises a disproportionate influence in the running of the state. A report of the European Parliament on Turkey reached a similar conclusion:

[18] According to the constitution, all but a few presidential decisions must be signed by the Council of Ministers. For example, the president may independently appoint some senior judges and university rectors and file appeals to the Constitutional Court against laws he believes are unconstitutional.

[19] "Regular Report 1998," para. B, point 1.1.

[20] Ibid.; "Regular Report 1999," para. B, point 1.1.

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> As for the role played by the army in society, it must be said that its influence over Turkish political life is excessive by any standards. Its *de facto* and *de jure* position in the legal and constitutional framework is far in excess of what is used in the EU member states.[21]

In acknowledgment of the problem, the Supreme Coordinating Council's report suggests amendments to the constitution that would ensure that civilian members of the NSC outnumber military members and would restrict the NSC to advising the Council of Ministers solely on security issues. Nongovernmental organizations observing Turkey insist that the NSC be abolished altogether.[22] The political parties have not yet broken their silence on the issue. The chief of general staff has told the press that the military does not have any objection to changing the membership of the NSC. It is highly likely that the body will preserve its constitutional status, but in a form revised along the lines suggested by the Supreme Coordinating Council.

An Independent Judiciary

The prominent place of the judiciary in Turkey's constitution is well acknowledged. It includes judicial and administrative courts, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Council of State. The constitution expressly states that the judiciary is and must be independent. It is a punishable offense to attempt to influence judges in their judicial duties. The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors alone has the power to appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors, except for members of the Constitutional Court, who are appointed by the president. The membership of the Supreme Council includes, alongside a majority of senior judges, the minister of justice and his undersecretary. There is now a consensus to the effect that the presence of the latter two undermines the council's independence, and the next overhaul of the constitution will likely remove the minister and undersecretary from the council. Otherwise, the EU's 1998 report faulted the State Security Courts, which deal with terrorism or crimes against the state, for not "offering defendants a fair trial." The reasons cited for this included, among others: overreliance on confession rather than traditional investigative methods; the relative status of the prosecutor (who sits next to judges) and defense lawyers (who sit below and whose points of law are not entered into the trial record in full, but summarized by the presiding judge); the slowness of trials; and long detentions pending trial without due reasoning. The judicial system's excessive workload is said to undermine the efficency of the system. In civil justice and normal criminal courts, the

[21] See European Parliament, *Report on the Commission Reports on Developments in Relations with Turkey since the Entry into Force of the Customs Union*, DOC-EN\RR1356\35875, PE 221.635/fin, p. 12.

[22] Basbakanlik, *Rule of Law, Democracy, and Human Rights: A Workshop with Nongovernmental Organizations* (in Turkish) (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1999), pp. 44, 105.

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slowness of the procedures raises concern. All relevant circles now agree that the judiciary needs to be reformed according to EU guidelines, and the Supreme Coordinating Council's report calls for an urgent reform of the judiciary.

Freedom of Association and Political Parties

Political parties are, according to the constitution, an inseparable part of the democratic system. However, the constitution and the Political Parties Act expressly prohibit ethnic and religious parties, and since the founding of the republic more than twenty parties that were established (under disguised names) by Islamists and separatists have been outlawed, mostly by the Constitutional Court. Recently, seven such dissolved parties brought cases against Turkey before the ECHR, and three of them emerged victorious.[23] Six had been dissolved on the grounds that they promoted separatism or terrorism, and one, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP), for promoting Islamic fundamentalism. Proceedings are currently pending before the Constitutional Court for the closure of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP) and People's Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi—HADEP). The Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe recently reacted, in a sense, to this excessive suppression of political organization in what is known as the Venice Report, which lays down guidelines relevant to Turkish law.[24] The report made it clear that "prohibition or dissolution of political parties may only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution." Specific examples of such justifiably repressed activity cited in the report include racism, xenophobia, and intolerance or involvement in terrorism or other subversive activities. But the report also emphasized that "a party that aims at a peaceful change of the constitutional order through lawful means cannot be prohibited or dissolved on the basis of freedom of opinion." The report would thus seem to conclude that ethnic or religious parties should be allowed to function. But it remains unclear whether it would look favorably upon ethnic or religious parties that campaigned on behalf of an Iranian-type Islamic state, for instance, or partition of the country along ethnic lines.

The fact is that a state may tolerate such parties as long as they do not have the potential to endanger public safety and national security. On the other hand, in a country where more than 30,000 people have been killed in

[23] The United Communist Party of Turkey, Socialist Party, and Freedom and Democracy Party.

[24] Venice Commission, *Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures, Adopted by the Venice Commission at Its 41st Plenary Session* (Strasbourg: Venice Commission, Jan. 10, 2000), CDL-INF (20 00) 1.

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the last fifteen years in order to establish or prevent the establishment of an ethnic state, it would be extremely difficult to persuade the majority that a separatist party whose goal it is to split the country is not a threat to the state and constitution. Likewise, a fundamentalist party that campaigns for the establishment of a theocracy may well threaten democratic order and human rights as universally understood. Therefore, much depends on the historical background and the democratic credentials of such parties and the degree of their determination to live within the same territory. Fundamentalism means to Turkey what Nazism means to West European states. If EU member states can suspend political relations with Austria after Jörg Haider's Freedom Party became a coalition partner in the Austrian government—even though his party posed no danger to the democratic system—then it follows that Turkey has legitimate reason to act likewise toward those in its midst who hope to fuel armed ethnic terrorism.

Fundamentalism means to Turkey what Nazism means to Western Europe.

Yet it is likely that, bearing those reservations in mind, the constitution and Political Parties Act can be revised in a fashion that would bring the Turkish legal system closer to those of the member states of the EU. Turkey would probably take a graduated series of measures against certain parties, including fines and, as a last resort, prohibition.[25] Such a system would recognize the parties' right to be different so long as they remain loyal to democracy within a unitary state. Insofar as they adhere to that requirement, fear about them may dissipate over time.

A Healthy Civil Society

The EU's 1998 regular report contained the observation that "Turkey has made an effort to gradually bring about a real improvement in the enjoyment of such rights as freedom of association, proof of this being the mushrooming number of NGOs in Turkey."[26] Indeed, Turkey is a fertile land for associations—74,617 of them are currently registered—although they remain subject to many restrictions.[27] In the fields of democracy and human rights alone, a number of well-organized associations exist, ranging from the Human Rights Association and Mazlum-Der to the Turkish Democracy Foundation, Turkey's Human Rights Foundation, and Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. Initially, the state looked on some NGOs with suspicion, and some of their

[25] Cf. Fazil Saglam, *Current Problems of Political Parties Law* (in Turkish) (Istanbul: BETA, 1999), p. 163.

[26] "Regular Report 1998," p. 16.

[27] Statistics supplied to the author by the General Directorate, Department of Associations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the restrictions, see Hüsnü Öndül, "Human Rights and Democratic Standards in Turkey" (in Turkish), in *Rule of Law, Democracy, and Human Rights*, pp. 112–13.

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activists were prosecuted for violations of law.[28] Now, however, the state and the NGOs have begun to cooperate in the interest of protecting human rights. Last year, the former minister of state for human rights arranged a workshop in Ankara with representatives of NGOs in order to search for ways and means to strengthen democracy and human rights. The findings of that workshop have now been published by the ministry. At the time of the writing of this article, the government arranged a second workshop, offering proof that the government is genuinely willing to promote human rights.

The Kurdish Conundrum

The question of ethnic minorities is extremely sensitive in Turkey because of the country's diversity and painful history. During its decline, the Ottoman Empire suffered very much from its own mistake of having given an international status (through capitulations and otherwise) to minorities, manipulated and in some cases created by European meddlers pursuing their own interests. Given the near-protectorate status of the empire in the nineteenth century, the Sublime Porte was almost paralyzed in its domestic and external affairs by various groups that abused their official "minority status," often with outside assistance.[29] To this day, Turks harbor a bitter memory of some minority groups' collaboration with the occupying powers after the First World War and their attempts to thwart Atatürk's bid to forge a modern nation-state out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

The Lausanne Conference of 1923 not only established the present boundaries of the Turkish republic, but also settled the ethnic problem once and for all by permitting special status for *non-Muslim* minorities only. The Turks fiercely and successfully refused to extend minority status to any part of its Muslim population, which included the Kurds. Because the European states agreed to those terms, Western attempts to establish, directly or indirectly, Kurdish autonomy in Turkey today arouse considerable suspicion and resentment among Turks.

In any event, in Turkey the concept "minority" depends on one's point of view. If, for example, Kurds are a minority in racial terms, they are certainly part of the majority in religious terms because they are Sunni Muslims. By the same definition, many ethnic Turks who are not Sunni would be considered part of a religious minority. Accordingly, Ankara's commonsense policy is to recognize no minorities except those (non-Muslims) whose status was established by the Treaty of Lausanne. By the same reasoning, Turkey has accepted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's

[28] See Yilmaz Ensaroglu (chairman of Mazlum-Der), "Resolution of Human Rights Question of Turkey: Fundamental Approaches and Proposals" (in Turkish), in *Rule of Law, Democracy, and Human Rights*, p. 51.

[29] N. Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933).

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Copenhagen Document of 1990, which addresses minority rights, and the Geneva Report on National Minorities, subject to a reservation that reiterates the Lausanne formula. The government has so far refused to sign the (European) Framework Convention on Minorities or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Recently it signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which contains an article on national minorities, but it is not clear whether or not the government will make a reservation to the document. The European Commission seems to have taken a conciliatory stance in light of Turkey's situation. Its 1998 regular report says: "The constitution does not recognize Kurds as a national or ethnic minority. There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political and economic affairs but Kurds who publicly or politically assert their ethnic identity risk harassment or prosecution." The report goes on to suggest that a political solution should be found to the problem in the southeast, which "could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism."[30]

As the report suggested, the status of the Kurdish language remains somewhat ambiguous. The regime that was established in 1980 following the coup did indeed pass the restrictive Law on Publications in Languages other than Turkish, but that law was repealed in 1991. It is now commonly accepted that Kurdish is no longer banned in the context of cultural activities. In practice, Kurdish music, folklore, and customs are all permitted, as are publications in Kurdish in any form. All that remains prohibited is Kurdish-language education and television, but in practice the government tolerates radio broadcasts in Kurdish as well. It remains to be seen if and when this de facto situation will become de jure. Most likely, Ankara will not agree to classification, categorization, and regulation of minority languages, but instead simply remove any restrictions on the use of such languages. The "residual rights" approach may play a part: anything that is not specifically prohibited by law is allowed, hence it is left to individuals to choose what language or languages to use.[31] In formal communications with government authorities, those who cannot use Turkish have always had access to free translation from their own native tongue.

As things stand today, Turkey will probably seek to accommodate the legitimate needs and aspirations of its citizens of Kurdish origin by promoting democracy and individual human rights.[32] Although Turkey's history and fears of separatism will not allow for a fully fledged institutionalization of minorities along racial lines, individuals will be able to realize their aspira-

[30] "Regular Report 1998," p. 18.

[31] See Nazli Ilicak, "Some Obstacles on the Way to the EU" (in Turkish), *Yeni Safak*, July 20, 2000.

[32] Hüsnü Öndül stated that the Human Rights Association views the Kurdish issue as a matter of human rights and democracy. See Öndül, "Human Rights and Democratic Standards in Turkey," p. 115.

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tions within the democratic system. In Turkey, all people have the right to be different, but diversity cannot come at the expense of unity.[33]

Freedom of Expression

The perceived or actual dangers that separatist terrorism and fundamentalism have posed to the integrity of the state have conditioned Turkey's policy of freedom of expression. As the European Commission stated in its 1998 regular report, "Despite improvement in recent years freedom of expression is not fully assured in Turkey."[34] In fact, the constitution and a number of other laws tend to restrict freedom of speech, but only because of the threats of separatism and fundamentalism. The state currently uses two legal instruments to combat those perceived "menaces": Article 312 of the Criminal Code, and the Act for the Prevention of Terrorism. A number of politicians, human rights activists, journalists, trade unionists, and novelists have been prosecuted for having violated one of them, including Necmettin Erbakan, the former prime minister and chairman of the now-defunct Welfare Party. He was sentenced to one year in prison for a campaign speech he made six years ago that was found to promote hostility between ethnic groups.

Article 312 expressly prohibits seditious libel, and the Act for the Prevention of Terrorism outlaws separatist propaganda, in an attempt to discourage and hopefully prevent the promotion of feelings of ill will and hostility between ethnically or religiously different segments of the population. The main problem with Article 312 is not its existence in law books, but the ambiguity surrounding its application.[35] It is couched in terms so broad that virtually anyone expressing views critical of the state's policies toward separatism or fundamentalism may find himself summoned to a prosecutor's office. The problem could have been mitigated if the judiciary had adhered to those criteria specified by the ECHR. Instead, the Turkish courts' interpretation of freedom of speech, in particular as it applies to Article 312 and the Act for the Prevention of Terrorism, is not compatible with the ECHR's case law. The state and the courts have yet to come to terms with the fact that advocating the abolition of a given law falls under the category of protected speech so long as peaceful means are used. The way to peaceful change must remain open if people are to be allowed to vent their anger or dissatisfaction and seek redress of grievances while simultaneously affirming the legitimacy of constitutional democracy.

[33] Cf. Graham E. Fuller, "The Fate of the Kurds," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 109, 115.

[34] "Regular Report 1998," p. 14.

[35] Seditious libel exists, for example, in the laws of the United Kingdom, but with the difference that words would constitute seditious libel only if they were likely to cause readers to act unconstitutionally. See *McNae's Essential Law for Journalists*, ed. Walter Greenwood and Tom Welsh, 10th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1988), p. 133.

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Turkish public opinion is divided on what to do with Article 312. Secularists are opposed to its abolition, as is the National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP). They look on it as an effective legal means to protect the integrity of the secular state. Human rights activists and some political parties such as FP and HADEP, however, would prefer to see it abolished. The Supreme Coordinating Council's report, some establishment political parties, and the president himself seek only its revision.[36] Erbakan's conviction is likely to strengthen the hand of those who want to see it amended along the lines of the above-mentioned European criteria.

The Death Penalty

In Turkish law, approximately forty legal provisions call for the death penalty.[37] In practice, however, the death penalty has been seldom carried out except in extraordinary times in which the very existence of the nation was threatened, as was the case between 1975 and 1980, when terrorism claimed more than twenty lives per day. Since 1984 no executions have taken place at all, and capital punishment would have been long abolished in law as well if not for the threat posed by organized terrorism. The death sentence delivered on Abdullah Öcalan has only served to renew discussions as to the wisdom of abolition, and public opinion remains divided. Victims of terrorism are pressing for his execution, but the ECHR has stated that his execution must not be carried out until his application before the court has been decided.[38] Most political parties, including one wing of the government coalition (the MHP), would agree in principle to the abolition of the death penalty, but do not wish to see Abdullah Öcalan benefit from the change. However, the Draft Criminal Code, now pending before parliament, would abolish capital punishment, a position that the prime minister has supported publicly.[39]

Abolition of the death penalty is a requirement of the Copenhagen criteria, and it is unlikely that any negotiations regarding Turkey's membership in the EU will proceed until the law is changed. The European Parliament has expressly stated that it would not give its consent to any candidate's accession if it retains capital punishment in its laws.[40] On the other hand, keeping the death penalty on the books without applying it has so far brought no good to Turkey. Other European states have refused to extradite to Turkey fugitive mafia members and common murderers in their custody on the grounds that the death penalty remains a legal possibility. A consensus

[36] "Statement by the President," *Sabah*, Aug. 5, 2000.
[37] See Öndül, "Human Rights and Democratic Standards in Turkey," p. 104.
[38] See ECHR, *Information Note on the Case Law of the Court*, Nov. 1999, p. 23.
[39] "Statement by the Prime Minister," *Sabah*, June 23, 2000.
[40] *Resolution in the Oostlander Report, A4-368/97*, adopted Dec. 4, 1997 (PE 264 945), para. 4.

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seems to have emerged within the nation that Turkey's best interests require the prohibition of capital punishment, at least in time of peace. The Supreme Coordinating Council has set the deadline for its abolition at the end of the year 2001.

Torture

National laws strictly prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in Turkey. Violators are subject to severe punishment and a permanent ban from civil service. Nevertheless, in several cases the ECHR has found violations of Article Three of the European Convention on Human Rights, indicating that torture is a continuing evil that the government has not been able to eradicate fully.

In legal and practical terms, however, the situation is fast improving. Amendments to Articles 243 and 245 of the Criminal Code have brought the definition of torture in line with international standards, and new provisions in several laws and regulations seek to remove its root causes. Notable changes include: more effective prosecution of allegations of torture; regulations on the apprehension, length of detention, and treatment of suspects; improvement of prison conditions; prevention of falsified medical reports; establishment of a parliamentary human rights committee to deal firmly with torture allegations; watchdog activities by NGOs; effective press coverage; access for prisoners to lawyers, doctors, and relatives; and perhaps most importantly, intensive training of law-enforcement personnel. Moreover, social opprobrium arising from greater publicity of torture tends to discourage violations.[41]

The law is fully in place, but the question of full implementation remains, to some extent, unanswered. First, the Turkish judicial system suffers from the lack of a well-organized and -equipped "judicial police." Public prosecutors have to rely on the police in their investigation of crimes because their own offices lack the necessary staff. But since the police come under the purview of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, prosecutors have little actual power over them. Secondly, the police, not being well trained in judicial affairs, may be less than scrupulous about their investigative methods. In cases where a police officer investigates a fellow officer, doubts naturally arise about the integrity of the process. Thirdly, most human rights violations stem from actions by law-enforcement personnel, but according to terms of the Act for Trials of Civil Servants, prosecution of the latter is possible only with the consent of their superiors (i.e., the governor or the minister of

[41] As to views of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Turkish practice concerning torture, and measures taken by the Turkish government, see "Interim Resolution DH (99) 434 on the action of the security forces in Turkey, measures of general character," *Human Rights Bulletin*, no. 46, Council of Europe, Human Rights Directorate (Sept. 1999), pp. 58, 63.

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internal affairs, depending on the status of the accused). The solutions to these problems, at least, are refreshingly clear: in addition to better training for officers, improvement will require the establishment of a judicial police force and the reform or abolition of the Act for Trials of Civil Servants.

Assessing Human Rights in Turkey

Despite ethnic and religious provocations, Turkish citizens today enjoy effective democratic rule and are justifiably proud of their success. But they are also eager to preserve that progress, and continue to harbor deep-rooted fears about the future of their democracy and territorial unity after decades of relentless blows from terrorism and fundamentalism. Because these fears have shaped Turkey's most basic policies and behavior, continued liberalization is contingent upon alleviating those concerns.

Turkey has every right to combat terrorism, but it needs to be more patient and attentive in distinguishing wrong from right. The Turkish people and government have now come to agree, thanks to the debate on the Copenhagen criteria, that reforms are needed in order to promote human rights and democracy. The Turkish nation has demonstrated its ability to adapt itself to new and changing conditions, a fact that gives cause for optimism. However, in order to fulfill its obligations to the EU, it must still make some difficult decisions and tackle some chronic political, structural, and legal questions. Change is always painful, but is now inexorable, even if it comes at the expense of long-standing internal balances and traditions. Insofar as EU norms and Turkish aspirations foster such change, they have a vital role to play in the future.

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The Land of Many Crossroads

The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics

by Svante E. Cornell

In November 1998, Turkey's Kurdish question returned to the top of the international agenda with the seizure in Italy of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the rebellious Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK). Demonstrations in support of Öcalan's release wreaked havoc throughout Europe and served as a reminder of the war between the PKK and the Turkish state that has claimed over 30,000 lives since 1984. A month before his seizure, Öcalan had been expelled from Damascus, his base for the last nineteen years, after Turkey had threatened Syria with war unless it ceased to provide a safe haven for the PKK. Having failed to find asylum in Russia, Belgium, or the Netherlands, Öcalan—apparently acting on an invitation from Italian leftists—believed he could find refuge in Italy. After heavy Turkish and American pressure, Öcalan was nevertheless forced to leave Italy and seek asylum elsewhere, but was eventually apprehended by Turkish security forces on February 16, 1999, in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Kurdish question is arguably the most serious internal problem in the Turkish republic's seventy-seven-year history and certainly the main obstacle to its aspirations to full integration with European institutions. Most Westerners define the problem simply as a matter of oppression and denial of rights by a majority group (the Turks) of an ethnic minority (the Kurds). The civil war in southeastern Turkey that raged between 1984 and 1999 is accordingly viewed as a national liberation movement and enjoys widespread sympathy both in the West and in the Third World. The Turkish political elite, for its part, promotes an entirely different view of the problem, which is often misunderstood and ridiculed in the West. In official Turkish discourse, there is no Kurdish problem, but rather a socioeconomic problem in the southeastern region and a problem of terrorism that is dependent on

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external support from foreign states aiming at weakening Turkey. In reality, neither the official Turkish view nor the dominant Western perception holds up to close scrutiny. A deeper study of the problem reveals its extreme complexity, with a number of facets and dimensions that tend to obscure the essentials of the conflict.

One observation that should be made at the outset is that the Kurdish issue in Turkey differs in many respects from such recent ethnic conflicts as those in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Liberia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Rwanda. Despite almost two decades of armed conflict and thousands of casualties, open tensions in society between Turks and Kurds remain, under the circumstances, minimal. Foreigners are startled by the discovery that a significant portion of Turkey's political and business elite is of Kurdish origin, including three of the country's nine presidents—something unthinkable for Kosovars or Chechens—and that Kurds' representation in the country's parliament is larger than their proportion of the population.[1] At the same time, it is difficult to refute the assertion that there is an ethnic dimension of the conflict, in the sense that a portion of the country's population holds on to an identity distinct from that of the majority and feels discriminated against on the basis of that identity, resulting in at least a limited ethnic mobilization. In addition to the irrefutable ethnic aspect, the Kurdish problem contains oft-neglected social, economic, political, ideological, and international dimensions that have carried different weight at different times.

Several points need to be understood with regard to the origins and future prospects of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. A thorough grasp of the problem requires, first, an understanding of the national conception underlying the Turkish state and society. Secondly, it must take into account the social (and not only ethnic) distinctiveness of the Kurds and their relationship with the republic's leadership. Thirdly, the Kurdish problem in Turkey must be understood as distinct from the problem of PKK terrorism. Finally, the Kurdish question must be understood within the analysis of the general process of democratization in Turkey.

The National Conception of the Turkish Republic

The Turkish republic is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, which dissolved during the First World War after more than a century of decay. However, the republic is a dramatically different construct from its predecessor. The Ottoman Empire was an authoritarian monarchy with a religious foundation derived from the sultan's claim that he was also the caliph, the spiritual head of all Muslims of the world. The empire recognized minorities and accorded them extensive self-rule, but it defined minorities in

[1] Based on estimates, given that the ethnicity of members of parliament is not published, and that census data do not include ethnicity.

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religious terms. Hence, no Muslim people was ever accorded minority rights, while Jews and Christian Armenians, Serbs, Greeks, and others were. Before the twentieth century, this approach posed few problems, especially given that the Muslim peoples in the empire developed national identities considerably later than the empire's Christian subjects in the Balkans, and did so at least partly as a result of the latter's emerging national awareness. Collective identities were based primarily on religion—Islam at the broadest level and various religious orders and sects at the local level—and regional or clan-based units.

The Turkish republic, by contrast, was modeled upon the nation-states of Western Europe, particularly France. It was guided by six "arrows" or principles enunciated by its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, étatism, and reformism. Among these, the first three principles form the foundations of the republic. Although Turkey was no democracy in Atatürk's lifetime, the principles of republicanism and populism suggest the goal of popular rule, that is, a democratic political system.[2] In the speeches and writings of Atatürk, republicanism unmistakably meant a break with the monarchy of the past.[3] The second pillar, secularism, entailed a break with the Islamic character of the state. Although religion was to be kept out of political life, however, this is not to imply that Kemalist Turkey was in any way atheistic. Indeed, as Dogu Ergil has noted, Atatürk's highest goal in the religious field was the translation of the Quran into Turkish. In fact, the aim of the new regime was twofold: to dissociate the state from religious principles, and to "teach religion in Turkish to a people who had been practicing Islam without understanding it for centuries."[4] The regime's policies, most blatantly the abolition of the caliphate, nevertheless enraged the more religious parts of the population. This included the Kurds, who have been described as being at that time "a feudal people . . . of extreme religious beliefs."[5] Indeed, the Kurdish population was ruled by local hereditary chieftains whose power often stemmed from the backing of the Naqshbandi or Qadiri religious orders.

The founding principle most relevant to the Kurdish question, however, is nationalism. The new state was based on Turkish nationalism, but the territory comprising the republic was a highly multiethnic area even before the large migrations that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[6] As the Ottoman Empire was retreating from the Balkans, large

[2] Populism (*halkçilik*) carries the meaning of a "government for the people" rather than the present-day meaning of the term, used to define political opportunism.

[3] For Atatürk's ideas, see e.g. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1980). *Nutuk* is the Great Six-Day Speech held by Atatürk on October 15–20, 1927.

[4] Dogu Ergil, *Secularism in Turkey: Past and Present* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1988), p. 61.

[5] Patrick Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld, 1964), p. 397.

[6] Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1995).

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numbers of Muslims, predominantly Slavic by ethnicity, fled to the heartland of the empire, the present-day Turkish republic. In addition, the Russian suppression of Muslim highlanders' resistance in the North Caucasus in the 1850s forced additional hundreds of thousands of people to migrate to Anatolia. As a result, when the Turkish republic was created in 1923, a large proportion of its population consisted of recent immigrants of Slavic, Albanian, Greek, Circassian, Abkhaz, and Chechen origin, whereas people that could claim descent from the Turkic tribes that had come from Central Asia were certainly a minority of Anatolia's population. It was in this complex setting that Atatürk and his associates aimed to create a modern nation-state, an integrated, unitary polity of the French type. For that reason, the model of the nation that Atatürk and his associates adopted was civic, as expressed by the maxim that lies at the basis of Turkish identity: "*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*," best translated as "Happy is whoever *says* 'I am a Turk'"—not whoever *is* a Turk. To be a Turk meant to live within the boundaries of the republic and thereby be its citizen. The very use of the word *Turk*, moreover, was a breakthrough, since it had been a derogatory term during Ottoman times, referring to the peasants of the Anatolian countryside. Thus, the word *Turk* defined a new national community into which individuals, irrespective of ethnicity, would be able to integrate. Language reform and the introduction of the Latin alphabet added to the novel character of the nation. It is against this background that every person living within the borders of the republic and accepting its basic principles was welcome to be its citizen. Immigrants to Anatolia of Caucasian or Slavic origin and indigenous populations of Kurdish, Laz, or Arabic origin all became Turks in their own right, whereas ethnically Turkish minorities outside the boundaries of the republic, in the Middle East or the Balkans, were disqualified from membership in the national community. But whereas the Turkish national conception was benign compared with the fascist ones triumphing in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, becoming a Turk entailed the suppression of an individual's own ethnic identity. In other words, Atatürk's maxim was generous in allowing everyone who desired to do so to become a Turkish citizen, but it did not provide a solution for those who were not prepared to abandon their previous identities in favor of the new national idea. This, in a nutshell, was the problem of a significant portion of the Kurdish population, which differed from the rest of the population not only because of language, but also because of its clan-based feudal social structure.

In retrospect, Atatürk's nation-building project appears to have been largely successful. Out of the melting pot of the 1920s has emerged a society in which an overwhelming majority of individuals feel a strong and primary allegiance to a Turkish identity. The only group that has escaped this process seems to have been the Kurds, though by no means all of them. In fact, a great number of Kurds, especially those that willingly or forcibly migrated to western Turkey, integrated successfully into Turkish society and adopted the

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language, values, and social organization of the republic. Kurds today are active in all spheres of social and political life, and are even present in the ranks of the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), which is often characterized in the West as fascist and anti-Kurdish. This remarkable level of assimilation can be attributed in part to the policies of the state, but clearly the ethno-linguistic heterogeneity of the Kurdish population was an additional factor.

It remains a fact, however, that the Kurds are the one ethnic group that to a large degree has retained a distinct identity. There are several reasons for this, of which a major one is demography. The Kurds are by far the largest non-Turkish-speaking group in the country. A second reason is geography: the Kurds were settled in a single area of the country that is distant from the administrative center and inaccessible because of its topography. Thirdly, the Kurds differed from other large groups such as Slavs or Caucasians in that they were an indigenous group and not comparatively recent migrants. Uprooted immigrant populations that have suffered severe upheavals and hardships are significantly more likely to embrace a new national identity than are indigenous groups. Fourthly, the Kurds, unlike other populations, were organized according to a tribal and feudal social structure, a factor that remains crucial to this day. Paradoxically, the Turkish nation-building project (with its one major exception) has been so successful that it is doubtful that state policies can still be described as seeking integration rather than assimilation. As the Turkish identity has strengthened and previous identities vanished or receded, Turkish identity itself has become more homogeneous; as such it carries the risk of growing less civic and more ethnic in nature.

The Distinctiveness of Kurdish Society

The Kurds are not a homogeneous ethnic group and evince differences in religion, language, and ways of life. In Turkey, the clear majority of the perhaps 12 million people that are referred to as Kurds are Sunni Muslims and speak Kurmandji. Nevertheless, some Kurdish groups speak Zaza, which is not mutually intelligible with Kurmandji, or adhere to the Alevi faith, a heterodox branch of Islam with strong non-Islamic features. Moreover, these groups overlap, especially in the Tunceli and Bingöl areas of Turkey, where most Kurds are both Zaza-speaking and Alevi. Hence there are important divisions among Kurds, a fact emphasized by most analysts as an important reason for their lack of political unity.[7] Even among Sunni Kurds, adherence to different religious orders (*tariqat*) has been a divisive factor. A more important element of the problem is Kurdish social organization, which has

[7] For a useful introduction, see David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 1–18.

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traditionally been, and essentially remains, tribal and feudal. The tribes, usually referred to as *ashiret* in Turkey, are "fluid, mutable, territorially oriented and at least quasi-kinship groups" that range in size between tribal confederacies of thousands of members to small units of several dozen individuals.[8] At the head of a tribe is an agha, the leader of a ruling family, who seeks to—and often does—command absolute loyalty from the members of the tribe. Tribes are often, but not always, held together by kinship ideology: an underlying myth of common ancestry, at times going back to a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, has been a strong source of legitimacy keeping the tribe together. Numerous shaykhs, or leaders of the religious orders, have also been tribal aghas, thereby exercising dual authority over their followers. Practically speaking, some tribes have nevertheless been no more than what McDowall calls "a ruling family that has attracted a very large number of clients."[9] During Ottoman times, the state used tribal leaders as a means to exert territorial control over Kurdish areas. Those that sided with the Ottomans in their wars with Persia were rewarded with the recognition of their autonomous rule over essentially semi-independent principalities, in return for which they paid an annual levy and pledged military support for the empire in times of war. A number of tribal leaders received the title of emir through such agreements.[10] But whereas tribal leaders were co-opted by the state, shaykhs and aghas also led rebellions against the state. However, the very fact of these rebellions' tribal rather than national nature led to a lack of cohesion vis-à-vis the state. When one tribal leader revolted, for example, others saw it fit to collaborate with the state to quell the rebellion. As Gérard Chaliand notes, perpetual competition was the hallmark of relations between tribes: "Allegiances can . . . fluctuate, but division itself . . . remains a constant."[11]

Moreover, the relationship between a tribal society and the state is by no means easy. As displayed not only in Kurdish-populated areas but also in places such as Afghanistan and Chechnya, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the tribal hierarchy and the modern nation-state. Tribal leaders "act as arbitrators of disputes and allocators of resources, benefits and duties . . . [and] jealously guard [their] monopoly of all relations with the outside world."[12] A centralized state is a direct threat to tribal leaders' authority because by definition it seeks to exercise direct control over all citizens. There are two basic ways for a state to exercise control over predominantly tribal areas: either to break down the tribal structures and integrate the population into the social structures of the state, or to co-opt

[8] See, for example, Jack David Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 149–51.

[9] McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 15–16.

[10] See Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State* (Utrecht: Rijswijk, 1978).

[11] *Gérard Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy*, trans. Philip Black (London: Zed Books, 1994).

[12] McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 15.

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tribal leaders and use them as instruments of power in the tribal areas. Most states facing this dilemma have employed a mixture of these two strategies, often playing tribal leaders against one another. Needless to say, the strategy of breaking down tribal structures risks provoking armed resistance on the part of the tribal leaders, and so the Turkish republic, much like the Ottoman Empire before it, adopted a strategy of co-optation. Among the numerous members of parliament from the predominantly Kurdish southeast, many if not most belong to families of feudal lords or are endorsed by them. This is especially the case for the rightist parties with an origin in the now-defunct Democratic Party (Demokrat Partisi—DP).[13] In the southeast, where it is not uncommon to find up to 80 percent electoral support for a given political party in one province and equally strong backing for a different party in a neighboring province, such curious parliamentary election results should be interpreted with that history in mind.[14] A tribal leader's endorsement of one party is likely to ensure the votes of an overwhelming majority of tribal members. It is small wonder, then, that the political leaders in Ankara have resorted to the policy of co-optation, which not only is much safer than trying forcibly to break down tribal structures, but also carries the distinct advantage of winning large numbers of votes without significant campaigning. Turkish governments until the 1990s therefore had little incentive to integrate southeastern Anatolia socially with the rest of the country.[15]

Whereas this strategy has been beneficial both for Ankara and the tribal leaders, it has been less so for the Kurdish population as a whole. The Kurdish areas have consistently lagged behind the rest of Turkey in terms of economic development, due largely to the preservation of the tribal structures and the neglect of the central government. Tribal leaders, of course, have an interest in preventing rapid modernization, which would inevitably weaken the traditional social structures that perpetuate their power. As a result, they have in all likelihood encouraged a certain lack of attention to their region on the part of central authorities. This is not to say that the rapid development of Turkish society has wholly bypassed the Kurds. Although the government may have neglected the area, considerable development has taken place, especially through the introduction of nationally standardized educational norms and compulsory military service, and through the spread of mass media, which have all brought dramatic changes to the perceptual environment of a generation of Kurds. In addition, as noted above, numerous Kurds have migrated to urban areas in western Turkey. Some of them left the

[13] The present-day center-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi—DYP), Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi—FP), and Nationalist Movement Party all originate from the DP, which existed from 1950 to 1960.

[14] For the 1995 elections, see Harald Schüler, "Parlamentswahlen in der Türkei" (Parliamentary elections in Turkey), *Orient*, vol. 37, no. 2 (1996).

[15] See Erik Cornell, *Turkey in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges, Opportunities, Threats* (Richmond, U.K.: Curzon Press, 2000), p. 101.

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southeast in search of better economic conditions and others were relocated by the state in an effort to integrate Kurds into society, but in both cases the result was to expose thousands of young Kurds to previously alien ways of living and thinking. In this context, leftist ideologies have had a specific attraction to many of the Kurds who have studied in Turkish universities since the 1960s.

The Militant PKK

Kurdish rebellions before World War II had a strong tribal and religious character that often overshadowed the national component, but in the postwar period this pattern underwent significant change. Turkey held its first multiparty election in 1950, resulting in the electoral defeat of Atatürk's Republican People's Party and a transfer of power to the center-right DP. The new government allowed exiled shaykhs and aghas to return, co-opting them into the system as outlined above.[16] The strengthened position of tribal leaders gave further impetus to the migration of Kurds to the urban areas of western Turkey, where a number of them benefited from the increasingly market-oriented economic policies of the government. Within a short time, a movement called "Eastism" (*Doguculuk*) emerged, advocating economic development efforts in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. After the military coup of 1960, a new and more liberal constitution was adopted that included substantial protections for democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights. Indeed, the 1961 constitution (which was superseded in 1982) was the most liberal that Turkey has ever had. These freedoms led to a mushrooming of leftist activity among Kurds and others in Turkey. Although more-radical groups with various Marxist-Leninist affiliations emerged, the most prominent was the Workers' Party, whose public statements calling attention to an oppressed Kurdish minority eventually led to its closure.[17] Meanwhile, the increasing stature of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in northern Iraq and the rise of Kurdish nationalism there had a profound effect on more right-wing Kurdish activities in Turkey. From the 1960s onward, therefore, one can speak of a clear ideological division among politically active Kurds. A Marxist wing cooperated with ideological brethren of Turkish origin and often formed parts of Turkish-dominated groups, while a more traditionally nationalistic wing identified closely with Barzani's KDP. A main item on the agenda of the leftist Kurds was the socioeconomic restructuring of the southeast into a more equitable society through the dismantling of tribal institutions and, in its more extreme versions, the creation of a socialist system. This agenda was naturally anathema to the

[16] McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 396–400.

[17] See Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 90. The Workers' Party is unrelated to the PKK.

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right-wing groups, which were closely linked to the tribal hierarchy. The right-wing Kurdish nationalists nevertheless failed to prevail for two main reasons: internal tribal divisions among them weakened their strength and appeal, and both their main leaders were forced into exile after the 1971 military intervention and eventually assassinated in northern Iraq. During the 1970s, leftist radicalization intensified as migration to urban areas of western Turkey continued and enrollment in higher education increased. These parallel processes heightened awareness of economic and political disparities between the southeast and the rest of the country, and Kurds were socioeconomically predisposed to be absorbed into the leftist climate predominant among the student body in Turkish universities. Gradually, however, Kurdish leftists became alienated from their Turkish colleagues and formed separate political movements.

Having its origins in an informal grouping around Abdullah Öcalan dating back to 1973, the PKK was formally established as a Marxist-Leninist Kurdish political party in 1978 and advocated the creation of a Marxist Kurdish state. From the outset, the PKK defined Kurdish tribal society as a main target of the revolutionary struggle. It described Kurdistan as an area under colonial rule, where tribal leaders and a *comprador* bourgeoisie colluded to help the state exploit the lower classes. In particular, it advocated a revolution to "clear away the contradictions in society left over from the Middle Ages," including feudalism, tribalism, and religious sectarianism.[18] It should be noted that in the 1990s the PKK toned down its Marxist rhetoric and instead emphasized Kurdish nationalism in the hopes of attracting a larger following among Turkish Kurds. Marxism-Leninism found little resonance among the population in agricultural, rural southeastern Turkey.

The PKK suffered heavily from the 1980 military coup, and Öcalan and some associates fled Turkey for Syria and the Beka'a Valley of northern Lebanon. But the repression of other leftist and Kurdish movements allowed the PKK to emerge as the sole credible Kurdish challenger to the state, and with the start of military operations in 1984, the PKK left Turkish Kurds with few choices. Unless they decided to stay out of politics completely, Kurds were forced either to side with the state, thereby expanding their opportunities as Turkish citizens at the price of suppressing their ethnic identity, or else join the PKK and fight the state. Any option ranging between these two extremes became highly dangerous, since any form of *peaceful* advocacy of Kurdish rights would attract the wrath of both the state and the PKK. The Turkish state painted itself into a corner by equating virtually all expressions of Kurdish identity with PKK terrorism. The PKK, in turn, suffered from several drawbacks that would ultimately precipitate its demise. Most signifi-

[18] See Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 60. For details on the PKK's ideology and tactics, see Michael Radu's article, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," in this issue of *Orbis*.

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cantly, its violence against the very population it claimed to represent disillusioned many Kurds, who saw little difference between the repressive Turkish state organs and a repressive PKK. To this should be added the megalomania that has been attributed to Öcalan. Beyond disallowing intra-party opposition, Öcalan developed a true personality cult around himself, leading other Kurdish leaders to abandon him as a madman. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the northern Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), stated that "Öcalan is possessed by a *folie de grandeur* . . . he is a madman, like a dog looking for a piece of meat." The other Iraqi Kurdish leader, Masoud Barzani of the KDP, compared him to the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.[19] Thirdly, the PKK's Marxist-Leninist ideology, which never really commanded much enthusiasm in Kurdish society at the outset, became a liability after the collapse of communism worldwide. Fourthly, despite its ideological zeal, the PKK failed to stay out of the tribal politics it aimed to destroy. In light of the authority commanded by tribal leaders, the PKK was forced to negotiate with the aghas, since winning over a tribal leader meant winning the support of the whole tribe, an advantage the PKK could not afford to forgo. As a result, the PKK had a stake in preserving tribal structures.[20] A fifth source of weakness derived from the westward migrations that were partly a result of the war. By the mid-1990s only a minority of Turkey's Kurds actually lived in the southeast. The sixth and final flaw was that the prospect of a separate Kurdish state did not enjoy the support of a majority of Kurds. The failure of the Kurdish "Federated State" in northern Iraq in the early 1990s, which culminated in economic misery and factional infighting, heightened the appeal of remaining within Turkey, especially as Turkish attempts to gain membership in the European Union were likely to bring increased democratization and economic development.

Most Kurds do not desire a separate Kurdish state.

The longevity and intensity of the PKK rebellion are partly explained by the party's organizational skills and the support it managed to muster as a result of dissatisfaction among Kurds in Turkey. Of equal or greater importance, however, has been the PKK's mobilization of international resources, which can be divided into three basic categories: support from Kurds in exile, primarily in Western Europe; financial resources stemming from the narcotics trade; and indirect and direct support from states with an interest in weakening Turkey. Reliable PKK support has come from the Kurdish communities in Western Europe, especially Germany and, to a lesser degree, Sweden, where it has commanded the loyalty of a majority of exiled Kurds. This is not surprising, given that Kurds in exile include large numbers of politically motivated migrants, and given that the political mobilization of Kurds in

[19] See Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled* (New York: Overlook Press, 1998), p. 261.

[20] Ismet G. Imset, *PKK: Ayrilikçi Siddetin 20 Yili* (The PKK: Twenty years of separatist terror) (Ankara: TDN, 1992).

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Europe, including the (sometimes forced) levy of "taxes," is considerably easier than in Turkey, where state restrictions are far more stringent.[21] As concerns the drug trade, significant circumstantial evidence suggests that the PKK derives a large part of its financing from the production, refining, and smuggling of illicit narcotics to Europe, although the importance of the drug factor in the PKK rebellion should not be overestimated.[22]

Unquestionably, the most important factor in the PKK's survival has been the support of several foreign countries. During the 1980s the PKK was funded mainly by its ideological brethren in the Soviet Union. Evidence that other states supported or tolerated its operations on their soil has also surfaced, notably Greece, Iran, and Greek Cyprus. The PKK's most crucial and stable ally, however, has been Syria, which hosted Öcalan for twenty years and provided training facilities in the Beka'a Valley of Syrian-controlled northern Lebanon. Syria's reasons for opposing Turkey are manifold.[23] Most fundamental is a border dispute over the Hatay province, which is claimed by Syria but was ceded to Turkey by France (Syria's League of Nations mandatory) in 1939. Furthermore, Turkey's economic development program for southeastern Anatolia, which was inaugurated in the 1980s, planned to use water from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to irrigate large tracts of the arid region. Syria, fearing this would jeopardize its own access to water from the Euphrates, increased its support not only for the PKK, but also for Armenian terrorist organizations targeting Turkey.[24] Syria's role as the PKK's main patron became increasingly evident as the Soviet Union dissolved. Although Russia has utilized the PKK as a lever against Turkey, especially to deter possible Turkish support for Chechen insurgents, Russian support in no way approaches that which the Soviet Union provided in the 1980s.[25] It is doubtful whether the PKK could have attained anything close to the position it did without foreign support.

Whereas the end of the Cold War entailed a series of problems for the PKK, the Persian Gulf War was highly beneficial. The coalition against Iraq and Operation Provide Comfort for all practical purposes removed northern Iraq from Baghdad's jurisdiction, and a U.S.-backed Kurdish "Federated State" was created there. At the heart of this new entity was a power-sharing agreement between Barzani's KDP and Talabani's PUK, an arrangement achieved partly through the efforts of the Turkish government, which stepped

[21] Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 30.

[22] Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, "The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties, Prospects," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 4 (1997), p. 440; Nur Bilge Criss, "The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1995), pp. 17–38.

[23] See Süha Bölükbasi, "Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the Regionalization of Turkey's Kurdish Secessionism," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Summer 1991, pp. 15–36.

[24] See Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1991), p. 50.

[25] Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 3, no. 4 (1996), pp. 106–18.

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in as a patron of the deal in order to keep the PKK out of the area. However, conflicts between the KDP and PUK prevented the scheme from being implemented, and northern Iraq became a power vacuum, which coincided nicely with the aims of the PKK. Öcalan's organization soon based its operations there, and by 1994 it had managed to deny the Turkish state effective control of large tracts of its southeastern territory.[26] At the same time, the Turkish army's demonstrable lack of preparation for mountain and guerrilla warfare undermined discipline in the ranks. As soldiers continually failed to differentiate between civilians and rebels, the PKK enjoyed increasing popular support.

But the situation began to change in the mid-1990s. The Turkish army, having apparently realized the importance of not alienating the civilian population, emphasized discipline within the ranks and initiated a public-relations campaign that included the introduction of health and educational facilities for the population of the southeast. Meanwhile, the Turkish military eventually adapted successfully to guerrilla warfare (in stark contrast to the disastrous performance of the Russian army in Chechnya at roughly the same time) and gathered enough strength to strike the problem at its roots in northern Iraq. Since 1995, regular and massive troop incursions (some involving up to 35,000 troops) and the establishment of a security zone reminiscent of the Israeli zone in southern Lebanon have caused the PKK's position in northern Iraq to wither away. By 1998 the PKK's only lifeline was Syria. Spurred by its alliance with Israel, the Turkish government felt strong enough to threaten Syria with war unless it expelled Öcalan and the PKK bases in the Beka'a Valley. Unable to rule out the prospect of Israel's joining a Turkish punitive expedition, Damascus complied and expelled Öcalan in October 1998. After the PKK's forces relocated to northern Iraq, a subsequent Turkish incursion dealt a severe blow to their military capabilities. Since Öcalan's capture, his unreserved submission to Turkish authorities seems to have damaged the PKK so seriously that it is doubtful that it will ever again become a credible actor.

In sum, the PKK's intrinsic weaknesses that shrank its base of popular support, the Turkish military's change of policy toward the civilian population, and especially Turkey's growing ability to crush the insurgents and stamp out its sources of foreign support combined to defeat the insurgency. In late 1999 the PKK declared its withdrawal from Turkish territory and in early 2000 publicly laid down its arms, apparently emulating the PLO by trying to gain recognition as a political movement instead.

[26] See Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 161–67.

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The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Democratization

Having defeated the PKK, Turkey has still not resolved its Kurdish question, since the PKK never represented the opinions of a majority of Turkey's Kurds. Although few reliable sources are available on Kurdish attitudes, there is conclusive evidence that only a minority of Kurds see the PKK as their main representative organ and that the majority desires to remain within the Turkish state. In the PKK's heyday in 1992, a poll conducted in the southeast showed that only 29 percent of the population viewed the PKK as the best representative of the Kurdish people.[27] Moreover, a great part of the Kurdish population has taken on Turkish identity in whole or in part. Indeed, Kurds in Turkey have three options: to reject Turkish identity altogether, to accept it in its civic version while retaining their Kurdish ethnic identity (which amounts to integration), or to accept Turkish identity in both its civic and ethnic forms (which amounts to assimilation). A 1993 poll showed that over 13 percent of Istanbul's population claimed Kurdish roots, while 3.9 percent considered themselves Kurds, and 3.7 percent identified themselves as "Turks with Kurdish parents." Apparently, the remainder considered themselves simply "Turks." Even accounting for the less-than-ideal polling conditions at the height of the conflict (including state restrictions on expressions of Kurdish identity), this outcome clearly shows that a significant number of Kurdish people have integrated into Turkish society.

That said, these figures should not be taken as evidence corroborating the view that Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem. Clearly, a large portion of the Kurdish population feels a significant frustration at the state-imposed restrictions on cultural and other rights. However, these figures do show that any solutions based on autonomy or federalism, which have often been advocated by outsiders, are obsolete. Since a majority of Kurds live in western parts of Turkey or are otherwise integrated into Turkish society, autonomy and federalism are impractical alternatives. Moreover, despite the bitterness of the armed conflict, tensions on the grassroots level between Turks and Kurds remain low. Any solution that would institutionalize ethnic distinctiveness would therefore risk fueling ethnic antagonism.[28]

The solution to the Kurdish question, pragmatically speaking, depends on several factors. First, the Turkish state needs to act in accord with its own rhetoric stipulating that the Kurdish issue is distinct from PKK terrorism. With the PKK militarily vanquished and Öcalan behind bars, the time has come for Turkey to accelerate its democratization, including the

[27] See *Milliyet*, Sept. 6, 1992, for the results of the poll; and Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: C. Hurst, 1997), pp. 245–48.

[28] On the perils of autonomy, see Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy: A Catalyst of Conflict in the Caucasus?" paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, Apr. 2000 (http://www.geocities.com/svantec/ASNCornell.pdf). Also see Henry J. Steiner, "Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities," *Notre Dame Law Review*, vol. 66 (1991), pp. 1539–60.

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removal of restrictions on cultural rights. Turkey has long opposed any easing of its strict legislation governing terrorism, freedom of expression, and cultural rights, and justifies its position with the argument that reform would imply concessions to terrorists.[29] Now that the specter of PKK terrorism has significantly diminished, a window of opportunity has emerged for the country to press forward with reforms on human rights and democratization. In so doing, Turkey could take significant steps to prevent separatist organizations from receiving popular support, and it could do so with little risk of harming its own interests. Some activists claim that Turkey should permit school instruction in Kurdish and other minority languages, but such provisions may be counterproductive. Lack of command of the state language has proven to be a major socioeconomic impediment in countries where similar policies have been in effect, such as the Soviet Union. While retaining its unitary state structure and preserving Turkish as the sole official language of the state and the medium of education in schools, the liberalization of language laws to allow private and supplementary school instruction in minority languages would enable Kurds (and others) to retain their identity while integrating with society. Television broadcasts in Kurdish would serve a similar purpose and deal a significant blow to the PKK-aligned channel MED-TV, which (via satellite from Europe) has had a virtual monopoly on Kurdish-language programming. If the Turkish government allowed private or state-controlled Kurdish media to exist, its ability to influence the local population would increase significantly, as some high Turkish officials have acknowledged. Such measures would also improve Turkey's image in the West. In its relations with the European Union and international human rights bodies, Turkey's very defeat of the PKK rebellion makes it increasingly difficult to justify restrictions on cultural rights. An even more important step, however, would be to lift the state of emergency in the southeast. Until that happens, the country is effectively split into two juridically, with a significantly stricter legal system applied in one part of the country.

With Öcalan behind bars, Turkey needs to accelerate its democratization.

In this context, the role of Kurdish political parties deserves mention. Most Kurdish-oriented parties in the 1990s have been closed by the Constitutional Court due to alleged links to the PKK. Presently the People's Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi—HADEP) is under the same threat. However, the results of the 1999 general elections indicate the wide popularity of HADEP in the southeast. Although the party received only 4.7 percent of the total votes in the parliamentary election, this poor showing is largely related to the 10 percent threshold for representation in the parliament. With little chance of attaining that level nationwide, many voters

[29] On human rights problems and legislation in Turkey, see Dilnewaz Begum, *International Protection of Human Rights: The Case of Turkey*, report no. 43 (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of East European Studies, 1998).

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concluded that a vote for HADEP was wasted. Results in the simultaneous municipal elections suggested a different picture. In many towns in the southeast, including the large cities of Van and Diyarbakir, HADEP candidates won landslide victories with up to 70 percent of the vote. This is a clear sign that large parts of the population of the southeast strongly favor a democratic representative of Kurdish rights. State attempts to destroy HADEP, either by closing down the party through legal measures or through the harassment or arrest of its leaders, are thus likely to be counterproductive. Removing the possibility of a democratic outlet for Kurdish sentiment will only fuel new illegal movements or enable the PKK to regain some strength. Despite its sometimes warranted suspicions, the state needs to tolerate and, if possible, engage HADEP and other democratic Kurdish movements instead of suppressing them.

Secondly, the economic measures consistently touted by the Turkish state must be realized. After the capture of Öcalan, the government did launch yet another large-scale investment program for the southeast, and as a result there is now a distinct possibility to attract foreign investments to the region. However, the government must take measures to ensure that development benefits the entire population and not just the tribal leaders who own most of the land and industry. Development efforts that enrich only aghas and their client networks but not the Kurdish population as a whole could provide a spark for a social explosion. The educational system, which suffered greatly from the war, also needs to be reestablished so that the Kurdish region's population can compete on equal terms in the increasingly competitive Turkish society.

Finally, the crucial issue for both democratization and economic development is the proper implementation of existing legislation. Previously, Turkey's main problem stemmed not from the legislation itself, but from a state bureaucracy that was often unable or unwilling to implement reforms. There is, however, reason to hope that this problem may be somewhat alleviated in the future. Civil associations in Turkey are growing in strength and exerting increasingly effective pressure on the government. At the same time, the end of large-scale hostilities should increase the transparency of state organs. The election of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a prominent democrat from the judicial establishment, to the country's presidency could also have a positive effect in this context.

The multifaceted Kurdish question is central to Turkey's future, including its relations with the European Union. Its international ramifications, moreover, make it an issue of utmost importance in the regional politics of the Middle East. However, the issue is often understood or depicted in simplistic ways. A deeper understanding of the matter must take into account the tribal character of Kurdish society, the dynamics of the PKK rebellion's rise and fall, and the larger context of Turkey's ongoing democratization. It is noteworthy that the current Turkish government is dominated by parties

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generally branded as "nationalist." Besides the MHP, the Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit is a center-left party with strong nationalist tendencies. However, the electoral victory of these two parties in the 1999 general elections should not be dismissed as "a nationalist wind" sweeping through the country after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan.[30] The anticorruption profile of these two parties and the infighting of the center-right played at least as important a role as the seizure of Öcalan. Nevertheless, the dominant political forces in Turkey today subscribe to a definition of the Kurdish problem that denies its ethnic dimension. Although the current government promotes economic development programs in the southeast, it seems unwilling, close to two years after Öcalan's capture, to release the pressure on Kurdish-oriented political parties or to consider the easing of cultural restrictions. Without broadening its understanding of the Kurdish question and the measures needed to address it, the government is unlikely to resolve this problem. The Turkish state must therefore take advantage of the opportunity created by its victory over the PKK, because conditions have never been better to address the Kurdish question constructively and bring an end to the political instability and economic backwardness of southeastern Turkey. Having won the war, Turkey now needs to win the peace.

[30] For a development of this argument, see Svante E. Cornell, "Turkey: Return to Stability?" *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4 (1999), pp. 209–34.

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The Land of Many Crossroads

The Rise and Fall of the PKK

by Michael Radu

In 1992 Turkey was in the midst of a war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK), whose forces were credibly estimated to be 10,000 strong.[1] In 1996 the journalist Franz Schurmann called the PKK "the biggest guerrilla insurgency in the world," and wrote of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, that "he alone among Kurdish leaders understands that a social revolution is going on in Kurdish society everywhere. . . . Öcalan will go down in the history books as the Saladin of the late 20th century."[2] By the summer of 1999, however, senior officers of the Turkish military and *Jandarma* (militarized police) estimated the PKK's total strength inside the country at 1,500 and declining rapidly.[3] In May 2000 the *Turkish Daily News* reported that "PKK armed militants have largely left Turkish territory after the PKK executive council called on them to cease armed struggle and leave Turkey."[4]

What brought about such a dramatic decline in just three years? Three developments provide a short, albeit incomplete, answer: the February 1999 capture of Öcalan, the PKK's founder and uncontested leader; the increasing disenchantment of Turkey's Kurdish citizens with the PKK's armed struggle; and dramatic changes in the regional balance of power in the Middle East, which weakened the PKK's traditional supporters. Of these, the capture of Öcalan in Nairobi, Kenya, by Turkish commandos was the most obviously

[1] Franz Schurmann, "Kurdish Leader Is Key Player," *San Francisco Examiner*, Sept. 5, 1996, posted by Kurdistan Web Resources (http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~rdemirb1/PUBLIC/Leader.html). Except where otherwise noted, all web sites cited in this article were accessible as of October 2000.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Author's interviews in Sirnak and Van provinces, June 1999.

[4] "PKK Looks for Route Out of Turkey," *Turkish Daily News*, May 18, 2000, posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://homepages.go.com/~heyvaheft1999/18-5-00-TDN-pkk-route-out.html). Many stories from the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://www.kurdistanobserver.com) are archived elsewhere. See especially (http://homepages.go.com/~heyvaheft1999/Archive-News.html) and (http://www.mnsi.net/~mergan95/).

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devastating blow, but was in fact symptomatic of military and political troubles that were years in the making. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that, after fifteen years of safe haven in Syria, Öcalan was on the run and desperately seeking asylum in Africa.

The PKK's evident vulnerability in the late 1990s raises the question of the depth and strength of its support among the Kurdish population, which had long been considered the source of the party's military and political successes over a decade and a half. The far from simple answer is that the degree of PKK support is a matter of definition. While some Kurdish clans actively backed Öcalan's party, others rejected it and joined the government's efforts to combat it. Clearly, then, the hitherto widespread impression of the PKK as a grassroots movement with broad popular support needs revisiting. To arrive at a greater understanding of the origins, ideology, leadership, and goals of the PKK, this article will rely heavily on the PKK's own statements and documents—all freely available on the Internet.[5] Obviously, such material constitutes propaganda rather than objective analysis, but that does not limit its value. To the contrary, what the PKK wants the world to know about it says a great deal about the way it sees itself.

Ideology, Leadership, and Strategy

On occasion, the PKK has presented itself as the defender and chief advocate of Kurdish nationalism. Its weak claim to such a position, however, reveals not any true conviction, but rather astute political instincts and sheer opportunism. Since the beginning, the PKK has been Marxist-Leninist in its ideology, Stalinist in its leadership style, and Maoist in its strategy for the conquest of power.

Marxism, not Kurdish nationalism, has always defined the PKK. Given that the founders of the PKK included ethnic Turks as well as Kurds, their common interest was never based on ethnicity. The history of the PKK, as portrayed in the records of its congresses prior to Öcalan's capture in February 1999, makes abundantly clear the party's unwavering loyalty to Marxism-Leninism. Most important is the "Fifth Victory Congress" of January 1995, which called attention to the importance of ideology in the life of Kurds—and the importance of the PKK in the progress of socialism across the globe.[6] In the two major documents that emerged from that congress, the "Brief History of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)" and the "Party Program of the PKK," the organization portrays itself as the "vanguard of the global socialism

[5] Most of the information here is taken from the PKK's own "Brief History of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)" (http://www.guerilla.hypermart.net/archives/pkkhist.htm). Site no longer accessible in October 2000, but see note 7 below.

[6] See "PKK Fifth Victory Congress" (http://www.kurdstruggle.org/pkk/information/congress.html).

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movement, even though the Party hasn't yet come to power."[7] Perhaps to shore up its claim to the leadership of socialism internationally, the program states that the PKK from the very beginning tried to enlist support in other countries; that "a new phase of socialism" has begun; and that the PKK "is the embodiment of one of the most significant socialist movements during this new phase."[8] It is important to consider the timing of that statement—a decade after Mikhail Gorbachev initiated *perestroika* and *glasnost*, and six years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. What had the PKK to say about those events? It claimed that "Soviet socialism was a kind of deviation," and went so far as to call it "rough," "wild," and even "primitive." By contrast, "the PKK's approach to socialism is scientific and creative."[9]

The arrogance manifest in such declarations can be attributed directly to Öcalan's leadership style, which in its megalomania and iron-fisted grip on power borrows heavily from Stalin. Öcalan, simply put, created a personality cult with himself as its focal point, and has made his own name virtually synonymous with that of the organization he heads. He has always been identified as the sole author of any text of significant ideological impact (including all major documents of the Fifth Congress), the initiator of every political and military campaign, and the uncontested decision maker at the party's helm.[10] And yet Öcalan's personal background would seem to make him an unlikely leader of Kurdish workers, a fact that makes the PKK's purported nationalist aspirations all the more specious. Öcalan was born in 1948 into a peasant family in the mostly Kurdish village of Omerli. Significantly, his mother was not Kurdish at all, but Turkoman, and it was she (described by Öcalan as an "independent, headstrong, woman") who controlled the household and dominated his "helpless" Kurdish father. Equally notable is Öcalan's statement that his family "was poor and had lost its tribal traditions, but it continued with strong feudal values"[11]—rather a surprising admission from a self-declared socialist leader who claims to be fighting against the "colonial" oppression of Kurds. After studying at a vocational school in the provincial capital of Urfa, Öcalan moved on to Ankara Univer-

[7] "A Brief History of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)" and "Party Program of the Kurdistan Workers Party," posted at a PKK web site available through the BURN! Project from the University of California at San Diego (http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/PKK/pkk-hist.html and /PKK/pkk5-1.html). The BURN! Project's site, a major publicity outlet for violent Marxist groups around the world, was closed down in 2000 by the administration of UCSD, but was accessible in October 2000. The "Party Program" is also posted by Kurdish Struggle (http://www.kurdstruggle.org/pkk/information/index.html).

[8] "Party Program."

[9] Ibid.

[10] Among other works, Öcalan is identified as the author of the PKK's manifesto, *The Road to the Kurdistan Revolution* (1982), *Problems of the Personality and Characteristics of the Fighter* (1982), 32 volumes of political reports (1981, 1990), *The People's War in Kurdistan* (1991), and *Selected Writings* (5 volumes, 1986–92). See "Biographical Notes on Abdullah Ocalan" (http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/APO/apo-bio.html) and "Abdullah Ocalan Biographical Notes" (http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~rdemirb1/PUBLIC/serok.html).

[11] Ibid.; see also Öcalan's own account of his life as given during his 1999 trial, "My Personal Status" (http://www.xs4all.nl/~kicadam/declaration/status.html).

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sity's School of Political Science in the early 1970s, a period during which Turkish universities were involved in revolutionary activism far more than education. Öcalan spent his time learning political organizing and Marxist doctrine, and he evidently learned well. As he later put it, "I dedicated myself completely to ideological work"—which included political violence, for which he was arrested and imprisoned for a few months in 1973.

The PKK itself was founded in 1978, and Öcalan's continuous control over it was only obtained by ruthlessly eliminating potential challengers to his absolute authority. Those who threatened his leadership or simply disagreed with him faced demotion, expulsion, or death. As he euphemistically described the fate of those unfortunates at his own trial, despite "comprehensive educational and organisational efforts against them, . . . the most deviated ones of them could only be neutralised by internal struggles."[12] According to Chris Kutschera, one of Europe's most active, sympathetic, and knowledgeable analysts of the PKK, "Five or six of the [PKK's] original central committee have been physically eliminated, three others committed suicide, [and] eight are still alive, acting semi-clandestinely. . . . Others have been driven underground."[13] Moreover, the purges continued for years. Kutschera goes on to quote Selahattin Celik, the founder and first commander of the PKK's armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Artesa Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan—ARGK): "There were between 50 and 60 executions just after the 1986 Congress. In the end there was no more room to bury them!"[14] Among those "arrested" at that time was Duran Kalkan, who was later released and is now still a member of the PKK Presidential Council. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Kalkan is now rumored to have offered Ankara his surrender in exchange for amnesty.[15] Another reminder of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s is found in the career of Ali Omer Can, a Central Committee member who was arrested and tortured in the PKK's Beka'a jails in 1986 and then released and rehabilitated. After he again broke with the party and tried to establish a rival organization, the "PKK Refoundation," he was assassinated in November 1991.[16]

If Öcalan's leadership style was Stalin's, his strategy for conquest resembled Mao's. The PKK's first goal was to establish a credible military force within Turkey that would be sufficient to challenge the political power of the government. Once that was accomplished, the party would expand its control to Kurdish areas beyond Turkish borders. A unified, socialist Kurdi-

[12] "The Final Statements of Defendant Abdullah Ocalan," June 17, 1999, posted by Kurdish Struggle (http://www.kurdstruggle.org/defence/final.html).

[13] Chris Kutschera, "Disarray inside the PKK," *Middle East*, May 2000 (http://www.africasia.com/me/may00/mebf0502.htm).

[14] Ibid.

[15] "Kurdistan: La situación del PKK," *Rebelión*, Aug. 5, 2000 (http://www.rebelion/internacional/Kurdistan_pkk020800.htm).

[16] Kutschera, "Disarray inside the PKK."

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stan could then serve as a base from which to promote socialism within the region and around the world.[17] In other words, the foundation of a Kurdish state was never an ultimate goal in itself, but rather a means to spread socialism.

Specious Nationalism

If a Kurdish state was only, at best, a secondary goal for the PKK, it is important to examine the nature of its purported nationalism. Upon closer look, it becomes clear that the PKK's claim to be "the leading force in the liberation of Kurdistan" is sheer obfuscation. In reality, the organization is not representative of the Kurdish people, nor is it nationalist in any commonly understood sense.

From the PKK's beginnings, there have been several reasons to question its claim to be the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. First, as noted above, ethnic Turks were a part of the party since its inception, and in the early years the PKK counted as many Turks as Kurds among its members. Secondly, the party's official history acknowledges that already by 1980 it had difficulty recruiting Kurds in Turkey, which suggests that many Kurds' interests—*as they perceived them*—did not coincide with the PKK's own. Thirdly, Öcalan's own background makes him ill suited to be a standard-bearer of Kurdish interests. Not only was his mother of Turkoman origin, but his recent trial made clear that he never learned either of the two major Kurdish languages (Kurmandji and Zaza) and used Turkish in all communications with followers.

Power matters far more to Öcalan than does the Kurds' welfare.

Surely the most damaging fact undermining the PKK's position as the representative of Kurdish interests is the party's adversarial and often hostile relationship with Kurds throughout the region. In its efforts to gain recruits and legitimize itself in the eyes of certain segments of the Kurdish population, particularly in Tunceli province, Öcalan's party has not only exploited but exacerbated historic regional divisions and clan rivalries. Kurds under PKK attack have then sought assistance from the Turkish government and joined in its successful counterinsurgency campaign. Partially as a result of this internecine conflict, more Kurdish civilians than Turks have died during the PKK's war against Ankara, which suggests that absolute power matters far more to Öcalan than the aspirations and welfare of the people he claims to lead. His party has killed Kurds as reprisals for suspected collaboration with Ankara; it has killed Iraqi Kurds during hostilities with the two leading

[17] "PKK Fifth Party Congress Resolution on the Function of Internationalism" (http://www.kurdstruggle.org/pkk/information/internationalism.html).

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Kurdish groups there; and it has killed Kurds in Europe and Lebanon who disagreed with Öcalan or simply did not support him fervently enough.

Among other tactics, suicide bombings in Kurdish areas have figured prominently in the PKK's terror campaign and contributed to the group's reputation for indiscriminate violence. According to the Turkish government, quoting both internal PKK documents and statements by captured militants, the PKK decided at its Fifth Congress to engage in bombing, and reaffirmed the decision a year later.[18] By 1997 the group had formed "Suicide Guerrilla Teams" that relied on large numbers of potential volunteers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the "volunteers" came from the most vulnerable segments of society: the majority of the early bombings attributed to the PKK were carried out by young, impoverished, and poorly educated women.

The PKK's disregard for human life has also carried over into its collaborative arrangements with governments waging violent campaigns against their own Kurdish populations, most notably in Syria and Iraq, but also to a lesser extent in Iran. The incentive for such collusion is not immediately apparent. One PKK analysis of the general Kurdish situation acknowledges that large numbers of Kurds in Syria "play an active role" in the Kurdish struggle, and Öcalan himself admitted that during the late 1980s Syrian Kurds were an essential part of the PKK's recruitment base.[19] And yet Öcalan has not only refused to provide assistance to Kurds in Syria, he cooperated with the government in Damascus that brutally oppressed them. Similarly, for more than a decade he supported Saddam Hussein's offensives against Kurdish nationalists in northern Iraq (or "South Kurdistan," in PKK parlance). The PKK's machinations have left Kurds throughout the region, who were never united to begin with, more divided than ever.

The real motivation for PKK collaboration can be summed up as strategic necessity. The insurgents have almost always needed outside help and have been willing to accept it from any quarter. The official history of the PKK acknowledges that the group engaged in a "tactical retreat" into Syria in 1980, when Öcalan fled Turkey just ahead of a military coup that culminated in a violent crackdown on Marxists.[20] He and his followers were given relatively free rein in the Syrian-controlled Beka'a Valley in Lebanon, where they thrived. As recently as the early 1990s, the PKK took foreign journalists on Potemkin village tours of bases and training camps there. For Öcalan to have objected to his hosts' treatment of their own Kurdish population would

[18] Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor, State Security Court (DGM), *Indictment Regarding Accused Abdullah Öcalan* (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Apr. 24, 1999), prep. #1997/514, principle #1999/98, indictment #1999/78, pp. 56–60.

[19] "Party Program of the PKK. Chapter One: The World Situation" (http://kurdstruggle.org/information/chap1.html). Öcalan neglected to mention, however, that many of those recruits were in fact infiltrators working for the Syrian government. See Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 26–27.

[20] "Brief History of the PKK."

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have meant the loss of the PKK's center of operations, without which it would have never been able to threaten extensive areas of southeastern Turkey during the 1990s. Öcalan's acceptance of safe haven from Syria marked only the beginning of the PKK's heavy reliance upon support from governments that, for reasons of their own, found common cause with it. The Persian Gulf War created a power vacuum in northern Iraq, allowing the PKK to expand its influence there in competition with the existing Kurdish groups, principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Iran, because of its ambiguous position vis-à-vis Kurdish separatism in Turkey and Iraq (but never at home), likewise allowed the PKK to use Iranian territory to open new fronts along Turkey's eastern frontier. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent Armenia also provided enough help, or tolerance, for the PKK to threaten northeastern Turkey. In addition to these friendly outsiders, Greece supported, tolerated, and encouraged the PKK for more than a decade, as the circumstances surrounding Öcalan's arrest ultimately revealed.[21] It is noteworthy, however, that although outside assistance greatly enhanced the PKK's effectiveness, ultimately it was also a key factor in the party's rapid descent.

In light of the PKK's acceptance of foreign support and open opposition to other Kurds, two questions suggest themselves: On what basis can the PKK claim to be nationalist, and what advantage does it gain from doing so? Despite ample evidence to the contrary, the PKK has gone to some lengths to shore up its claim to represent Kurds—a claim that has required no small amount of logical and linguistic contortions. According to the Fifth Congress documents, the lineage of the Kurds can be traced back to the ancient Medes, who as early as the seventh century B.C. were engaged in a "long struggle which gave rise to a national consciousness," and who "played a leading role in the formation of our national values."[22] But the national consciousness touted by the PKK is not any "bourgeois" consciousness of the Kurds as an ethnically, culturally, or historically distinct group. Rather, the PKK distinguishes "reactionary nationalism" from a "socialist national consciousness" that takes into account "the fact of exploitation . . . a class characteristic."[23] Presumably, then, a Turk of an "exploited" class would be included within this "nation," whereas a Kurdish landowner would not.

This patently Leninist definition of nationalism is incompatible with the usual understanding of the concept, but has nevertheless allowed the PKK to portray itself as a Kurdish nationalist organization since the class-

[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, *Greece and PKK Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Turkish Embassy, Feb. 1999) provides an admittedly biased but largely correct analysis of Greece's support for the PKK and other terrorist groups in Turkey.

[22] "Party Program of the PKK. Chapter Two: Kurdish Society" (http://kurdstruggle.org/information/chap2.html).

[23] "Nationalism and the Kurdish National Liberation Movement" (http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/PKK/nationalism.html).

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based distinction seems largely lost on outsiders sympathetic to its calls for national self-determination. Thus, although not a single volume has been published in English on the PKK per se, the vast literature on the Kurds tends to assume, without further explanation, that the PKK is the legitimate representative of Kurdish interests. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, for example, while aware of Öcalan's Stalinist beliefs, still described the PKK as "the latest in a long line of insurgent groups which has tried over the years to obtain basic human rights for the Kurds of Turkey."[24] Michael M. Gunter describes the PKK as "first a Kurdish nationalist movement."[25]

A European Life-Support System

Here the PKK's motivation to be called "nationalist" becomes clearer: the label has proved to be a highly successful part of its public-relations campaign and its principal means of gaining a degree of legitimacy around the world. Specifically, the survival of the PKK has depended not only on the cooperation of the various governments mentioned above, but also on the active support of some Westerners and the Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe. By virtue of its being considered a nationalist organization, the PKK seems to have inoculated itself against at least some of the damage that might be expected to result from reports of its murders, insurgent attacks, and collaboration with dictators. No such news, for example, dissuaded Danielle Mitterand, the radical widow of the former French president, from addressing Öcalan as "Dear President Öcalan" in a 1998 letter, which ended "[R]est assured, Abdullah, that I am committed to be beside you in the bid for peace. Sincerely yours, Danielle Mitterand."[26] As Öcalan's attempts to find political asylum in 1998 and early 1999 proved, he also enjoyed the support of leftist parties in Italy, France, and Greece. The most insidious, if not necessarily surprising, support came from Germany's and Italy's Marxist terrorists, which supported and occasionally even joined in PKK combat operations. At least two German women became PKK members. One was killed in combat, the other was captured in 1998.[27]

Nothing better demonstrates the PKK's public-relations capabilities

[24] *No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 168.

[25] *The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 32.

[26] Danielle Mitterand, "An open letter to President Öcalan," Sept. 1, 1998, posted by the American Kurdish Information Network (http://www.kurdistan.org/Articles/dmforpeace.html).

[27] See "Juhnke to be Transferred to Amasya," *Kurdish Observer*, Dec. 28, 1999 (http://www.kurdishobserver.com/1999/12/28/hab06.html); and "ERNK Statement on the Death of Andrea Wolf," KURD-L archives, Nov. 29, 1998 (http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/kurd-l/1998.11/msg00033.html). For more details on German anarchist and "anti-fascist" groups' ties with the PKK, see (German) Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Annual Report 1997* (http://www.bmi.bund.de/publikationen/vsb1997/englisch/v97). The latter web page was no longer accessible in October 2000.

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than MED-TV, a satellite television channel that operated first under a British license from London and later from Brussels. Although it ostensibly existed to promote Kurdish culture, the channel was such a blatant propaganda outlet for the PKK (at a cost of some $200 million per year) that it was eventually expelled from Britain and later lost its operating license in Belgium as well.[28]

Its public-relations campaigns and prominent supporters gave the PKK a measure of legitimacy, but the party also needed something else: funding. It proved so adept at generating money that European assessments generally placed its annual income at between $200 and $500 million in the mid-1990s. Income came from two major sources in Europe. One was the sizable pool of West European Kurdish militants among the émigré population, especially in Germany. In 1997 Germany's Federal Ministry of the Interior estimated the number of PKK sympathizers in the country at 11,000, and claimed that the PKK possessed an ability to mobilize "tens of thousands" among the 500,000 resident Kurds.[29] The German government further stated that the PKK collected millions of marks at its annual fundraising events, including 20 million marks in 1996–97.[30]

The more important source of funds has been criminal activity, especially in Germany, Switzerland, France, Scandinavia, and the Benelux countries.[31] Operating among Europe's 800,000 Kurdish immigrants, the PKK has been involved in theft, extortion, arms smuggling, human smuggling, and heroin trafficking. Infamous for its violence, the PKK is widely known to rely on murder and beatings as enforcement measures. Apparently, its methods have had their desired effect. Some sources estimate the PKK's annual income from criminal activities at $86 million.[32] Recently, the PKK's bankrolls have likely suffered some setbacks due to the military decline of the PKK and factional disputes among the European front's leaders. One PKK representative, for example, disappeared with 2.5 million German marks in party funds and may have made them available to PKK dissidents.[33] Despite those losses, however, the magnitude of the PKK's income suggests that the group remains wealthy. It is also worth noting that in addition to providing considerable

[28] MED-TV ceased operations in 1999, but its web site was still accessible as of October 2000 (http://www.med-tv.be/med/med-tv/medhome.htm).

[29] Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Annual Report 1997.*

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Organizations* (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Aug. 1998).

[32] "Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Jan. 27, 2000 (http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=20). This source quotes the British National Service of Criminal Intelligence to the effect that in 1993 the PKK obtained 2.6 million pounds sterling from extortion and 56 million German marks from drug smuggling.

[33] "Cracks Appear in the PKK," *Turkish Daily News*, Jan. 21, 2000; and Susanne Gusten, "Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan at the Mercy of the PKK," Agence France-Presse, Jan. 13, 2000, both posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* at the following addresses (http://homepages.go.com/~heyvaheft1999/21-1-00-TDN-pkk-cracks.html and /~heyvaheft1999/13-1-00-AFP-apo-mercy-pkk.html).

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financial resources, the PKK's international criminal activities also attest to the organization's sophisticated logistical capabilities.

Foreign political support, well-padded bank accounts, and the backing of thousands of Kurds in Western Europe enabled the PKK to apply immense military and political pressure on Turkey throughout most of the 1990s. Ultimately, however, these same pillars of support pointed up the inherent weakness underlying the PKK's apparent strength. Émigrés and criminals underwrote the PKK, and prominent leftists legitimized it, but their backing never translated into the broad support of Kurds in Turkey, who were better apprised of the party's totalitarian nature.

This constellation of facts provided the kernel of the PKK's undoing, as became apparent in the late 1990s, when much of the external support started to unravel. Most prominently, Turkey's de facto alliance with Israel automatically raised the stakes for Syria's continuing support for the organization.[34] As a result, when in the summer of 1998 Ankara threatened military action because of Syrian aid to Öcalan, President Hafez al-Assad had to back down. In October of that year he expelled Öcalan and closed most PKK camps in Lebanon and Syria, including those along the Turkish border. Suddenly on the run, Öcalan had to find a new refuge farther away from his fighters (whom, one may add, he never personally joined in combat), first in Russia, then Italy and Greece. Pursued by the Turks and denied asylum in Western Europe, he accepted Greek offers to go to Nairobi, only to be captured there by Turkish commandos with Kenyan connivance and probably American and Israeli intelligence help. The Iraqi government is in no position to offer any significant assistance to the PKK, since it still does not control its own northern territories. Armenia, constrained by its vulnerability to Turkish reprisals, likewise cannot do much even if it were so inclined. Greece, apparently, was stung by the Kenya episode and U.S. criticism, and has made a concerted effort both to mute its traditional hostility toward Turkey and to limit aid to the PKK.

Ankara's Response

Deprived of external support and chronically short of it within Turkey, the PKK was left vulnerable to Ankara's crushing blows. As major insurgencies go, Turkey's campaign against the PKK is one of the few recent examples of clear victory by the state—only Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori's success against the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was similarly decisive.[35] It took Ankara sixteen years and cost

[34] See Raphael Israeli's article, "The Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple," in this issue of *Orbis*.

[35] The definitive analysis of the Shining Path is to be found in Coronel PNP Benedicto Jimenéz Bacca, *Inicio, Desarollo y Ocaso del Terrorismo en el Peru* (The beginning, development and decline of terrorism in Peru), restricted ed. (Lima: Servicios Graficos SANKI, 2000), vol. 2, pp. 759–65. See also Carlos Ivan Degregori, ed., *Las*

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some 30,000 lives, but success ultimately resulted from a combination of military astuteness, political realism, and diplomacy.

For the first six years of PKK operations, Turkish forces failed to realize the magnitude of the PKK military threat and respond adequately. Among the most effective measures taken was the militarization of virtually the entire southeast. The army and militarized police seized de facto control of daily life and managed to ingratiate themselves with the population at least in part through initiatives such as education programs for girls. But the military also won support because a large portion of the Kurdish population found the protection of the Turkish government far more attractive than the terror of the PKK and its hostility to Kurds of rival clans or differing political views. The most dramatic result of the cooperation between government and people was the "village guards," which were local Kurdish self-defense forces specifically organized to counter PKK operations. At the height of their strength, the village guards numbered some 60,000 armed civilians.

Aside from the changed relationship between the Turkish government and the population, the military also took other tactical and strategic steps to harm the Kurdish rebels. Notable in this regard was the effective use of special forces to pressure PKK groups in their mountain strongholds. In addition, heavy use of air power, mostly helicopters, hindered PKK movements in border areas where limited natural cover left the insurgents vulnerable. The army also launched massive operations in northern Iraq—often in conjunction with local KDP elements—that succeeded in denying the PKK access to its rear bases there. Finally, improvements in intelligence led to the capture of at least three major PKK leaders abroad in 1998 and 1999, the most notable, of course, being Öcalan himself.

To be sure, the Turkish military also benefited from developments that lay at least partially beyond its control. Among the most important of these was the depopulation of the countryside and concentration of Kurdish civilians in defensible centers. This dramatic shift occurred for several reasons, including PKK atrocities against civilians (mostly Kurds from clans Öcalan could not control or intimidate), the government's own military operations (damage from air attacks, in particular, forced people to relocate), and the general poverty of the southeast, which the war exacerbated. Local residents fled many of the more isolated areas and migrated to Western Europe, other parts of Turkey, or regional centers such as Diyarbakir, Van, and Sirnak. In doing so, they deprived the PKK of the recruitment, logistical, and communications assistance on which it had depended. As Öcalan himself admitted, "The PKK has not succeeded to become a regular armed force," the implication being that the PKK's inability to attract willing recruits forced it to

rondas campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso (Peasant self-defense goups and the defeat of the Shining Path) (Lima: IEP Ediciones, 1996). For a recent analysis in English, see Michael Radu, "The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas," *Orbis*, Summer 2000, pp. 363–82.

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resort to violence and intimidation, which in turn led to indiscipline and indiscriminate attacks against civilians.[36]

Ankara also pursued other policies that greatly enhanced its position vis-à-vis Öcalan's rebels. As noted above, its increasingly assertive regional diplomacy, backed by credible threats of force, led Syria to expel Öcalan and close down PKK camps on its territory and in Lebanon. Domestically, Turkish leaders, from the late president Turgut Özal to the present prime minister, Bülent Ecevit, have gradually come to acknowledge the Kurdish issue as such and—without ever accepting any PKK connection to it—have made concessions on matters related to language and cultural grievances. In addition, the government has also initiated huge investments in the southeast, exemplified by the $32 billion Southeastern Anatolia Project, to improve the long-languishing region's economic prospects.[37] Indeed, between 1983 and 1992 the southeast received twice as much investment per capita as any other region in Turkey, with total spending during that time on the Southeastern Anatolia Project reaching $20 billion.[38]

Lastly, it should be noted that strong diplomatic support from the United States helped to convince a number of West European governments, particularly the Netherlands, Greece, and Italy (and to a lesser degree Russia and Armenia), to deny Öcalan political asylum. His failure to find refuge ultimately led him to Kenya and captivity.

The Prisoner Recants?

If the dramatic progress of the campaign against the PKK within Turkey exposed the weaknesses in its support there and the inadequacy of its outside assistance, then Öcalan's incarceration revealed the flaw in the party's Stalinist leadership structure. Once the supreme commander was arrested, rifts emerged throughout the entire organization that threatened its continued existence. Even more important than his imprisonment itself, however, was the effect on the PKK of Öcalan's apparent renunciation of his entire insurgent campaign.

Ever since his arrest in Nairobi in February 1999, Abdullah Öcalan has made repeated statements contradicting the ideological, military, and political positions he has advocated since the founding of the PKK. To begin with, in his wide-ranging final statement at his trial in June 1999, he acknowledged that Kurdish society in Turkey did not fit his long-standing analysis and

[36] "Final Statements of Defendant Abdullah Ocalan."

[37] Douglas Frantz, "As Price of Progress, Turkish Villages Are Flooded," *New York Times*, Aug. 21, 2000.

[38] Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 124. For details on the $20 billion project, see Bülent Topkaya, "Water Resources in the Middle East: Forthcoming Problems and Solutions for Sustainable Development of the Region" (http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/Jungle/1805/gap.html).

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strategy. Indeed, he admitted that the PKK "should have taken into account the development the country had undergone both when it was founded and in the 1990s." More astonishing still was his giving up pursuit of "a separate part of a state, something which . . . would have been very difficult to realize—and, if realized, could not be maintained and was not necessary either."[39] In one grand stroke Öcalan delegitimized all PKK positions on matters of ideology, strategy, and tactics. In other words, a socialist Kurdistan—for which the PKK had ostensibly fought for years—was, as Chris Kutschera phrased it, a "mad dream."[40] Not only did Öcalan ask the PKK to stop fighting and withdraw from Turkish territory, but in September 1999 he also ordered the symbolic surrender of a few units to Turkish authorities.

Öcalan abruptly delegitimized the PKK's entire ideology, strategy, and tactics.

The obvious question is whether Öcalan's statements are representative of true changes of personal opinion or merely an expression of survival instincts, particularly given the prospect of capital punishment. His behavior at his trial hints at the latter, in light of his attempts to lay the responsibility for the PKK's record of violence at the feet of his field commanders by claiming that he was unable to "implement my own ideas and the official tactical line of the organization. . . . Individual or local initiatives were dominant." He even seemed to suggest that his followers' upbringing was at the root of their violence: "[I]t was hard to control the PKK . . . especially when one considers how the individuals [fighting in the PKK] had grown up."[41] He also claimed that he had never ordered or approved of suicide bombings—a dubious denial from the man who once said: "We shall come down to the cities. . . . No matter the price, it is not difficult to get on a bus, to get on an airplane. We have thousands of people who shall go with a bomb around them."[42]

It is probably impossible to determine the degree to which Öcalan's about-face was due to the threat to his own life, or to a realization that the insurgency was a lost cause, or to the collapse of vital Syrian support. What is clear, however, is that, in a manner befitting a Stalinist leader, he made these extraordinary changes without consulting anyone and simply expected the party to accept them. Amazingly enough, the PKK did largely follow Öcalan's lead. Nothing better symbolized the abandonment of the goal of a separate Kurdish state than the decision by the PKK's Presidential Council in February 2000 to drop the word "Kurdistan" from the name of both its dwindling armed wing, the ARGK, and the still-strong international political

[39] "Final Statements of Defendant Abdullah Ocalan."

[40] Chris Kutschera, "Mad Dreams of Independence: The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK," *Middle East Report*, July–Aug. 1994, posted by the Kurdish Information Network (http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/lib/dream.html).

[41] "Final Statements of Defendant Abdullah Ocalan."

[42] *Indictment Regarding Accused Abdullah Öcalan*, p. 58. The PKK occasionally mentioned having as many as 3,000 would-be suicide bombers.

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wing, the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Natewa Kurdistan—ERNK). Thus, the ARGK became the People's Defense Force, and the ERNK became the Democratic People's Union.[43] The personality cult constructed around Öcalan, which had for so long given the PKK its unity, coherence, and purpose, ultimately allowed it to be undermined rapidly.

High-ranking Turkish military officials professed surprise at Öcalan's apparent change of heart.[44] In actuality, however, it matches rather closely the behavior of the Shining Path's founder and supreme leader, Abimael Guzmán, who renounced armed struggle after his own arrest. In both cases the result was similar: the party faithful, having lost their ideological anchor, became confused and descended into factionalism and intraparty violence. The Shining Path suffered defeat; the ultimate fate of the PKK is not yet known.

Many PKK hardliners found Öcalan's newly conciliatory stance intolerable. Subsequent to his orders issued from captivity, and particularly his lengthy concluding statement at trial, dissent within the ranks of the party appeared almost immediately from among Kurds in Europe as well as fighters in and around Turkey. An anonymous group that called itself the "PKK revolutionary line fighters" issued a starkly worded rejection of Öcalan's call for some PKK combatants to surrender to Turkish forces: "At this junction, we will either be simple executor of this plan, and therefore we would kill ourselves, or we will say 'No' with all our force against this liquidation plan."[45] Some of the most prominent PKK hardliners, including former Central Committee members and other leaders, accused Öcalan of no less than "treason." In proof of their opposition to his decisions since capture, they established the "Kurdish Initiative in Europe," which was intended as a possible alternative to the ERNK. They also threw their support to Hamili Yildirim, a Central Committee member and field commander from Tunceli province who refused to obey Öcalan's call for a general retreat.[46] Yildirim joined forces with Turkish Communist Party elements and continued fighting Turkish security forces.[47] Significantly, the dissident group chose January 12, 2000, for one such attack—the very date the Turkish government coalition was to decide whether to execute or give a reprieve to Abdullah Öcalan. In view of Turkish public sentiment in favor of execution, those attacks could be seen as nothing but an attempt to have Öcalan killed. However, Yildirim's rebellion did not last. By May 2000 security forces had killed one of his fellow

[43] "PKK dropping the word 'Kurdistan' from the names of new wings," Associated Press, Feb. 9, 2000, posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://homepages.go.com/~heyvaheft1999/10-2-00-AP-pkk-dropping-kurdistan.html).

[44] Author's interviews with army and *Jandarma* officials in Diyarbakir, Sirnak, Van, and Eruh, June 1999.

[45] "Statement from 'PKK revolutionary line fighters,'" KURD-L archives, Nov. 12, 1999 (http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/kurd-l/1999.11/msg00000.html).

[46] Kutschera, "Disarray inside the PKK."

[47] "Cracks Appear in the PKK."

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commanders and wounded Yildirim himself, whereupon he returned to the PKK fold and reintegrated his troops into the PKK's "Public Self-defense Force," although they did not disarm. That outcome, in fact, demonstrates the disingenuous nature of Öcalan's current position: he has ostensibly renounced armed struggle, but continues to encourage "self-defense" and overlooks the PKK forces still active in northern Iraq.

For a group notoriously intolerant of internal dissent, it is not surprising that the PKK leadership has taken exceptional measures to ensure that its orders are followed. The party dispatched Presidential Council member Murat Karayilan to the Netherlands in 1999, ostensibly to seek political asylum, but in reality to enforce Öcalan's will among Kurds in Western Europe.[48] In early 2000 the PKK Presidential Council simply decided to abolish the Free Women's Movement of Kurdistan (Yekityia Azadiya Jinen Kurdistan—YAJK), which had long supplied the movement with suicide bombers and assassins, because of the YAJK's leaders' objections to Öcalan's "capitulationist" stance. Intimidation and credible threats of violence are also commonly used to enforce the party line. In 1998 Semdin Sakik, a Central Committee member and ARGK field commander, was expelled from the party and forced to flee to pro-Turkish areas in northern Iraq after facing death threats for disagreeing with Öcalan.[49] When it cannot silence dissidents, the PKK has also tried to discredit them. Sakik, for example, is now accused by the PKK of having sabotaged Öcalan's 1993 cease-fire declaration by attacking and killing some thirty unarmed Turkish recruits. This particular claim, however, is belied by the fact that he was reelected to the Central Committee in 1995—two years after his alleged transgression. In another case, Öcalan tried to destroy his estranged wife, Yesire Yildirim, and her brother Huseyn (who are not related to Hamili Yildirim), who had been expelled from the party in 1986, by accusing the pair of murdering Swedish prime minister Olof Palme—an unproven and probably unprovable charge.

Yet for all its efforts, the PKK has still not entirely succeeded in silencing its disgruntled members. Some of the most telling statements have come from a co-founder of the ARGK, Selahattin Celik, who was beaten up by PKK supporters in Cologne after criticizing Öcalan's behavior in captivity. In an interview given in Germany following that attack, he said,

> Most Kurds simply cannot understand this [Öcalan's statements since his capture]. And yet no one is allowed to raise their voice in opposition to this new line. While the PKK makes one concession after another to the Turkish state, they damn people who demand democracy in their own ranks and in Kurdish society.[50]

[48] Kutschera, "Disarray inside the PKK."

[49] In April 1998 Turkish special forces captured Semdin Sakik in a KDP-controlled part of northern Iraq and brought him to Turkey, where he was tried and sentenced to death. He now, like his former leader, awaits a decision of the European Court of Justice regarding his fate.

[50] Jorg Hilbert, "Interview with Selahattin Celik on the PKK," *Junge Welt*, Sept. 25, 1999, KURD-L archives, Oct.

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In a view paradoxically shared by Ankara, Celik went on to state that the "Kurdish issue could increasingly become separated from the PKK . . . [and] contradictions could surface within the PKK, which would make internal clashes unavoidable."[51] In other words, the PKK could lose its relevance and descend into yet another round of purges.

What Future for the PKK?

Currently, however, as Öcalan faces the (admittedly unlikely) prospect of execution and his beleaguered party confronts political and military pressure on almost all fronts, the PKK leadership seems to understand that it cannot afford costly strife within its own ranks. In an August 2000 interview, Cemil Bayik, the only remaining PKK founder at large and the most prominent member of the Presidential Council, announced a new strategy that emphasized "deepening party unity and national unity, adding new circles of friends to those that already exist, strengthening solidarity with the regional people, and securing internal peace among the Kurds."[52] It would appear, then, that the PKK may seek common ground with erstwhile rivals and dissidents. But his statement was by no means completely conciliatory. Bayik, Öcalan's closest collaborator, lashed out at rivals among Kurds in Iraq and had harsh criticism for those within and outside the party who sought to "tear us from our beloved President" and "liquidate the party and the revolution and sell out the people." He went on to declare that the conflict with Turkey was far from over and that the PKK was "carrying on a sacred war with the genuine lords of the manservants"—the "lords" being an apparent reference to Turkey, the "manservants" being collaborators.[53] As those strident words suggest, the "strategic" changes that ostensibly announced the end of the PKK's bid for a separate Kurdish state may have actually been a tactical ploy to buy time for the PKK to regroup. In fact, according to plausible estimates from Jalal Talabani, leader of the rival PUK in northern Iraq, the PKK now has approximately 7,000 fighters in Iraq and Iran, and is currently recruiting and rearming. He added, however, that the fighters' morale was low: "I think that if there is an amnesty . . . all of them will come back to Turkey."[54]

The PKK's tenacious survival despite its declining fortunes has, of course, not escaped the notice of the Turkish government. To its credit, Ankara does not trust Öcalan's peaceful intentions or those of his lieutenants

11, 1999 (http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/kurd-l/1999.10/msg00002.html).

[51] Ibid.

[52] Cemal Ucar, "Cemil Bayik: We Will Be Victorious," *Özgür Politika*, Aug. 16, 2000, posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://www.mnsi.net/~mergan95/15-8-00-OP-interview.html).

[53] Ibid.

[54] "Talabani: There Is No Assault against the PKK," *Özgür Politika*, Aug. 5, 2000, posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://www.mnsi.net/~mergan95/7-8-00-OP-talabani-ankara-pkk.html).

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still at large and, despite Öcalan's September 1999 announcement that the party laid down its weapons, has given the PKK no quarter. In fact, recent air attacks on targets inside Iraq demonstrate the military's greater willingness to pursue the PKK wherever necessary in order to ensure its final destruction.[55] At the same time, however, Selahattin Celik's prediction has come to pass, and the Turkish government has indeed separated the Kurdish issue from the PKK. The significant political and economic changes mentioned above—most initiated since Öcalan's capture—prove that the PKK has been not an advocate for Kurds, but rather the major obstacle to political and economic development in southeastern Turkey and to Kurdish interests in general. The critical question now is whether the PKK's sympathizers and supporters in Western Europe will make a similar distinction. For only when Öcalan and his followers are deprived of funds and legitimacy will their bloody campaign truly be "neutralized," and only then will peace and genuine reconciliation have a chance for success.

[55] "Turkey Acknowledges Iraqi Air Raid, Probes Casualty Claims," Agence France-Presse, Aug. 18, 2000, posted by the *Kurdistan Observer* (http://www.mnsi.net/~mergan95/18-8-00-AFP-tky-acknowledges-raid.html).

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The Land of Many Crossroads

The Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple

by Raphael Israeli

Turkey and Israel, by all accounts the predominant powers in the Middle East, have in the past decade forged an unlikely alliance that baffles many a keen observer of the region. On the face of it, there would seem to be little historical or contemporary logic to a close relationship between the two. One is large in size and population, the other comparatively tiny. One is the well-established successor to a glorious empire, the other an embattled state whose boundaries and very existence are challenged by neighbors. One is Muslim, the other Jewish. One is just emerging from Third World status and aspiring to join the European Union, the other thoroughly modernized and well entrenched in Western culture. One is notoriously deficient with regard to international norms of human rights and the rule of law, the other a respected liberal democracy. One is subject to the whims of its military, the other supremely civilian in its demeanor.

No one would suggest that some sudden love affair suffices to explain the stunning rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Nor could one point to new common interests attracting the two to each other, because their common borders with Arab states, common stand against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, cooperation in Central Asia, and certain economic interests all pre-date the current entente and have occasionally caused as much hostility as amicability. Rather, the origins of this momentous shift, which is likely to shape the contours of Middle Eastern politics in the foreseeable future, may be found in a triad of new contingencies: the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and the technological revolution in Israel. The new configuration of regional and global forces unleashed by these three contingencies has enabled Turkey and Israel to pursue a partner-

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ship in military and civil, strategic and economic, institutional and human affairs—a close relationship founded on shared interests that has the potential to develop into an intimate and lasting rapport.

A Telescoped Chronology

The amazing development of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s stands out against the backdrop of the tenuous connection between the two countries during the preceding forty years. Turkey recognized Israel upon its birth in 1948, and in the following year, diplomatic relations began at the level of legation, meaning that ministers, not ambassadors, were exchanged. However, in November 1980, when the Knesset's passage of the Jerusalem Law caused outrage throughout the Islamic world, Turkey recalled its minister and downgraded relations to the level of second secretary, one step short of breaking off diplomatic relations completely. It was not until 1985 that they were informally restored to the minister level.

Relations between Turkey and Israel began to improve dramatically after the Gulf War and the announcement of the Madrid conference. The two nations exchanged ambassadors in November 1991, and soon afterward Israeli president Chaim Herzog visited Istanbul. When Turkish president Turgut Özal died in April 1993, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres attended the funeral in Ankara, whereupon the Turkish foreign minister traveled to Israel in November to conclude a cultural agreement. In January 1994 the president of Israel made a state visit to Turkey, followed by another official visit by the Israeli foreign minister to sign an agreement on the environment. In May 1994 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish parliament visited Israel. Six months later, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller went to Israel with seven ministers to conclude pacts on communications, law enforcement, and drugs, and apparently also to discuss broader security and strategic concerns. At least three more high-level visits took place in 1995, including Çiller's attendance at the funeral of murdered Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The diversity, frequency, and reciprocity of visits during the mid-1990s by top-level officials—a tempo without parallel even in the links Israel has maintained with the United States—suggested the importance that both Turkey and Israel ascribed to their blossoming relationship. Was the frenzy intended to make up for four decades of lost opportunities, or to catch up with growing strategic dangers, or was it simply a reaction by Turkey to its rejection by the European Community and its hope that, via Israel, it could curry favor with the United States? Whatever the motives, there was a certain paradox in the fact that from the 1950s through the 1980s, when Israel was isolated and desperately sought an alliance with "outer ring" states (including Iran and Ethiopia), Ankara shunned the Israelis, whereas in the 1990s, when Israel was actively pursuing peace, breaking up the siege that had enclosed it, and entertaining demarches from many nations, Turkey should be so eager and forthcoming.

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In the first half of 1996, further high-level visits and agreements attested to the growing strength of the relationship. But in July of that year, the Islamist head of Turkey's Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP), Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister, sparking apprehension that his commitment to an Islamic foreign policy might threaten the rapprochement. But those fears were mitigated by Çiller's retaining oversight of Turkish foreign policy as deputy prime minister. Israeli president Ezer Weizman also held consultations with leaders of several Turkish parties in Istanbul shortly after Erbakan's ascent to power, and in April 1997 Erbakan himself received Foreign Minister David Levy of Israel. In the succeeding years, reciprocal visits by leading officials ensured the continued development of the Turkish-Israeli relationship.

The event that lent a human dimension to this diplomacy was the series of tragic earthquakes that shook western Turkey in the summer of 1999, causing widespread death and destruction. In an effort out of all proportion to the size and the resources of the country, and one that strengthened goodwill far beyond the official level, Israel sent rescue teams, established field hospitals, and donated great amounts of food, medicine, and money to Turkey. Prime Minister Ehud Barak himself flew in to dedicate a prefabricated village erected by Israelis to lodge some of the survivors of the quake. Israel then maintained its assistance in the wake of another tremor in November 1999, and it is symbolic that while the first rescue operation was dubbed "Lifeline Operation," the second was called "Fraternity between Nations."

In 2000, Turkey and Israel kept up the dizzying pace of contacts established over the previous years. Weizman was invited to Turkey for his fifth visit, and several Turkish ministers went to Israel to ask for assistance in the reconstruction of devastated sites and rehabilitation of displaced populations. Their requests for help indicated the extent to which their countries' ties had been strengthened throughout the decade. The array of visits and agreements, which resulted in sales of weapons by Israel and permission for Israeli pilots to train over Turkish air space, also engendered institutionalized dialogues. Since July 1999, a forum comprising the two foreign ministers and other high officials has met regularly for consultations, a strategic dialogue has brought together the top brass and defense officials, and an academic dialogue has been established between the Institute of Foreign Relations in Ankara and the Dayan Center at Tel-Aviv University. Finally, the two nations' ministries of tourism jointly published huge advertisements in the *New York Times* to attract tourists on combined visits, prompting the Turkish press to run such headlines as "Turkey-Israel: The Romantic Couple."[1]

[1] Dispatch from the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul to Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, Feb. 2000.

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Turkey's Uneasy Identity with the Middle East

Turkey's population of over 60 million people, 60 percent of whom live in urban areas, is suffering from a severe identity crisis due to domestic and international developments. For a democratic country that saw three military takeovers in the last generation before government reverted to civilian hands, the rise of Islam now presents a paradox. As in Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, where the process of liberalization provoked a countercurrent in the form of political Islam, Turkey has discovered that allowing all its people to express themselves freely often results in their choosing Islam as a focus of individual, communal, and political identity. This was so alarming to the Turkish military, which regards itself as the guardian of the secular legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, that it did not hesitate to force out the democratically elected Erbakan government in 1997, given the latter's eager and evident tilt toward Islamism and away from Israel.[2] But breaking the thermometer did not cure the fever. Rather, the military coup probably exacerbated the Islamist challenge by spawning extraparliamentary movements on the Right and the Left that resort to violence and threaten to undermine domestic stability.

Islam has insinuated itself into the heart of Turkey's secular political system.

The late Turkish president Turgut Özal was often quoted as saying: "Turkey is a secular state, I am not; I am a Muslim." This comment reflects the inherent tension between the identity of most individuals as Muslims who follow Islamic practice to varying degrees, and their role within a state that has officially divorced itself from the faith. While in the West the separation of the sacred and the secular has been effected relatively painlessly and seems to work, no Islamic country has been able to come to terms with such a separation, not even modern Turkey. Indeed, after visiting Turkey in late 1996, the daughter of Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani noted similarities between the situation in Turkey and that in "Iran at the end of the Shah's reign."[3] This ominous comparison was perhaps what prompted the military to install Mesut Yilmaz as prime minister and send Erbakan packing in June 1997.

While the blunt intervention of the army calls into question Turkey's maturity as a modern liberal state, there is no doubt that it also reflects Turkey's determination to continue to align itself solidly with the West, including Israel. It is equally evident, however, that Islam has insinuated itself into the heart of Turkey's outwardly secular political system. It is reasonable to assume that should Islam reemerge as a strong political force, the question

[2] See A. Shmuelevitz, "The Attitude of the Islamic Press in Turkey Towards Israel" (in Hebrew), in *Hamizrah Hehadash* (The New East), 1997–98, pp. 114–24.

[3] *Ha'aretz*, Dec. 22, 1996.

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of Turkish identity will again come to the fore and militate against the present rapprochement with Israel.[4]

As a Muslim country and a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Turkey has always had to walk a tightrope between its interest in maintaining a relationship with Israel and its cultural, economic, historical, and emotional commitment to Islam. For most of the period preceding the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, Ankara tilted toward its Islamic neighbors.[5] But the worldwide process of globalization and sustained development that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf War drew Jerusalem and Ankara closer together. Many Arab and Islamic countries and societies, however, remained fearful of such all-encompassing changes and distanced themselves from their erstwhile Turkish ally. Turkish president Süleyman Demirel's declaration that "Israel and Turkey have decided on regional cooperation for increasing the economic welfare of the region and curbing terrorism" contrasts sharply with the continuous attacks on Israel by intellectuals and policymakers even in Arab countries that have signed peace accords with Israel.[6]

The question of counterterrorism is of particular interest in this context, because Israel and Turkey both found themselves in boundary disputes with Syria (over the Golan Heights and Alexandrite, respectively) and opposed Syria's efforts to establish hegemony in Lebanon. What is more, Damascus also supported and sheltered terrorist groups directed against either Israel or Turkey.[7] Considering that Israel had backed the Kurdish rebellions in Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s, it must have been difficult to collaborate with the Turks in their own struggle against Kurdish insurgents. But Israel's interest in thwarting Syria meshed well with Turkey's campaign against the Syrian-supported Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—PKK), and evidently outweighed points of principle. As for the Turks, their simultaneous pursuit of relations with Israel and the Arabs was likened to a man

> who had both a wife and a mistress: he may feel a special attraction to his mistress who possesses certain charms his wife lacks, but in public he must appear a dutiful husband and cannot even officially acknowledge the existence of the mistress. This is all the more true if the wife comes, as do the Arabs, from a large and prominent family and has brought a big dowry to the marriage.[8]

[4] See Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1997), pp. 22–37.

[5] Walter Weiker, "Turkey, the Middle East and Islam," *Middle East Review*, Spring 1985, pp. 27–32.

[6] Quotation from Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership," Ariel Center For Policy Research, Policy Paper no. 47 (1998), p. 5. See also Raphael Israeli, "Arab and Muslim Anti-Semitism," Ariel Center For Policy Research (Apr. 2000).

[7] George Gruen, "Turkey's Relations with Israel and Its Arab Neighbors: The Impact of Basic Interests and Changing Circumstances," *Middle East Review*, Spring 1985, pp. 33–43.

[8] Ibid., p. 35. Also cited in Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p. 75.

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To be sure, Israelis resented this analogy because their country had never demanded that Turkey divorce itself from its Arab and Muslim neighbors. Israelis have always sought what the Turks were reluctant to grant them, namely, a full and openly acknowledged relationship.

Turkey's long rebuff of Israel owes much to the treatment of the former by the West. Turkey realized in the 1960s that in spite of its secularism, loyalty to NATO, and attempts to emulate the West, its security was ignored during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent crisis over Cyprus. Far from enjoying U.S. support, Ankara watched as the Americans rushed to support Greece, "going so far as to supply the Greek Cypriots with arms for their campaign against the Turkish minority and the British in Cyprus."[9] The Turks considered this a stab in the back and therefore pursued Muslim solidarity in the wake of the OPEC embargo of 1973. Commercial relations between Turkey and the Arab states picked up, especially with regard to Turkish oil imports. But after the mid-1980s, the volume of that trade slacked off, and its character changed as Turkish exports increased and its oil imports decreased, diminishing considerably Ankara's dependence on those ties.[10]

Remarkable in this web of Turkish relations with the Arab world was its love-hate relationship with Iraq. Both countries struggled against the Kurds, who constituted about one-fifth of their respective populations. Moreover, Baghdad's ability to sustain its long war with Iran in the 1980s depended on the flow of oil across Turkish territory and the importation of foodstuffs via Turkish ports. On the other hand, debt issues, conflict over water distribution, and Turkey's support of the United States during Operation Desert Storm drove Turkish-Iraqi relations to new lows. As a consequence of that war, Turkey confronted not only vast economic deficits, but also hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who streamed across the border from Iraq to find asylum on its territory. At the same time, however, Turkey was also instrumental in implementing the oil-for-food program, which eased Turkey's economic pressures by allowing it to ship oil from and foodstuffs to Iraq.

In sum, Turkey's ties with the Muslim world have been mixed indeed. But during much of the 1980s, even that equivocal relationship was warm compared to the chill between Turkey and Israel.[11] After passage of the Jerusalem Law in 1980, the Turkish consulate general in Jerusalem was closed down, allegedly under the pressure of Erbakan's Islamist party, and Turkish Airlines and Turkish Maritime Lines ceased transport between Turkey and Israel. It was not until 1986 that the level of diplomatic representation was

[9] Amikam Nachmani, *Turkey and the Middle East* (Ramat Gan: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, May 1999), p. 3.

[10] Ibid., pp. 4–5.

[11] See Ekrem Guvendiren, *A Concise Report on Turkish-Israeli Relations* (Istanbul: Foreign Economic Relations Board, Apr. 1999), p. 9.

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raised again, setting the stage for the entente that blossomed during the 1990s.

The Stunning Events of 1989–91

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War sharply reduced the importance of Turkey in the Western defense system and forced Ankara to reevaluate its standing in the world. It was perhaps no coincidence that it was in a meeting of Israel's and Turkey's foreign ministers in Moscow that both sides sought to mend their relationship and exchange ambassadors for the first time. The immediate causes were the outcome of Desert Storm and the subsequent Madrid conference on Palestinian-Israeli peace. But the rapprochement also stemmed from a clear realization by both parties that the heralded new world order necessitated an upgrading of their relations. Israel, having long pursued closer ties, needed no prodding. But the prevailing opinion in Ankara was that the turn-about on relations with Israel constituted one of the most important events in Turkish foreign policy in the past fifty years.[12]

As a result of the Gulf War and the weakening of the Iraqi army, Turkey felt secure, especially since the war left in Turkish hands vast amounts of American weapons, including armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and missiles. It also received billions of dollars' worth of export contracts, oil deliveries, customs concessions, canceled debts, grants, and access to markets—all as compensation for its immense financial losses during the war.[13] Moreover, Turkey's support for the Western coalition against Iraq, which was calculated to gain favor with the European Union, paid off at least in part in 1995, when Ankara concluded a customs agreement with the EU—far short of the full membership that Turkey covets, but a significant step in that direction.[14] Hence, the Gulf War reminded the West that, even in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey remained a significant strategic asset.

The Madrid conference, closely followed by the Oslo accords of September 1993 between Israelis and Palestinians, solved another dilemma for the Turks and allowed them to draw closer to Israel. For reasons more emotional than rational, the Palestinian cause enjoyed almost universal support among the Turkish citizenry. For the Islamists there, the matter was unambiguous: Muslims must side with their coreligionists anywhere and under all circumstances. Thus, Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal insisted in late 1994 that what Israel called Palestinian "terrorism" was merely the Palestinians' attempt to defend their rights.[15] The Israeli ambassador to

[12] Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1998, p. 22.
[13] Nachmani, *Turkey and the Middle East*, p. 15.
[14] Ibid., pp. 15–16.
[15] Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 22.

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Turkey in those days, Zvi Elpeleg, also was of the opinion that no foreign issue was of more concern to the Turks than the fate of the Palestinians. Even such a left-wing intellectual as Ilhan Selcuk, a sworn secularist and advocate of strong ties with Israel, believed that before any rapprochement could occur, Israel had to "discharge all its obligations to the Palestinians."[16] It is no wonder, then, that the Oslo accords removed one of the greatest barriers to closer Turkish relations with Israel.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Azerbaijan and the five republics of Central Asia, a fierce competition for the loyalty of those countries and their inhabitants developed among Iran, Turkey, the Arabs, and to a lesser extent Israel.[17] The competition was not merely a conventional struggle for spheres of influence, but (in the case of Iran and Turkey especially) a sustained effort reminiscent of the Cold War in that all means short of military confrontation were employed. While Turkey, as a modernizing and pro-Western state, appealed to the urban elites in those fledgling republics, Iran seemed to capitalize on popular support in the countryside.[18] Of course, Islam in Central Asia had been diluted by seventy years of Communist rule, and the people might have been expected to find the moderate, secular regime in Turkey appealing. But at the same time, many Central Asian Muslims were fascinated by the revival of their faith as the basis for a total political, ethical, and social order, precisely because they were long deprived of it.[19] This mood may have been further fostered by the rout of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover there in late 1996.

Not surprisingly, the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism was a source of great concern to both Israel and Turkey, as well as to their joint ally and benefactor, the United States. Turkey, taking advantage of its ethnolinguistic affiliation with most of Central Asia (save Iranian Tajikistan), mounted an orchestrated effort to establish a political, cultural, and economic foothold there. As Prime Minister (later President) Demirel put it at that time, those republics regarded Turkey as their "big brother." Turkey's growing role in Central Asia stemmed not only from the rapid dismantling of the Soviet empire, but also from the disintegration in the Balkans and the rejection that Turkey encountered in Europe in spite of its decades-long attempt to identify as European. Although it was a member of NATO (an honor it had won thanks to its participation in the Korean War in the 1950s), Turkey remained on the fringe of the European Union while its archenemy Greece had gained full admittance. It was natural for the Turks, therefore, to look eastwards and entertain pan-Turkic dreams. In June 1992, having established a directorate

[16] Ibid., p. 21.

[17] This item is based mainly on R. Israeli, "The Islamic Republics of Central Asia and the Middle East," *International Journal of Group Rights*, vol. 3 (1995), pp. 31–46.

[18] See Amalia Gent, "Turkish Claim to Leadership in Central Asia," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, May 1992, pp. 21–22.

[19] "Central Asia: The Silk Road Catches Fire," *Economist*, Dec. 26, 1992.

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for relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as with the nations of the Balkans and the Caucasus, Turkey hosted a symposium of all Turkic-speaking nations and minorities and a conference to create a new forum in which Turkey might play a determining role.[20]

Aware that the future of these countries would hinge on their economic progress, Demirel signed a series of commercial agreements with the new republics, and President Özal visited all of them to ensure that Turkish diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence would be omnipresent. With this sustained effort (systematically supported by the United States), Turkey sought to bring Central Asia closer to the West. For Ankara the stakes were, and remain, high: if it does not respond to the Central Asians' eagerness to draw close to them, they might be pushed into the arms of radical Iran or fundamentalist Muslims. But if the Turks themselves go overboard in their effort to court Central Asian governments, they might only give the European Union new excuses to block their Westernization. Ankara's motivation for increased reliance on the United States as a partner in its Central Asian strategy thus became more apparent: Turkey understands that it could be abandoned by Europe. And this is precisely where Turkish interests coincide with those of Israel.

The Attraction of Israel

Surprisingly enough, the new Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan have all established diplomatic relations with Israel, although, due to their lack of funds, not all have resident diplomatic missions yet. This is especially noteworthy because, apart from Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and Senegal, the rest of the fifty-odd countries with large Islamic populations have as yet been reluctant to commit themselves to full diplomatic relations with Israel (which merely maintains interest offices in North African and Persian Gulf states). However, the potential appeal of Israel to these new nations is enormous for at least four reasons. First, most of these emerging states are small in population if not in territory and are attracted by Israel's model of how a small but determined state can achieve diplomatic, economic, industrial, agricultural, technological, and military prowess. Secondly, the stability of Israel's regime and its democratic nature offer some hope to these new nations that by adopting similar sociopolitical institutions, adapting to the technological and scientific environment of the modern world, and internalizing certain values, even a small country can thrive in the twenty-first century. Thirdly, Israel is considered by developing countries, rightly or wrongly, as a conduit to the West in general and the United States in particular. Emerging nations seeking development assistance and foreign

[20] "Turkey Spreads Its Wings," *Economist*, Aug. 6, 1992, pp. 4–5.

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investment have usually established diplomatic relations with Israel as soon as they shed their doctrinaire Third World ideology and adopted pragmatic state-building policies. Fourthly, Israel has broad experience and know-how to share in the fields of water conservation, agrotechnology, and development of arid areas. Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, devastated by years of monoculture that polluted their land and water, are much in need of Israeli expertise. So, too, are Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, which stand to benefit immensely from Israel's technologies.

These points of convergence not only attract Western and Turkish interest, they also mesh well with Turkey's aspiration to forge a moderate, secular, and developed Central Asia. Unlike great powers that may make their assistance to those countries hinge on their global corporate interests or use their power to exert political pressure, Israel offers aid without demanding any collateral price. For its part, Turkey recognizes the value of Israeli cooperation in shaping the future of Central Asia.

It is perhaps ironic that a forged anti-Semitic document concocted in tsarist Russia at the turn of the twentieth century should reemerge again in the past decades, not as a vicious and mischievous tool to fight the Jews, but as a naive or benevolent myth to aggrandize Israel beyond measure. It is true that in some circles, especially Arab and Islamic, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are still cited in their old anti-Semitic context.[21] But the new and far less invidious myth of Israel's international power, especially in developing countries, draws from the same historical sources. For many countries, including Turkey, Israel is important as a conduit for access to the only remaining superpower. In short, the road to Washington leads through Jerusalem.

This belief derives in part from the fact that Israel enjoys a privileged and intimate relationship with the United States, and in part from the myth of America's "redoubtable" and "omnipotent" Jewish lobby. Occasionally it still engenders outbursts of anti-Semitic remarks, such as the Malaysian prime minister's blaming financier George Soros and Jewish bankers for the collapse of the Asian money markets in the late 1990s. To the allegedly magical power of Jews in world economics and American domestic politics one may add the widespread perception that Jews also control the world media, enabling them to propagate any belief that serves their interests. And yet, in the assessment of some policymakers in Turkey and throughout the Middle East, this very belief in Jewish power also underscores the value of good relations with Israel. Zvi Elpeleg, the former Israeli ambassador in Ankara, has noted that "it is helpful that Turks believe in the Protocols of the Elders of

[21] The charter of Hamas contains references to the Protocols, and some Arab media currently resort to "citations" from them. In this regard, see "The Charter of Allah: The Platform of Hamas," in *The 1988–89 Annual of Terrorism*, ed. Yonah Alexander (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1990); and Israeli, *Arab and Muslim Anti-Semitism*.

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Zion, for this leads them to think that Israel has vast powers."[22] Ilhan Selcuk, the Turkish intellectual, likewise observed that Muslims, Arabs, Greeks, Kurds, Armenians, and their respective lobbies in America would all like to see Kemalism vanish. His conclusion was: "We have nobody but Israel . . . and the Jewish Lobby" to depend on for support. Thus, it was in the Turks' national interest to collaborate with Israel, because the latter could relieve their isolation and balance the Greek and Armenian lobbies in American politics.[23]

Israeli-Turkish Strategic Convergence

Of all the complex issues affecting Turkey's relationship with Israel, security, strategy, and military and technological collaboration are perhaps the most acute and certainly the most important ones for the Turkish generals who monitor their country's politics. Not only did the military, as the guardian of the Kemalist heritage, initiate the rapprochement with previously alienated Israel, but it also forced Erbakan's government to accept that bold policy departure and then ousted him as soon as he refused to pursue it further. The Islamist press went so far as to accuse Elpeleg of "being the confidant of the generals who were intent on toppling the Erbakan government."[24] It is therefore no wonder that the most striking and rapid advance in the relations between the two countries has been in the military-strategic domain. Turkey has purchased advanced Israeli weaponry and electronics, engaged in joint maneuvers, cooperated in counterterrorism and intelligence gathering, and exchanged high-level visits with the Israeli military.

These initiatives rest on the assumption that Turkey, surrounded by hostile, authoritarian, unpredictable, and anti-Western regimes, would be foolish not to cooperate with the only other power in the Middle East that is democratic, stable, strong, and pro-Western. Israel, for its part, continues to believe (as it has since the 1950s) that it must forge ties to the strong, stable, and pro-Western peripheral states surrounding the Arab world, thereby "leap-frogging" past the hostile ring of front-line Arab states. Iran and Ethiopia played this role for decades, but by the end of the 1970s the Islamic revolution in the former and the Marxist takeover of the latter eliminated those two pillars, leaving Israel to rely on Turkey alone. After the peace accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, it became all the more imperative for Israel to counterbalance its most formidable enemies in the north and east (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) with Turkish power. Syria, in particular, has maintained a long-standing territorial conflict with Turkey, and the latter, merely by deploying troops on the Syrian frontier, could force Syria to split its military

[22] *Ha'aretz*, Sept. 30, 1997, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 21.
[23] *Cumhuriyet*, Nov. 5, 1994, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 21.
[24] *Ha'aretz*, Sept. 30, 1997, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 22.

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power between two fronts, thereby paralyzing any military threat emanating from Damascus. This indeed helps to explain why Syria has kept quiet on the Golan issue for the past three decades and why Turkey was left free to quash the separatist Kurdish bases within its own borders. Hafez al-Assad could simply not afford to provoke Turkish ire so long as he was locked in a struggle with Israel over the Golan and Lebanon.

The Turks likewise worry about the Kurds in Iraq, whose demands for autonomy, if realized, could prompt similar agitation among Kurds within Turkey. Still another concern is Iran's perceived hostility to the current Turkish regime by dint of the latter's anti-Islamism and competition for influence in the Central Asian republics.[25] Add to that the growing fear in Israel and Turkey of Iraqi and Iranian development of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and it is evident that Turkey's and Israel's respective interests converge along many avenues. It was for that reason that the resumption of negotiations in 1999 between Israel and Syria, a close ally of Iran, was a source of deep concern within Turkey. If Syria achieved peace with Israel and gained control of the Golan, it would become much freer to challenge Turkey with Iran's support, a menacing prospect for Ankara. Therefore, although both Israel and Turkey have sought to appease fears by stating that their alliance is not directed against any third party, everyone understands that Syria and Iran may be its primary targets.

Economic ties maintain Turkey's balancing act between Israelis and Arabs.

Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation is most evident in the relationship of the two militaries,[26] but another element of potential strategic value is cooperation with regard to water supplies. Unlike its Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey suffers from no serious shortage of water, thanks to its control over the headwaters of the Euphrates River (which flows into Syria and Iraq) and its vast quantities of ground water fed by the rivers of Anatolia. Thus, Ankara can exert considerable pressure on its enemies downstream and deploy its surpluses of water to strategic advantage. For example, Turkey promised Israel virtually unlimited quantities of fresh water, either by tankers or pipeline, while restricting the supply of water to some hostile neighbors. Although economic calculations may limit the feasibility of such enterprises, it is evident that water may become, like oil, a political weapon as the populations of the Middle East increase rapidly and water resources dwindle.[27]

A final arena for Turkish-Israeli cooperation, and one that has been

[25] During Erbakan's tenure, Ankara and Tehran even achieved a brief rapprochement. See Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership*, pp. 10–11.

[26] See Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," pp. 24–26.

[27] See Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership*, pp. 3–5; and Amikam Nachmani, *Water Jitters in the Middle East* (Ramat Gan: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, June 1997).

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second only to military collaboration in importance over the past decade, is the purely civilian domain of economic development, investment, and trade. The huge volume of Israeli tourism to Turkey has long been acknowledged, but in areas such as investment, construction, manufacturing, environment, water and land conservation, technical cooperation, and joint enterprises, ties have expanded more recently. From a measly $54 million in 1987, trade grew to more than $1 billion by the end of the 1990s and was expected to reach $2 billion by 2001—the largest flow of commerce between any two countries in the Middle East—thanks to a 1997 free-trade agreement that opened new vistas for business in both countries.[28]

To be sure, the political détente between Turkey and Israel initially prompted the intensification and diversification of economic activity, but the process seems to have acquired a dynamic of its own. The vast and growing markets of Turkey are a powerful lure to Israeli investors and exporters, and Turkey's low labor costs (at about one-third of Israel's) encourage the flow of Turkish goods into Israel. However, due to the limitations of Israel's tiny market, Turkey's aggregate trade with Arab countries still surpasses by far the volume of bilateral Israeli-Turkish exchanges. Moreover, remittances from millions of Turkish workers employed in other Middle Eastern countries ensure the continuation of a balancing act by Ankara between its Israeli and Arab partners.

Conclusions and Prospects

On the eve of the Jewish Passover and Festival of Freedom in April 2000, Israeli newspapers stressed the need for a greater humanitarian thrust to international politics. The Israeli government and public responded to the famine in Ethiopia with the same energy they showed at the time of the earthquakes in Turkey. But when the successful and popular minister of education, Yossi Sarid, announced in a ceremony commemorating the Armenian genocide that the Israeli school system would henceforth include that Turkish atrocity as part of its curriculum, protests poured in at once from the Turks, for whom the Armenian massacres have been a most sensitive issue. Only a few years before, Ankara had refused to accredit a respected Israeli scholar, Ehud Toledano, as ambassador because of an allegation that he had voiced accusations against the Turks and sympathized with the Armenians' plight.

Predictably, all elements of Turkish society, not just the Islamists, viewed the Armenian affair as proof of the unreliable Jewish state's tendency to side with Christians against Muslims. Die-hard nationalists also seized upon

[28] See Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," pp. 26–27; and Gil Feiler, "Economic Relations between Turkey and Israel" (in Hebrew), in *Turkey and Israel in a Changing Middle East*, ed. A. Shmuelevitz (Ramat Gan: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 1996).

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the on-again, off-again negotiations between Israel and Syria as a sign that Israel would always subordinate Turkey's strategic interests to its own. Israel's explanations to the effect that it could maintain its growing relationship with Turkey even as it evoked the Armenian massacre (just as it does with Germany despite recurrent references to the Shoah) fell on deaf ears in Ankara. For unlike Germany, which has recognized its past and accepted responsibility, Turkey continues to treat the Armenian massacre as taboo and does not acknowledge any guilt. Disputes over Armenia and the prospect of Israeli peace with Syria will continue to strain the relationship between Turkish and Israeli governments, their strategic and economic cooperation notwithstanding.

Another element of incongruity has crept in recently in the shape of a nascent détente between Israel and Greece. The nature of this relationship appears to be reminiscent of what occurred between Israel and Turkey a decade ago: military coordination, sales of Israeli weaponry, upgrading of outdated Greek equipment, visits of high officials, full diplomatic relations, and a growing degree of intimacy between the governments. Ten years ago it was unthinkable that either the Turks or the Greeks would have countenanced a "courtship" involving Israel and both of them at the same time. But now, as the old enmities between those archrivals seem to be easing, they may be able to tolerate that arrangement, just as they have learned to live with their joint membership in NATO and their prospective partnership in the European Union. But it remains certain that each of them would prefer to be the only bride under the wedding canopy, and that any failure by Israel to take into consideration the sensibilities involved may spoil its relations with both.

A further development with potentially serious consequences for Turkey and Israel is Syria's slow turn back toward Iraq. Prior to the 1980s, tensions already existed between the two "sister states" due to the competition for hegemony between the two rival branches of the Baath Party to which both claimed allegiance. The rivalry was also a matter of personal one-upmanship between Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad. But in August 1980, just prior to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, when Syria sided with Iran, the two countries cut off their diplomatic relations. When Syria then joined (at least nominally) the U.S.-led coalition during Desert Storm, the ties between them deteriorated even further. In 1997, however, Syria was desperate for cash, and so Assad swallowed his pride and approached the Iraqis for contacts under the U.N. oil-for-food deal. By the spring of 2000, the first signs of improvement emerged as Syrian goods found their way to Iraqi markets and Iraqi oil was illicitly ferried via Syrian (and Turkish) territory. Diplomatic negotiations aiming at normalization between the two have been taking place through third parties, and there is even talk of growing economic

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exchanges.[29] Those two besieged and isolated states may be forging a united front against the Americans, a joint defense against the Turkish-Israeli alliance, and a fallback position should the Syrian-Israeli talks over the Golan come to naught.

There is no doubt, however, that the most menacing issue in the Turkish-Israeli partnership in the long term is the prospect that ultra-nationalist or ultra-religious factions in Turkey may agitate to return their country to its Anatolian-Asian or even Islamic roots, undoing the Kemalist heritage so jealously guarded by the military. An insoluble dilemma would then confront Israel and the West. Is the partnership with Turkey so important that it is worth maintaining even under the bayonets of the Turkish military? Or is it preferable to allow "democracy" to triumph even at the cost of Turkey's slipping—as Iran did two decades ago and Algeria almost did less than a decade ago—into the anti-Western Islamic camp? The stepped-up activity of the Turkish Hizbullah in the eastern confines of the country at the beginning of 2000, which generated killings and arrests on a massive scale, and the gains of the Hizbullah in Lebanon against Israel in summer 2000 do not augur well. For if the strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey is perceived as resting on the coercive power of their arms rather than on the democratic principles they claim to uphold, its longevity will be anyone's guess.

[29] Leon Barkho, "Iraq Betting on Oil Wealth to End Isolation," Associated Press, Mar. 1, 2000.

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

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The Land of Many Crossroads

Turkey's Caucasian Initiatives

by Paul B. Henze

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish diplomacy has been active *à tous azimuths*, not least the northeastern. In the many, often contentious republics that arose in the Caucasus after the Soviet crack-up, Turkish leaders perceive opportunities to expand trade, strengthen security, and participate in the anticipated oil boom. So far, their success has been mixed, because long historical shadows still dance over the region.

A Checkerboard of Peoples

Long before the creation of the modern Turkish state, extensive links existed between the Caucasus and Anatolia. Some of the most ancient peoples of the region are believed to have entered Anatolia from the Caucasus, while Roman armies reached deep into what is today eastern Turkey and penetrated Georgia and Armenia. The Byzantine Empire enjoyed close ties to the Christian civilizations of the Caucasus, and its borderlands were an arena of competition among Rome, Byzantium, and Persia for centuries. Turkic mercenaries fought in Byzantine armies before the Battle of Manzikert (1071), when Seljuk sultan Alparslan defeated the Byzantines and captured Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes himself.[1] Once firmly established in Anatolia, the Turks moved steadily westward into Europe, but continued to be deeply involved with the Caucasus to the east. After the Ottomans captured Trabzon in 1461, another period of competition with Persia ensued. For long periods, the Ottoman Empire exercised control over Georgia, the Circassian coast, and the entire north shore of the Black Sea. The Crimean khans were vassals of

[1] Gyula Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica* (Leiden: Brill, 1983).

Paul B. Henze, a retired U.S. diplomat and long-time consultant to RAND, is a specialist in Caucasian history and current politics. His history of modern Turkey, *Ataturk's Legacy* (SOTA Publishers, 1998) is currently being prepared for publication in Turkish translation.

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the sultan, and Ottoman emissaries penetrated into the North Caucasus to establish contacts with Kabardans, Chechens, and Dagestanis and to trade with Azerbaijan. Most Caucasian Muslims looked to Turkey as the center of their civilization and their potential protector. After the Russian conquest of Crimea in 1783, the Ottomans began their gradual retreat eastward along the Black Sea coast, although they did manage to win occasional victories over Russia. They did not lose Anapa, near the outlet of the Sea of Azov, until 1829, and, with initial encouragement from Britain, continued covert support of the Circassians until their final conquest by the tsar's armies in 1864, five years after the defeat of the great Caucasian resistance leader Shamil.[2]

Turkey's struggle with Russia in the Caucasus throughout the nineteenth century is essential to understanding Turkish attitudes and policies toward the Caucasus at the end of the twentieth.[3] Each Russo-Turkish war brought a resurgence of Turkish efforts to support Caucasian peoples against the Russians, but in the end the tsarist armies won out and engaged in ethnic cleansing on a massive scale. The northeastern Black Sea coast was practically cleared of Circassians, Abaza, and Abkhaz, and historians believe that well over a million of these peoples were deported to the Ottoman Empire between 1860 and 1875.[4] They were parceled out among the lightly populated parts of Anatolia and more distant provinces of the empire, forming the core of the so-called Circassian communities in Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.[5] Simultaneously, Chechens, Dagestanis, and Azeris from the eastern side of the North Caucasus made their way to Turkey in smaller numbers in the wake of Shamil's defeat. Still other refugees arrived after the Ottomans had to cede the cities of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars to Russia after losing the war of 1876–78, because the Ottoman Empire, like the modern Turkish republic, maintained liberal immigration policies for persons of Turkic blood.

After World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, a new wave of defeated Caucasians found refuge in Turkey, augmented by Muslims fleeing communist rule in the Volga-Ural region and Central Asia. The long Russian effort to break the "North Caucasus barrier" entailed exploitation of the Christian peoples of the Caucasus (Georgians, Armenians, Ossetes, and a few smaller groups) in order to counter the Muslims. During each Russo-Turkish war from the mid-nineteenth century to World War I, Russia sought to use Ottoman Armenians and other eastern Anatolian Christians as a fifth

[2] Paul B. Henze, "Circassian Resistance to Russia," in *The North Caucasus Barrier*, ed. Marie B. Broxup (London: Hurst, 1992), pp. 66–111.

[3] W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).

[4] Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1995).

[5] Because the Circassians were the most numerous of the Caucasian refugees, Turks called all Caucasians Cherkess (*Çerkes*). Only recently have the descendants of the various Caucasian peoples in Turkey begun again to use their original ethnic designations.

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column. The practice had disastrous consequences for all these ancient communities during the upheavals of 1917–22, including the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians as well as other Christians and Muslims.

The southern Caucasus experienced foreign intervention from several directions after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. Imperial Germany attempted to establish a foothold in Georgia. Turkey was sympathetic to Azerbaijani strivings for independence and opposed to Armenian efforts to expand the territory of the emerging Armenian republic. For a brief period following the armistice of November 1918, Britain occupied Baku and actively attempted to reinforce independence movements in Georgia and Armenia.[6] These efforts proved ineffective, however, because the Bolsheviks were able to exploit serious divisions within each Caucasian republic. Their rhetoric about self-determination of nations notwithstanding, Lenin and Stalin were not about to permit the Russian hold on the Caucasus to be broken. The Red Army moved systematically to gain control of each of the South Caucasian republics and had for the most part accomplished its aim by the end of 1921. It took much longer to "pacify" the North Caucasus, where Muslim guerrilla movements continued operating for the rest of the decade.

As for Turkey, the ambitions of expansive nationalists such as Enver Pasha included assertion of Turkish dominance throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. Enver allied himself briefly with Lenin, but turned against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia, assembled a Turkish-dominated guerrilla army, and fell to ignominious defeat near the Afghan frontier in remote eastern Bukhara (now in Tajikistan) in August 1922.[7] The much more realistic Mustafa Kemal (who later took the surname Atatürk) calculated that establishing a firm eastern frontier for his new Turkish republic was as far as his ambition should take him. He took advantage of Lenin's desire to subdue independent Armenia by making a bargain with him, formalized in the Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) in December 1920. In return for restoration of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, Russia would keep Batum, and the Bolsheviks would be free to do with Armenia as they wished.

The Turkish republic that arose in the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 had a population of barely 13 million. Perhaps as many as 2 million—15 percent—were of Caucasian origin. Atatürk's emphasis on nationalism and pride in Turkishness led to assimilation of those living within the boundaries established by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.[8] Subsequent prohibition of irredentist movements left Turkey's citizens of Caucasian and Balkan origin with only limited opportunities to keep their cultural traditions

[6] Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917–1921* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951).

[7] Alexandre Bennigsen et al., *Soviet Strategy and Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 8–12.

[8] The question of Mosul remained open. It was awarded by the League of Nations to Britain's Iraq mandate in 1926. No other adjustments of Turkey's boundaries occurred until 1939, when France transferred Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta) from its Syrian mandate to Turkey. See C. J. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel, and Research in Northeastern Iraq, 1919–25* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

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alive. Education and political activity, moreover, were conducted exclusively in Turkish. Although some prominent political exiles from the Caucasus settled in Turkey, entered academic life, wrote valuable memoirs, and laid the foundations for Caucasian and Central Asian studies in Turkish universities, they were not allowed to conduct anti-Soviet activities. To be sure, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union remained cool, and communism was strictly proscribed. But Atatürk's agreement with Moscow meant that Caucasian frontiers remained more tightly sealed during most of the twentieth century than they had been in previous thousands of years of history.

Thanks to Ismet Inönü's astute leadership, Turkey managed to stay out of World War II, maintaining formal neutrality until the war's final stages. Allied leaders concluded that Turkish nonbelligerence served their interests better than Turkey's participation would have, because the latter course might have prematurely opened a Balkan front. The German advance toward the Caucasian oil fields in 1941–42 inspired brief hopes of liberation from Soviet rule among some Caucasians and Caucasian exiles. The Caucasus was a major source of Soviet petroleum and a key link in the Lend-Lease lifeline over which the United States sent vast quantities of supplies and equipment to Russia through the Persian Gulf.

Stalin's lust for expansion propelled Turkey into the Western alliance.

As the war in Europe came to an end, Stalin's lust for expansion led him into a blunder that propelled Turkey firmly into the Western alliance. He pressed Ankara for special rights in the Turkish Straits and generated demands from his Georgian and Armenian Soviet Republics for "rectification" of their borders, which would have required ceding Turkish territory to the Soviet Union. Turkey's response was an unequivocal refusal, and Turkish suspicion of Soviet intentions was reinforced by Stalin's attempt to maintain a foothold in Iranian Azerbaijan (frustrated by U.S. action in the new United Nations in 1946). From this time onward, Turkey shifted steadily into the Western alliance. The Truman Doctrine and a major U.S. aid program to Turkey launched in 1947 were followed by Turkish involvement with the Marshall Plan and membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (1950), and NATO (1953).

During World War II, Turkey was a center of intelligence activity by all the powers.[9] When Stalin clearly demonstrated his desire to abet communist takeovers in East European countries and exercise heavy-handed influence around the world, Western intelligence activities in Turkey (as well as Turkey's own) became firmly focused on the Soviet bloc. Caucasian and Central Asian exiles became actively involved by publishing journals and books, staffing U.S.-sponsored radio stations such as the Voice of America

[9] One of the best sources on this subject is Barry Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989).

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and Radio Liberty, and working for Western intelligence services. The Turkish government, however, despite its firmly pro-Western and strongly anticommunist stance, remained sensitive about exiles' political activities and therefore maintained tight control over U.S. and other Western intelligence operations directed at the Caucasus.

Stalin's successors lost no time building up bases in the Caucasus for all branches of their military forces. By the end of the 1950s, the region was dotted with modern installations and the Turco-Caucasian frontier was every bit as militarized as the Iron Curtain in Central Europe. Until the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union maintained a half-mile-deep complex of plowed strips, barbed-wire entanglements, and guard towers, and patrolled the Turkish border by helicopter. Of course, these "defenses" served more to keep Caucasians and other Soviet citizens from leaving than to keep Turks from entering. Turkish contacts with citizens of the Caucasian Soviet republics were restricted to sporadic, low-level political and cultural exchanges. Crossing points at Sarp on the Black Sea and at Gümrü (Leninakan) in Armenia remained quiet except for occasional transits of diplomats and minimal exchanges of goods.

In the 1980s, the rigid application of some of Atatürk's principles in Turkish life began to be eased. Turkey's leaders became less sensitive about ethnicity, and its citizens, now much more open to the world, found themselves free to take an interest in their heritage. Meanwhile, Turkish historians and other academic specialists had begun to produce an impressive body of research about the *Türk Dünyasi*—the Turkish world and the peoples close to it. Interest in the Caucasus, moreover, was no longer primarily the province of exiles of Caucasian origin or their descendants, though many of them made major contributions to research as they explored their own roots. By the time the Soviet Union began to crumble, Caucasians were no longer simply grouped under the heading Çerkes, and descendants of Chechens, Avars, Lezgins, Kumyks, Abkhaz, Karachay, Balkar, Nogay, and others formed associations of their own. As soon as Soviet power collapsed and borders opened, these groups quickly reestablished links with their long-separated kinsmen.

The Georgians and Turkey

Prime Minister (later President) Turgut Özal laid the basis for official relations with the soon-to-be-sovereign South Caucasian republics even before they broke with Moscow. By September 1991 a Turkish diplomatic delegation had already visited Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi to arrange for formal diplomatic relations. Although Armenia's war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh prevented formal diplomatic relations, Turkish embassies were soon set up in Baku and Tbilisi. The Georgian border was opened for

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traffic in both directions. During 1991 more than a million Georgians made shopping trips to Turkey, and a Turkish consulate general was opened in Trabzon. Daily hydrofoil service was inaugurated between Batum and Trabzon, and Georgian and Turkish airlines now provide efficient service between Tbilisi and Istanbul. New border crossing points were opened in the mid-1990s, and Georgia has now become a major avenue for truck and bus traffic across the Caucasus and northward into the Russian Federation. Turks of Georgian ancestry publish the journal *Cveneburi*, which is written largely in Turkish but includes some Georgian texts and vocabularies in Laz and other Georgian dialects.

Historical ties between Turkey and Georgia go back at least as far as the High Middle Ages, when present-day northeastern Turkey formed an important part of the Kingdom of Georgia. The Georgian monarchs King David the Builder and Queen Tamara lived in that region and constructed numerous churches, castles, bridges, and other architectural monuments that survive to this day. When the Ottomans conquered the area in the fifteenth century, the new rulers encouraged the native Georgian population to remain in place and gradually converted them to Islam. Some of the great churches were turned into mosques, their frescoes simply painted over. Prior to the spread of modern schools, radio, television, and newspapers, most of the rural population still spoke Georgian, and a Georgian dialect is widely used today among the Laz of the eastern Black Sea coast. Conversion to Islam turned both the Laz and inland Georgians into loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire and later into citizens of the Turkish republic. Neither imperial Russians nor Soviets were successful in creating an irredentist movement among these people, who in recent years have had further reason to be thankful to belong to a rapidly modernizing, democratic country. Until World War I, families on both sides of the border managed to maintain ties to each other, and the resumption of these connections during the past decade has much to do with the rapidly improving transit and communications links between the two countries.

Good relations on a personal level have largely mirrored constructive political ties and are enhanced by the close relationship between Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and Turkish president Süleyman Demirel. Turkish trade with Georgia has expanded steadily, accompanied by a modest amount of Turkish investment and credit. Turkey has provided assistance to Georgia's new army and opened its service schools to Georgian military personnel. Turkey has supported Georgia's entry into the Black Sea Cooperation Organization and other regional bodies. Cooperative endeavors also include cultural and academic projects such as joint archaeological explorations. Turkish relations with Georgia's autonomous Republic of Ajaria have been especially close, not surprisingly inasmuch as Ajaria formed part of the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years before 1878 and was given "autonomy" under Soviet rule because of its predominantly Muslim population.

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For the most part, both Turkey and independent Georgia have had the good sense to refrain from any irredentist claims. One potential pitfall for Turkish-Georgian relations arose when Abkhaz refugees and descendants in Turkey sought Turkey's support for the Russian nationalist–backed effort to detach Abkhazia from Georgia immediately after independence. Although the Abkhaz managed to attract some sympathy among the Turkish population and in some quarters of the government, the realization that the Abkhaz separatists were being manipulated by former Communists and militarists in Russia for their own purposes in the North Caucasus—and falsely claimed to be oppressed Muslims—eventually prevented any serious Turkish involvement in that movement.[10] Turkish authorities intervened to keep Abkhaz freebooters from mounting operations from eastern Black Sea ports. Turkey has supported both the U.N. observer force in Abkhazia and international efforts to settle the problem. Abkhazia itself remains depressed, a sad fate for the region once dubbed the Soviet Riviera.

The Armenians and Turkey

Given the legacy of Armenian "treason" (in Turkish eyes) and Turkish "genocide" (in Armenian eyes), it is surprising that one finds almost as many Turkish products on sale on the streets of Yerevan as in Batum, Tbilisi, or Baku. However, the Armenian-Turkish border remains closed, and the only official trade between the two countries involves intermittent air and land travel for transport of emergency relief. For the most part, Turkish products as well as relief shipments enter Armenia via Georgia. When Armenia experienced a devastating earthquake in 1988, Turkey provided substantial aid, but Armenia's campaign to absorb Nagorno-Karabakh began the following year and developed into a full-scale war. Armenia's victory over Azerbaijani forces and its occupation of large sections of western Azerbaijan created a refugee population numbering in the hundreds of thousands. These circumstances, combined with the opposition of Turkish public opinion to any improvement in relations, made it impossible for any Turkish government to establish normal diplomatic or trade relations with Armenia. Ankara insists that normalization of relations must depend on Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani territory and resolution of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The rancor and distrust born of past Turco-Armenian tensions are never far from the surface and contribute to the troubled bilateral relationship. Unlike the Georgian-derived community concentrated in northeastern Turkey, Armenians were scattered widely over Anatolia and had a strong

[10] Most Abkhaz Muslims migrated to Turkey in the nineteenth century, while those who remained were primarily Christian. Nothing of Islam survived in Abkhazia into the twentieth century. The notion that the Abkhaz were anticommunist Muslims gained currency in the international press in 1991–92 and was skillfully exploited by both separatists and Russians.

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presence in Istanbul. And unlike the Georgians residing in Turkey, few Armenians converted to Islam. Still, for centuries the Armenians were considered among the sultan's most loyal subjects, and many served the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the Balkans, and Arab areas. Others achieved high status as scholars, clerics, architects, doctors, and government officials in Istanbul. During the late nineteenth century, nationalist movements grew rapidly among Armenians in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires. During the last two decades before World War I, clashes between Armenians and Turks grew in intensity. During World War I, many Armenians in eastern Anatolia supported Russia, and Ottoman generals consequently ordered many of them deported to Syria. As a result of the severe hardship, a great many people perished on all sides. The Armenians also committed their own share of atrocities against Kurds and Turks.[11]

Both Armenians and Turks seemed to have moved beyond this history until the 1960s, when the extensive Armenian diaspora began to revive memories of the tragedy. Moscow, seeing in this renewed awareness an opportunity to destabilize Turkey and drive a wedge between Turkey and the United States, encouraged its own Armenians to agitate and provided clandestine support for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which espoused Marxism and the annexation of eastern Anatolia to the Soviet Union. The spectacular assassinations of Turkish diplomats by ASALA agents, coupled with intense Armenian lobbying against Turkey in the U.S. Congress, rekindled the old animosity that continues to hinder normal relations between the two neighbors. While some leaders in independent Armenia have called on all parties to move beyond past hatred and concentrate on future opportunities, they have not yet prevailed. Those politicians who nurture old wounds and favor a close alliance with nationalist elements in Russia have maintained their dominance. Although landlocked Armenia stands to gain far more from reconciliation than does Turkey, public opinion surveys show that most Turks would welcome normalization.

Surveys show that most Turks would welcome normalization with Armenia.

The Azerbaijanis and Turkey

Turkey's relations with independent Azerbaijan, by contrast, have been even warmer than those with Georgia. Turks regard Azeris as first

[11] For a reasonably objective assessment of these events by an American scholar, see McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, pp. 179–253. For a comprehensive collection of documents from the Turkish viewpoint, see *Armenian Allegations: Myth and Reality* (Washington, D.C.: Assembly of American Turkish Organizations, 1986). For varied Armenian viewpoints, see Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 161–85; Christopher Walker, *Armenia: Survival of a Nation* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 121–240; and Ronald Suny, *Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 94–115.

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cousins, and their languages are mutually intelligible, although the Azeris have adopted a somewhat more awkward Latin alphabet than the one used in Turkey. The fact that the majority of Azeris are Shi'ite Muslim while most Turks are Sunni has not dampened the enthusiasm of both peoples for each other. Azerbaijani intellectuals were leaders in the revival of Turkic nationalist consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and were always sympathetically regarded by Turkish nationalists.[12] After the Red Army put an end to Azerbaijan's independence, many Azerbaijani leaders settled in Turkey. A further influx of Azerbaijani émigrés arrived after World War II, when former Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans made their way to Turkey and fit easily into Turkish life.

The Soviet KGB used Baku as a base for subversive operations against Turkey for many years. Turkey felt little affinity for Heidar Aliev and his successor, Ayaz Mutalibov, the Azerbaijani leaders of the Gorbachev era. Mutalibov found himself presiding somewhat reluctantly over Azerbaijani independence. Turkey favored Ebulfez Elchibey, who won the comparatively free election of 1992 but governed for less than a year. Of his many mistakes, perhaps the most serious was advocating the union of far more populous Iranian (southern) Azerbaijan with the smaller independent republic, an aspiration that Turkey could not support. Elchibey was overthrown in a coup in June 1993 that brought Aliev back to power. Immediate reaction in Turkey, as in much of the world, was negative, since Aliev was thought to have been restored at Russian initiative.

If such was the case, then Aliev must have proved a disappointment to Moscow, for during the next year he established himself as an Azerbaijani patriot and was soon warmly embraced by Turkish leaders. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have been close ever since, as witnessed by flourishing trade and cultural exchanges. In Azerbaijan one now finds Turkish schools, Turkish-language television broadcasts, and even editions of Turkish newspapers. Turkish investment in Azerbaijan has grown steadily, and Turkish construction firms have been active in Baku. A bridge has been built at the narrow border between Turkey and the autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, which is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenia that extends to the Iranian border.

Turkey is well aware of the considerable potential benefit of a good relationship with Azerbaijan. Notably, Turkey hopes (as does the United States) that most Azerbaijani oil can be transported westward via a new pipeline across Georgia that would link up with the pipeline originally built to transport Iraqi oil to Ceyhan on the Gulf of Iskenderun. Aside from the profit to be gained from putting to use a pipeline that has sat unused for a

[12] Audrey Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule* (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1992).

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decade, a major Turkish motivation is to reduce pressure from abroad to permit increased tanker traffic through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Turkey and the North Caucasus

Turkey, like the rest of the world, officially recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the varied republics of the North Caucasus. Nonofficial contacts have increased significantly in recent years, however, particularly as Turkish citizens of North Caucasian derivation travel in and trade with the region. But the principal issue affecting Turkish relations with the North Caucasus is the Chechens' struggle for independence. The large numbers of Chechens who have fled to Turkey have attracted the attention of the Turkish media and the sympathy of the Turkish people. Mindful of the sentiments of its own citizens, the Turkish government has offered only minimal interference to Chechen exiles publicizing their cause. As a result, Russia has periodically objected to the tepid governmental response and sought to intimidate Ankara into repressing the Chechens, although so far to no avail.

After Chechnya, Turkey shows the most interest in Dagestan, a populous republic with a bewildering mosaic of peoples who reside in the mountains along the western shore of the Caspian Sea north of Azerbaijan. Many Turks are of Dagestani origin, and regular weekly flights between Makhach-Kala and Istanbul help to maintain ties on many levels, including commerce in Caucasian carpets and handicrafts, for which Turkey is a major outlet. Turkey also supports three prestigious high schools in Dagestan staffed by Turkish instructors. An impressive new Turkish-style mosque designed by a Turkish architect was dedicated in Makhach-Kala in October 1997 during celebrations of the two-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the resistance leader Shamil.[13] Shamil was an Avar, not a Turk, but like all the non-Turkic Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, he has long enjoyed the status of "honorary Turk" and will no doubt continue to do so.[14]

Prospects for the Caucasian Frontier

The collapse of the Soviet Union rapidly restored the close but complicated relationship between Turkey and the Caucasus that had existed for centuries. Caucasians never forgot that they were neighbors of Turkey, and despite decades of anti-Turkish Soviet propaganda (perhaps even be-

[13] Paul B. Henze, "Dagestan in October 1997—Imam Shamil Lives!" *Caspian Crossroads*, Winter/Spring 2000, pp. 16–31.

[14] This phenomenon is hardly new. Samih Nafiz Tansu's 1975 biography of Shamil, *Seyh Samil*, bore the subtitle "A Turk Who Refused to Bow to the Tsars."

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cause of it) they have continued to be deeply interested in Turkey. The affinity takes many forms. For a minority the Islamic link is important, for others Turkic culture and historical ties take precedence, and to most Caucasians Turkey represents a model of the sort of successful modernization and development they soon hope to enjoy. Eventually, they also hope to follow Turkey on the path toward a much deeper relationship with Europe. No one can predict the extent to which, in years to come, the Caucasus will develop into a major highway to Asia, a "new Silk Road" that leads all the way to China. But the region will nevertheless continue to be an important avenue for Turkish traffic and trade to the east and north, and if the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline becomes reality, it will lead to expansion of Turkish ties to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Only Armenia will remain, as ever, the exception to these happy trends—unless and until it has the good fortune to find leaders focused more on future opportunities with Turkey than past injustices.

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The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle

by Douglas A. Macgregor

American foreign policy in the past century has frequently been shaped not by the realities confronted by diplomats and soldiers, but by an idealistic longing to remake the world in the United States' own image.[1] The first American attempt to do so in the Versailles Treaty ended in tragic failure. The supposedly moral peace that concluded Woodrow Wilson's "war to end war" actually perpetuated injustice and set the stage for World War II.[2] At the start of the twenty-first century, the moral imperative in U.S. foreign policy again compels American and allied troops to pursue idealistic goals in Bosnia and Kosovo long after the ideas that underpin those goals have become irrelevant and unattainable.

It is time to fix the problem with U.S. policy, not the blame. The United States and its allies must deal with the Balkans on terms its inhabitants understand and respect: power politics and fair agreements. All of the peoples who live on the territory of the former Yugoslavia deserve to survive and prosper within a just framework. But to create such a framework, the next president must understand that Europeans themselves, rather than Americans far removed from the context, must shape the path to regional stability. Furthermore, the emergence of Vojislav Kostunica as Serbia's legitimate leader poses a new challenge to U.S. and allied policy in the region. European support for Kostunica and opposition to independence for Kosovo under

[1] The author thanks Ambassador Robert Oakley; Col. William R. Phillips, U.S. Army; Col. Richard Roan, U.S. Marine Corps; Steven Meyer, National Defense University; Patrick Balestrieri, SHAPE; Lt. Col. Scott Bethel, U.S. Air Force; Lt. Col. Jerry Cummings, U.S. Army; Maj. Mark Elfendahl, U.S. Army; Maj. Simon Underwood, British Army; and Capt. Ray Eiriz, U.S. Army, for their recommendations and suggestions.

[2] Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 84.

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Albanian leadership could reignite war in the Balkans unless the next administration adopts an approach that recognizes the legitimate aspirations of all the peoples that live in the former Yugoslavia.

If Americans and their NATO allies in uniform have learned anything from their experience in the Balkans and elsewhere in the last ten years, it is that diplomatic arrangements made in isolation from the political, social, cultural, and economic realities on the ground result in political objectives without any hope of success. For the next administration, this means recognizing that military power cannot artificially create multiethnic social structures and Western-style political institutions where the foundations for them do not exist and the rationale for long-term U.S. engagement is weak. If nothing is done to redirect the course of U.S. policy, Americans will confront more than violence in Kosovo or an open-ended commitment of U.S. military power. Without abandoning the attempts at social engineering that have dominated policymaking since October 1995, Yugoslavia will remain a catalyst for regional conflict, and the growing European backlash against American policy will further erode alliance cohesion and encourage isolationism in the United States.

The Bosnian Debacle

In 1995 the Clinton administration concluded that American military intervention was indispensable to any resolution of the Balkan crisis. European reluctance to intervene militarily to stop the Yugoslav conflict reinforced this attitude. When the Yugoslav army (Voyska Jugoslavska—VJ) failed to intervene to rescue the Bosnian Serb army from military defeat and to protect the 200,000 Serbs driven out of the Krajina by the Croat army in early August, President Clinton sought a diplomatic solution. The sudden emergence of a Croat military force capable of defeating the Bosnian Serb army on a level playing field at last seemed to offer favorable prospects to an administration that had touted principles of justice in foreign policy since taking office in January 1993, but had avoided involvement in Bosnia.[3]

After the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace killed scores of innocent civilians on August 28, 1995, Clinton seized the opportunity provided by the Western public's revulsion to employ American and allied air power on the side of the Croat and Bosniac armies. In early September the Bosnian Serb leaders, confronting seemingly unstoppable ground forces and a ferocious allied bombing campaign, signaled a readiness to talk peace. Clinton then suspended the bombing and left resolution of the dispute to the diplomats gathered at Dayton, Ohio. The result was an uneasy truce that ended the fighting before either side could win or lose the war.

[3] Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 123.

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This use of American military power in Bosnia is instructive. Power was not employed to win the Bosnian conflict outright or to achieve definitive settlement of disputes before or during negotiations. Rather, the bombing and subsequent occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by 60,000 NATO ground troops (half of whom were American) had two key objectives: to prevent a resumption of the fighting and ethnic cleansing, and to formalize the creation of a Muslim-dominated multiethnic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

From its inception, Bosnia-Herzegovina was an artificial structure whose claim to legitimacy depended on the presence of foreign troops and a steady influx of foreign money. Because Bosnia-Herzegovina had never been a nation, its newfound equality with other regional actors ran counter to the historic structure of interstate relations in Europe. In addition, at precisely the time when so many of the Balkan peoples rejected multiethnicity in the context of European cultural and ethnic integration, another myth took root in the minds of the Western public: that of a formerly happy, prosperous, and multiethnic Yugoslavia—as if Yugoslavia had suddenly descended into hatred and turmoil in 1992. It is much nearer the truth that the fraud of Serb political dominance—that is, Tito's world of political gangsterism backed by the Serb-controlled secret police—collapsed into a sea of nationalist discontent that had been latent from the Yugoslav state's inception. But the notion of stopping the fighting and "restoring" a multiethnic status quo ante seized American imaginations and ultimately became the organizing imperative of the Dayton accords.[4]

While Americans harbored alchemical dreams of turning nationalist lead into multicultural gold in the Balkan laboratory, European leaders sought a solution that would end the fighting without changing territorial boundaries in the region. Fearful that Yugoslavia's violent disintegration could set dangerous precedents in other European states with large minorities or even accelerate the exodus of culturally alien Balkan peoples to the prosperous states of the European Union, NATO's Western Europeans continued to insist on the inviolability of the internal borders of the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia. The result was a decision at Dayton to create the new nation-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[5] All ignored the reality that the wars of extermination waged since 1992 by various nationalist leaders seeking to carve out new states for themselves and their peoples had breathed new life into the older ethnic, cultural, and religious traditions that Tito had suppressed for fifty years. These points were lost on the Western public, which concluded, once the conflict disappeared from nightly television reports, that the nasty ethnic war was over. The settlement reached through U.S. military and diplomatic action and without American casualties seemed a great achievement and became an important feature of the Clinton

[4] Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 363.
[5] Ibid., p. 241.

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administration's program to sell U.S.-led operations in the Balkans to Congress and the American electorate. Only American and allied troops on the ground in Bosnia periodically reminded the viewing public of NATO's open-ended commitment there.

Bosnia, Five Years Later

Despite proclamations of progress towards Dayton's goals, ethnic hatreds and organized crime still swirl just beneath the deceptively calm surface and gain strength from disillusionment with the artificial state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consistent with the trend since Tito's death, democratic elections in the region have tended to reinforce separatism rather than encourage multiethnicity. In the April 2000 municipal elections that attracted the lowest voter turnout to date, the hard-line nationalist parties in the Croat- and Serb-controlled areas retained their political strength. Not even the so-called moderate parties in those areas advocate multiethnicity, despite their calls for economic and democratic reform. Only urbanized Muslims in two of the region's largest cities demonstrate a willingness to support multiethnic government. Meanwhile, Sarajevo has purged its Slavic heritage and transformed itself into a "Muslim" city. For Serbs and Croats, the message is unmistakable. The "multiethnicity" imagined at Dayton means homogenization within an artificial Bosnian identity. Predictably, Belgrade and Zagreb remain much more powerful magnets for Serbs and Croats than does Sarajevo.[6]

When fighting erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the early 1990s, 5.2 million people lived in the region. Of the roughly 2 million residents displaced during the war, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees reports that about 800,000 currently live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of those displaced persons, who previously lived as minorities in majority areas, very few have returned to their former homes because of the hostility and insecurity they would face there. The Clinton administration, while touting apparent successes in Bosnia, fails to mention that those few refugees who do return to areas in which they are minorities are tolerated by the local majorities only because they are mostly over the age of fifty, have no children, and consequently pose no threat to the dominant group's control. In any case, if all minorities attempted to return to their homes, NATO would have to quadruple its troop presence to protect them. This would be politically untenable because it would not only prevent the gradual withdrawal of NATO troops, but also put U.S. troops at increased risk of casualties. The billions of dollars invested by the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina have neither

[6] Jeffrey Smith, "Outside Efforts Do Little to Mend Fractured Bosnia," *Washington Post*, Jan. 23, 2000. Also see Alex Djilas's response to Noel Malcolm, "Djilas Replies," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 1999, p. 138; and Misha Glenny, *The Balkans, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804–1999* (New York: Viking Press, 2000).

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changed the essential character of the Tito-era socialist economy nor fostered self-sustaining prosperity. In sum, neither the artificial state of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the tenuous peace that now holds would be viable without thousands of NATO troops and massive foreign aid.

The Kosovo Debacle

Historians note that it is from the festering humiliations of great peoples that arrogant falsehoods and propaganda spring. The violent dissolution of Serb-dominated Yugoslavia combined with the ambitions of political demagogues to provide Serb and Albanian nationalism with a powerful inspiration in Kosovo. By 1998 Kosovo was already a political, economic, and security catastrophe for Belgrade, and President Slobodan Milosevic's popularity among his Serb constituents had sunk to an all-time low. It was not implausible to suggest that the Milosevic regime would eventually have been destroyed by events in Kosovo had NATO not inadvertently rallied the Serb nation behind the president.

Belgrade's control over Kosovo was doomed once the Yugoslav military began to resist Milosevic's attempts to use it to implement policy in Kosovo. Serb police officers treated an assignment to Kosovo as a virtual death sentence, and hundreds of officers ordered to Kosovo in 1998 simply refused to deploy. General Momcilo Perisic, the Yugoslav army chief of staff, urged Belgrade to limit the use of force in Kosovo and resisted Belgrade's pressure to employ VJ formations in direct action against the Albanian insurgents. Among the civilian population in Kosovo, order broke down as Kosovar Albanian refugees fled to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and thousands of Kosovo's Serbs left for Montenegro and Serbia. While these events did not escape the notice of NATO's European leaders, their reactions were tempered by awareness of the Kosovar origins of their continent's most dangerous criminal gangs and allegations of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) links to terrorism and organized crime. Thus, most European leaders greeted American proposals for air operations against the Serbs in 1998 with considerable skepticism.[7] In fact, some European ambassadors to NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) were reluctant to consider bombing unless both KLA and VJ forces in Kosovo could be attacked from the air. Since this was beyond the capabilities of U.S. and allied air power, the idea was never taken seriously. However, in the view of the U.S. government, the KLA was changing from a terrorist organization into a legitimate irregular

[7] Ariane Barth et al., "Das Geschäft ist alles: Wie sich Albaner-Clans mit der italienischen Mafia arrangierten" (Business is everything: How Albanian clans came to terms with the Italian mafia), *Der Spiegel*, no. 31, 1999, pp. 43–67. Current fundraising for the KLA is believed to center on the International Islamic Front, founded by Osama bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist leader in Afghanistan, which has a wing in Britain. See David Bamber and Chris Hastings, "KLA Raises Money in Britain for Arms," *Daily Telegraph* (London), Apr. 23, 2000.

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army and was increasingly portrayed by U.S. leaders as a group of "freedom fighters" or "liberators." Still, a consensus for military action in the NAC did not yet exist.

In the fall of 1998, the NAC acquiesced in U.S. and British proposals to assemble allied air power in Italy in order to pressure the Yugoslav government. But the preferred plan was Ambassador Richard Holbrooke's arrangement with Milosevic, which introduced a U.S. and European observer mission into Kosovo from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because that option supported the OSCE's goal of reintegrating Yugoslavia into Europe rather than attacking it. At the time, NATO's European members made it clear that only a significant outrage committed by Serb forces against the Albanian population would move them to intervene, and if then, only from the air.

That attitude changed after press reports of the massacre of Kosovar Albanian civilians by Serb police in the small town of Racak evoked memories not just of the Holocaust, but of the Bosnian Serbs' recent atrocity at Srebrenica. Military action now had the support of horrified Europeans, who disregarded reports of numerous KLA violations of the cease-fire regime negotiated by Holbrooke. Still, one more drama had to play out before the air campaign could begin—Rambouillet.

U.S. military power in Kosovo did not match the interests under threat.

A discussion of what occurred at Rambouillet is beyond the compass of this essay, but its results are not. General Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, warned the NAC that air strikes should not be undertaken without the readiness to conduct offensive operations on the ground. His counsel was ignored, as was the historical lesson that international pariahs such as Milosevic or Saddam Hussein cannot be bombed out of office. Instead, the experience in Bosnia in 1995 buttressed confidence in Brussels and Washington that a series of swift and violent air strikes would, within three or four days, demonstrate to the Belgrade government the futility of resistance to NATO and lead it to pull back its forces. The OSCE observer mission was withdrawn, and NATO's leaders agreed to attack the Serbs—provided NATO ground troops were not involved. These leaders apparently disregarded the criticality of NATO ground forces because of domestic political considerations. Clearly, the White House still felt keenly the backlash from U.S. Army casualties in Somalia.[8] Moreover, the U.S. experience with air operations in the years since Desert Storm might have suggested to policymakers in Brussels and Washington that as long as military operations were brief and cost the lives of no NATO pilots, the public was unlikely to become deeply concerned.

[8] John Barry and Evan Thomas, "The Kosovo Cover-up," *Newsweek*, May 15, 2000.

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Usually, when the United States contemplates the use of military power, the national command authorities take care to ensure that the military action corresponds to the U.S. interests under threat. In this case, the fit was poor. The stated objectives of the air strikes were to stop Serb aggression against Kosovo's population, induce Serb compliance with the provisions of the Rambouillet document, and compel the Yugoslav army and police to withdraw from Kosovo. In the words of the U.S. secretary of defense, the objective was "to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo."[9] The decision to intervene preceded development of a coherent strategy to address the range of issues from specific political-military objectives to conflict termination. As the air campaign played out, it became clear that NATO's planes could do little from 15,000 feet to influence events on the ground in Kosovo. In the absence of NATO ground forces positioned to invade, the widely dispersed Yugoslav forces presented poor targets for aerial attacks. In addition, the high personal and political stakes for Milosevic made him willing to tolerate a significant amount of destruction of Yugoslavia's military and civilian infrastructure. For the Yugoslav president, yielding to NATO meant not only that he would have to terminate VJ operations in Kosovo and surrender another portion of Yugoslavia's sovereign territory, but also that he would enter Serb history as the man who gave away the venerated medieval site of Serbia's last stand against the hated Muslim Turks.

Regardless of NATO leaders' expectations at the onset of the air campaign on March 24, 1999, Serbia and its military quickly rallied behind Milosevic. Though equipped with 1970s technology, the VJ reacted to the U.S.-led air campaign with considerable skill and determination, and by April 1 had nearly completed its offensive to crush the KLA. Though not completely eradicated from Kosovo, the KLA was never an effective opponent for the VJ after that date. Air strikes under more favorable weather conditions in late April and May had little or no effect on the dispersed and expertly camouflaged Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, but did destroy bridges, factories, power lines, and communications systems that will ultimately require years, and billions of Western dollars, to repair.

Five days after the air attacks began, the expulsion of nearly 800,000 Albanians from Kosovo started in earnest. The Western media's reporting of this event persuaded millions of Americans and Europeans that rational discussion and compromise were impossible with the Serbs. Although this situation would later change, in early April the images of destroyed homes and fleeing Albanians seemed to validate the air operation's broader purpose of punishing the Serbs.

However, from the Serb viewpoint, sound military reasoning justified

[9] House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on United States Policy toward Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Statement of Secretary William Cohen, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 15, 1999, HASC 106-13.

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the expulsions that had been characterized by the media as ethnic cleansing. Faced with a population that concealed and supported the insurgent KLA, the Yugoslav forces did exactly what U.S., French, and British forces have done in counterinsurgency operations: they expelled the population and removed the insurgency's base of support. From a military perspective, the effects were highly beneficial to VJ operations. First, Albanians equipped with cell phones could not easily observe and report the presence of Yugoslav forces to NATO if they were sitting in Albania or FYROM. Secondly, the flood of refugees into potential staging areas for NATO ground forces in contiguous states made offensive ground operations nearly impossible and diverted NATO military assets into humanitarian operations. Lastly, because of the fears among Orthodox Slavs in FYROM of an ethnic Albanian uprising, these actions punished the FYROM government for allowing NATO to turn its country into a platform from which to attack Serbia.

As the flood of refugees ebbed and the air attacks dragged on, European and American leaders realized that the military operation could last for months or even years. At this point, it is again instructive to consider the use of American military power. Because few Americans or Western Europeans knew much about Kosovo, and because none had been told why their countries' soldiers, airmen, or marines should die to liberate it from Belgrade's control, avoidance of casualties preoccupied allied leaders. Their concern was evident not only in the refusal to employ ground forces against the VJ, but also in the priorities of the air campaign. Among the "measures of merit" provided by General Wesley K. Clark on March 24, 1999, to the U.S. and allied air forces, the *first* was not to lose any of their own aircraft. Only in second place came the directive to stop the Yugoslav army and police aggression against Albanians in Kosovo. The third priority was to protect allies and friends from attack by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and maintain alliance cohesion.[10]

The expectation among top leaders that the campaign would last just three or four days resulted in the initial selection of only fifty-one targets, focused on integrated air defense systems and command and control facilities. Very soon, however, it became obvious that the Yugoslav air defenses would prove more difficult (if not impossible) to locate and destroy. VJ troops continued to reinforce and supply their forces in Kosovo without interruption. Yugoslav air defenses, bad weather, complex terrain, and the limitations of target-acquisition technology mitigated the effects of relatively high altitude bombing. As a consequence, NATO had to increase the intensity of operations so long as Milosevic refused to capitulate to its demands. Without the ability to shape events in Kosovo, the air operation began to focus primarily on punishing the Milosevic regime, which required identifying new

[10] Statement on Kosovo issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Apr. 23–24, 1999. Press Communiqué S-1, (99) 62, Apr. 23, 1999, pp. 1–3.

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targets for attack throughout Yugoslavia. By the end of the air operation, slightly over one thousand targets had been approved for Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an area the size of Ohio. However, allied air forces often hit targets primarily because they were the only ones that had received the green light from President Clinton, key alliance leaders, and the NATO Council. This unwieldy approval process placed an enormous constraint on the campaign.

One obvious effect of the decision to bomb in and around Serb-populated areas, however, was to increase the likelihood of collateral damage and civilian casualties, and with it the probability that an erratic missile or targeting error would weaken the already-tenuous public support in Europe and the United States. NATO efforts to suggest that the few errors that did occur were insignificant when compared with the accuracy of most of the strikes fell on the deaf ears of television audiences appalled by images of "accidental" destruction.

It was perhaps inevitable that European and American public opinion would eventually oppose military action against a country that had never in its history threatened the United States or NATO. By the end of May 1999, more than 80 percent of Americans polled by CNN concluded that the air campaign should end.[11] The evils that the air strikes were theoretically launched to avert had been overshadowed by the suffering that they inflicted on the people of Serbia and Kosovo.[12] At this point, however, the policymakers in Washington and Brussels who had initiated the conflict discovered that they lacked the power to stop it.[13] Faith in the efficacy of bombing, born of the ostensible success of the campaign in Bosnia, turned out to have been misplaced. For American military planners, the air operations in May 1999 stirred memories of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965. Officers even wondered aloud if the U.S. Army would be ordered to prepare for a ground war, as it had been when the bombing offensive against the Vietnamese Communists failed. At the same time, European leaders urgently sought a diplomatic solution before a loss of consensus in the NAC jeopardized military action against Belgrade. In spite of Herculean efforts by the U.S. national command authorities, key European leaders, and General Clark, the third measure of merit—alliance cohesion—was now at risk.

Fortunately, on the seventy-eighth day of the air campaign the Belgrade government agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. The reasons for this decision were more self-evident than realized at the time. The

[11] According to the Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* poll results released on May 26, 1999, 82 percent of Americans polled supported the idea of temporary suspension of air strikes in order to reach agreement through negotiation. Only 40 percent supported the use of American ground forces, down from much higher levels of support recorded in April. See "Poll Releases: May 26, 1999, Support for U.S. Kosovo Involvement Drops" (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990526.asp).

[12] Edward N. Luttwak, "How a Splendid Little War Failed," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 23, 2000.

[13] Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 85.

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withdrawal of Moscow's support for Belgrade under great pressure from the United States left Serbia without any hope of assistance in its bid to retain control of Kosovo. At the same time, the destruction of Serbia's meager economy, whose output in 1998 was less than two-thirds as great as that of Fairfax County, Virginia, made further resistance impossible. Belgrade could have perhaps retained Kosovo, but without external support the Serb population would have starved or frozen during the following winter. Finally, Moscow warned Belgrade that it could not rule out a future U.S.-led ground offensive to drive the VJ out of Kosovo.

One of the most undesirable consequences of NATO's air campaign—and one that European leaders had sought to avoid—was to make the United States and the KLA de facto allies in the offensive to expel Yugoslav troops from Kosovo. The stridently anti-Serb rhetoric emanating from Washington and Brussels before and during the air campaign left little doubt that the NATO powers would enter into peace negotiations only on their own terms. In addition, the indictment of Milosevic as a war criminal encouraged false hopes and dangerous aspirations among the KLA for a "Greater Albania." For the KLA, the arrival of NATO forces on Yugoslav soil seemed to promise the means to drive out the few remaining Serbs and establish a close relationship with Albania itself.

Although the KLA publicly vowed to disarm in accordance with the agreement negotiated on behalf of NATO by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, commander of the Kosovo force (KFOR), few of the Kosovar fighters actually complied. In meetings between the KLA leadership and KFOR, the rebel group explicitly portrayed itself as the national security force. Although the KLA did initially withdraw from some areas and surrender some weapons to NATO, Western observers never considered the Kosovar force to have truly demobilized, nor had they ever expected that the KLA would voluntarily forfeit its military power.[14] It is customary for Albanian men to be armed, and it is worth noting that in fifty years of rule, the Serbs seldom tried to disarm the entire Muslim Albanian population of Kosovo. For NATO to undertake this task would have meant immediate war with the KLA in June 1999.

The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was supposed to address this problem in part by supplanting the KLA and satisfying the need for the trappings of an armed force. Naturally, the Albanians' desire for a national army stimulated much controversy for KFOR and the U.N. transitional authority, especially since the question of Kosovo's legal status remained unresolved and possession of an army would provide de facto evidence of

[14] At the invitation of the KFOR commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, this author visited the sites where those weapons turned in by the KLA were stored. In most cases, the surrendered weapons were old and in poor condition, many dating back to World War II. Modern automatic weapons remain under KLA control today. KFOR authorities were well aware of this fact and reported this to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE).

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sovereign statehood. Theoretically, the KPC was to conduct humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations and consist largely of unarmed firemen, construction crews, and rescue teams. Today, the KPC's true character varies in practice from area to area within Kosovo, but Kosovar Albanians regard the KPC as an army in waiting. Among themselves, KPC leaders still address each other by military rank, even though NATO officers do not recognize these ranks. It is clear that if the United Nations and NATO fail to meet Albanian expectations, core elements of the KPC will form the cadre of a resurrected KLA.

As in 1995, the use of violence itself engendered new obstacles to peace.[15] No amount of international goodwill or economic assistance will soon, if ever, overcome the hostility between Serbs and Albanians that the air operations only intensified. It should therefore come as no surprise to find that Kosovo's Albanian leaders press their strategic advantage by orchestrating violence in places like Kosovska Mitrovica. In Pristina during June and July of 1999, an organized campaign of murder and terror sought to drive Serb civilians out of the city. After the torture and murder of three Serb faculty members at the university in Pristina, the plan worked. It is equally unsurprising that drug trafficking, smuggling, and prostitution have returned to the province with renewed strength because, especially in Kosovo and Albania, the income they generate translates readily into political power.[16]

Kosovo, Two Years Later

What, then, is the situation of American and allied soldiers in Kosovo today? The reality can be grasped by a comparison to Britain's peacekeeping role in Northern Ireland. Few people now remember that the minority Catholic population initially welcomed British troops as protection against the Protestants who tried to burn them out of their homes. But within two years of their arrival, British soldiers started to die at the hands of the Irish Republican Army. For the Orthodox Christian Serbs whose friends and relatives are killed by Muslim Albanians, the failure of the allied force to protect them makes NATO at best an occupier and at worst an enemy. To Kosovar Albanians who seek to rid their territory of Serbs and achieve total independence from Yugoslavia, NATO troops are betraying the Albanians' trust, making them legitimate targets for rogue elements of the KLA.[17]

[15] Bernard Edinger, "Analysis—Kosovo Crisis Looks Dim at Sharp Edge," Reuters, Feb. 17, 2000.

[16] See Norbert Mappes-Niedek, "Mehr ein Sumpf des Verbrechens als eine Insel der Stabilität" (A swamp of crime rather than an island of stability), *Der Standard* (Vienna), June 12, 2000, which outlines the dramatic upsurge in prostitution, heroin trafficking, and smuggling and notes that Albanians have committed 1,027 murders in the months since NATO's occupation of the province began in June 1999.

[17] Elena Becatoros, "Albanians Lose Trust in Peacekeepers," Associated Press, Feb. 19, 2000.

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In the United States, the finger pointing has begun.[18] Republican and Democratic senators raised questions about General Clark's order in March 2000 to send U.S. troops into Kosovska Mitrovica, where sixteen French peacekeepers were wounded trying to halt street clashes between Albanians and Serbs. Responding to White House concerns, General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subsequently instructed General Clark not to send significant numbers of American troops outside their sector "except in emergencies."[19] After spending $4 billion to bomb Serbia, many people question the current role for U.S. troops on the ground in Kosovo. The explanation is complex, but critical to an understanding of how U.S. and allied military power can be usefully employed in the future.

It is the business of statesmen and diplomats to make the use of force unnecessary. But if military power is used, they must ensure that the political-military objectives are attainable and that the resulting settlement is viable. This is especially critical in coalition warfare because, over time, each ally thinks only of itself. Kosovo is no exception. The U.N. Security Council resolution that suspended the fighting in Yugoslavia states simply that Kosovo will become a self-governing, autonomous province within the territory of Yugoslavia under U.N. administration. It does not provide a clear and unambiguous cloture that would allow for NATO's eventual disengagement and withdrawal.

Nine months after intervention on the ground in Kosovo, U.S. and European military leaders began privately to think that NATO's military strength was being squandered in pursuit of unattainable multiethnic social and political structures. Soldiers in the region know that throwing money at the problem is not enough.[20] Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, none of the key NATO players is really willing to invest the time, troops, or resources necessary to preserve the problematic status quo in Kosovo—and Bosnia. The reasons for this attitude have less to do with the nobility of NATO's purpose in the Balkans than with domestic concerns that limit the duration and power of the military intervention.[21] In the absence of a significant threat to their national survival, most of the mainstream European political parties favor significant cuts in their respective national defense budgets, and peace-support operations in the Balkans have done nothing to change that priority. Few Americans understand the complexities of the

[18] Elaine Grossman, "US Military Debates Link between Kosovo Air War, Stated Objectives," *Inside the Pentagon*, Apr. 20, 2000, p. 1.

[19] While not totally prohibited, all out-of-sector operations by U.S. forces must have prior approval by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The U.S. components of the Strategic Reserve Force do not require such prior approval, but during the recent Dynamic Response exercise the U.S. exercise area was altered late in the planning to ensure that U.S. forces remained in their own sector.

[20] Jason Sherman, "Not There Yet," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Aug. 2000, p. 10.

[21] Elena Becatoros, "With Morale Low, Some in Kosovo's UN Police Force Decide to Go Home," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Feb. 11, 2000.

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Balkan region, and their representatives in Congress have no political incentive to provide explanations. Without a regional solution that rests on the foundation of European consensus and the mutual interests of European states, the inevitable decline of the U.S. military presence in the region will produce a gradual redistribution of power that over time could doom the Balkans' Muslim minorities. The question for Europe and the United States is how to avoid this outcome.[22]

From a military standpoint, an attractive model for NATO's peace-support operations is the peacekeeping operation in the Sinai that resulted from the Camp David accords, which costs just $50 million a year, has the support of the United States, Egypt, and Israel, and involves 15,000 troops. By comparison, the current multinational force in the Balkans requires 100,000 troops and far greater costs. A crucial difference is that the conditions lying at the heart of the Balkan conflict—intermingled populations that refuse to coexist in peace—keep a Sinai-type solution beyond the reach of NATO and the United Nations. Successful peace-support operations in the Sinai depended upon a policy separating Israelis and Egyptians.

To date, the U.S.-led alliance has not met the challenge of restoring stability in a region where so-called peace settlements are merely facades behind which the local parties prepare for future hostilities. To understand this failure, three critical observations are in order. First, at some point in their struggles to become nations, most peoples—including those of Europe and North America—have engaged in the horrific practices of ethnic cleansing and population exchanges. Simply put, the Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs, and Albanians are now building their own nations through a process well known to every modern nation-state.

In their struggles to become nations, most peoples have engaged in ethnic cleansing.

Secondly, the European Union did not make its own internal boundaries irrelevant after World War II by using American military power to enforce multiethnicity. Rather, the presence of U.S. military power in Cold War Europe guaranteed the survival and economic development of the European peoples *separately* within the territorial boundaries of Europe's nation-states. Today, Europe prospers, and German, French, Italian, and Polish youth regard the Second World War as the modern equivalent of Europe's Dark Age. If NATO's military strength were to be employed in a similar fashion today, the attitude of Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs, and Albanians

[22] On May 9, 2000, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an amendment terminating funding for the U.S. presence in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless Congress specifically authorizes its continuation. Moreover, unless the European Commission, the EU, and the European members of NATO have made specific commitments of assistance to Kosovo by July 15, 2000, funds are available after that date only for the purpose of U.S. withdrawal.

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might resemble that of the rest of contemporary Europe in thirty or forty years.

Thirdly, the U.S. State Department advocates a political settlement in the Middle East based on ethnically "pure" states for one simple reason: it will eventually offer the only chance for a fledgling Palestinian state to deal with the hard task of becoming politically viable *before* becoming multiethnic. A similar policy, along with similarly unlimited patience, could also be applied to the Balkans.

A Way Forward

These points suggest a solution that will not please everyone, but one that nevertheless promises to be more realistic and stable than the current approach. The people who live in the former Yugoslavia should decide their future at the polls, even if their elected representatives vote for partition from Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. Substituting a confederation for the federation called for in the Dayton accords would preserve the independent existence and future prosperity of all the Balkan peoples within their own polities, thereby promoting long-term stability. By contrast, a federal structure centered on Sarajevo or Pristina or Belgrade would inevitably subordinate minority populations to majority rule and threaten the survival of one or more ethnic groups. Removing the requirement for a multiethnic federal state would also rob the region's hard-line nationalists of the issue that sustains their political support.

This solution could affect the peoples of the former Yugoslavia in numerous ways. For the Serbs in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo who loathed Milosevic, Vojislav Kostunica's political triumph and nationalistic aspirations will likely make unification with Serbia more appealing than ever. Resurgent nationalism, in turn, could increase Bosnian Serbs' determination to confederate with Belgrade rather than with the Bosniacs, since the latter option would be seen as violating the unity of Yugoslavia. In Montenegro, Kostunica may be unable to contain the drive for independence in any case.

For Bosniac Muslim leaders, the confederation proposed here would require that they accept the reality that instead of outright sovereignty, they can enjoy regional independence, including their own courts, judiciary, police, and elected government. Because the Bosnian federation has been an American client state since its inception, the new confederation would require that the United States help the Bosniacs fashion a more realistic future.

Given the desire of the new Croatian leadership to integrate into the European Economic Community and NATO, there is every reason to believe that Zagreb would uphold a confederation that encompasses both Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. Such an arrangement would also be much easier to achieve than a federal system that subordinates non-Muslims to Muslim rule.

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For the Croats living in Herzegovina, who until recently were allowed to vote in Croatian national elections, confederation with the Muslims would not preclude their membership in the larger Croat nation. In fact, Croat independence from Sarajevo within a confederation with Muslims would give the new leadership in Zagreb latitude in its dealings with compatriots in Herzegovina as well as a stake in the success of the new political arrangements.

For the Albanians in Kosovo, disengagement from the Yugoslav federal state through confederation could offer real separation from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav state they despise and the possibility of closer cooperation with Albanians in contiguous states if they so desire. In return for this solution, Kosovo's emerging elected leaders would recognize the Serb minority's property and civil rights within the Serbs' respective areas. This solution could also resolve tensions stemming from Kostunica's commitment to Yugoslavian unity and from the European Union's strong opposition to an independent Kosovo. In the absence of some guarantee that they will not be dominated by Serbs within Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians may press harder than ever for full independence and could even resort to armed action against U.S. and allied troops.[23] Kosovo's successful disengagement from Belgrade's control through confederation would also set a precedent for nonviolent conflict resolution that could prove critical to long-term stability in FYROM. How long the Muslim Albanians in that country will want to remain part of a larger Orthodox Slav state is unclear. But if at some point the Albanians in FYROM decide to change their political status in FYROM and confederate themselves with either the Orthodox Slavs or their cousins in Kosovo, this should occur without violence.

All of these points suggest that Western leaders must acknowledge the legitimate nationalistic aspirations of all parties without demonizing the Serbs or Albanians. It also means that asking Kostunica to compromise with the West on Montenegro's independence or Kosovo's long-term future outside of Yugoslavia will require flexibility from the West on the question of the Bosnian Serbs' probable desire to confederate with Serbia.

Simply accepting the will of the people at the ballot box is not all that is required. Struggles for control of "hotspots" like Brcko and the Gorazde corridor in Bosnia or the Trepca mine complex in Kosovo will have to be resolved by the Contact Group nations (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in consultation with the regional leaders who emerge from the elections. The wishes of people who voluntarily opt to live in any one of the new states will have to be respected. But ending policies that force people into a form of coexistence they would otherwise reject could transform NATO's peacekeeping role in the Balkans. Instead of continuously dealing with a multitude of local power struggles,

[23] Jeremy Grant, "Analysis—Western Thaw with Belgrade May Radicalize Kosovo," Reuters, Oct. 10, 2000.

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massive internal social dislocation, and competing organized crime syndicates, all of which require widely dispersed and vulnerable ground forces, NATO could focus simply on preventing conflict between the new states. Peace-support operations would thus be based on the assumption that formerly warring states have agreed to NATO's assistance to help them live in peace and pursue economic prosperity. Smaller contingents of U.N. and NATO ground forces, reinforced by air power, would remain along the territorial boundaries to ensure unobstructed travel between the entities.[24] In the absence of ethnic confrontation, the United Nations could work to secure economic and political development while international law-enforcement agencies turn their attention to the real threat to prosperity and the rule of law in the region: organized crime.

Power and Principle

In the fall of 1876, the disputed results of the U.S. presidential election threatened to revive the war between North and South. President Ulysses S. Grant conferred with his closest military advisers, Generals William T. Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan, and outlined a compromise solution. The Republican candidate would succeed Grant as president on condition that the U.S. Army end its occupation of the South and halt Reconstruction. Sheridan, adamantly opposed, swore that the Democrats would not win at the ballot box what they could not win on the battlefields of the Civil War. He went on to insist that with a million bayonets the South could be compelled to accept the rule of federal law and view African Americans as equals. Sherman, however, supported the compromise, saying: "No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people in the South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation."[25] Grant listened to Sherman, and his decision averted a resumption of civil conflict. Echoing a similar sentiment, General John Jumper, the commander in chief, U.S. Air Forces Europe, stated in September 1998 that bombs and missiles would not solve the problem on the ground in Kosovo, and cautioned that there would be "no easy answers in Kosovo."[26] Military power has its limits.

This is not an argument against military intervention or peace-support operations. On the contrary, the use of force to establish basic law and order is a fundamental prerequisite to any form of successful civil administration,

[24] Jakkie Cilliers, "Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity: Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?" in *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (Pretoria, S. Africa: Institute for Security Studies and the Government of Sweden, 1999), p. 145.

[25] James E. Safton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865–1877* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 254.

[26] Steven Komarow, "Warning: Airstrikes Not Solution in Kosovo," *USA Today*, Sept. 16, 1998.

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without which an early return to peace and stability is impossible. Since this type of military intervention is characterized by interdependence between political and military leaders, it requires clear goals and attainable objectives. However, the use of military power in the context of any unclear and self-deceptive policy, regardless of its intent, is wasteful and potentially dangerous.

Today, it is hard for some to understand how American forces ended up in the Balkans, a region often perceived as an exclusively European concern. What they do not understand is that Americans, not Europeans, created the situation that exists today in Bosnia and Kosovo.[27] The United States adopted a course of action that NATO allies eventually had to support. As former national security adviser Anthony Lake said after his meetings with NATO allies to press for military action in Bosnia in August 1995, the "big dog had barked." Until recently, most European states were comfortable with America's leading role in European affairs. However, "bombing for humanitarian purposes" and committing NATO military power to well-meaning but unattainable political goals has led many Europeans to question this approach.[28] Since 1996, Clinton administration officials have argued that military intervention in the Balkans would both preserve NATO's collective defense organization and create a new military instrument to extend stability and security to the rest of Europe. In retrospect, many Europeans are beginning to think that U.S.-led intervention disregarded the political morality that stems from respect for the interests of other nations. Americans should not miss the point that European discomfort with operations in the Balkans has reinvigorated the formerly moribund European strategic defense identity.[29]

In the end, the real measure of whether the Clinton administration made the right decision to involve the United States and NATO in the Balkans will be determined not by good intentions in 1995 or 1999, but by results. If fighting eventually resumes in the former Yugoslavia because American leaders insist on an unrealistic political framework for the region, then history will judge the United States harshly. In fact, the artificial stability created by NATO military power in the region is reminiscent of J. F. C. Fuller's comment on the aftermath of World War I: "Our civilization was unable to make peace, because it had forgotten how to make war. War had lost its significance, and when the cease-fire sounded, its meaning monopolized its end. All that

[27] Amos Perlmutter, "Kosovo as Viewed from London," *Washington Times*, Mar. 22, 2000. Also see William Pfaff, "After NATO's Lies about Kosovo, It's Time to Come Clean," *International Herald Tribune*, May 11, 2000. Lars-Eric Nelson, "The Big Air War in Kosovo Was Costly Scandal," *New York Daily News*, May 12, 2000.

[28] William Pfaff, "Germany's Special Relationship with U.S. Is Ending Badly," *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 28, 2000.

[29] John Keegan, "The U.S. Is Not Amused by Our Redundant Military Gestures," *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 6, 1999. Also see William Pfaff, "Falling Out over European Defense," *International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 13, 2000.

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happened was, the conflict continued in another form; therefore, there could be no peace."[30]

But the most serious repercussions of the Balkan intervention may turn out to extend far beyond that remote peninsula. Frustrations with the region's seemingly intractable problems may convince U.S. policymakers that intervention is pointless, that Fortress America should revert to splendid isolation. At the same time, delusions about the recent war with Belgrade may suggest that the high-tech U.S. military's overwhelming superiority allows leaders in Washington to pursue goals, however muddled, with impunity.[31] If either or both of these interpretations become widespread, the United States risks losing more than the confidence of its allies. The United States is and must remain a European power. But will European security and U.S. strategic interests fall victim to imperious and impulsive decision making, or will they thrive under reliable American leadership?

[30] J. F. C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War 1789–1961* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 217.

[31] For a good summation of this thinking, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1998–99, p. 73.

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Can the U.S. and India Be "Steadfast Friends"?

by Joel E. Starr

When our eight-person congressional staff delegation flew into New Delhi on January 9, 2000, four months had passed since Congress lifted economic sanctions against India for its May 1998 nuclear weapons test. It had been three months since the United States rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although Washington was still pressuring India to sign.[1] A week before our arrival, India had exchanged three Kashmiri Islamic terrorists for 160 hostages hijacked aboard India Airlines flight 814. And as our plane landed, the seventeenth Karmapa, the second most prominent Tibetan lama behind the Dalai Lama, fled Tibet for India. The *Times of India* captured this crisis-to-crisis atmosphere in a front-page cartoon depicting a cabinet meeting in which one Indian minister turns to another and whispers: "He [Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee] is talking about the hijack crisis out of habit! This meeting is about solving the Lama problem."[2]

E. M. Forster once advised a friend traveling to India: "As for being bored, don't mind it. . . . You will never get hold of anything in India unless you experience boredom."[3] I was never bored in India, but still managed to "get hold" of a few things. Most notably, I reached three conclusions after our serial briefings by India's Defense Planning Staff. First, the United States should recognize the worldwide threat posed by Pakistan's support of radical Islamic terrorism. This observation, combined with Pakistan's Kargil border war against India and subsequent military coup in 1999, convinced me that President Clinton should not have visited Pakistan during his South Asia trip

[1] The U.S. Senate voted down ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-28) on October 13, 1999, by a vote of 48 yeas to 51 nays, 1 responding present. *Congressional Record*, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 145, no. 138, p. S12548.

[2] Laxman, "You Said It," *Times of India*, Jan. 14, 2000.

[3] Jeffery Paine, *Father India: Westerners under the Spell of an Ancient Culture* (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), p. 139.

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in March 2000. The Pakistanis must be made to realize that regional actions have global security consequences. Secondly, India must relent in its fifty-year-long opposition to international involvement in solving the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Thirdly, assuming that India agrees to international participation, the United States should offer itself as an honest broker in this matter and devote the same level of attention and resources to resolving it as it has to the Middle East peace process. By doing so, Americans could both reduce future threats of terrorism against themselves and move toward strengthening their post–Cold War relationship with India, whose importance to Asian and indeed global stability will only increase.

Pakistan, Pistols, and the "Balkanization" of India

The Indian Ministry of Defense is housed in South Block, one of three government buildings that includes the former British viceroy's house on Raisani Hill in New Delhi. Called by one architectural historian "the most wonderful architectural undertaking of modern times," these massive structures stand as a monument to the British Raj.[4] A combination of Classic and Renaissance styles in sandstone, topped by Indian motifs of domes and minarets, and surrounded by elephant-shaped topiary, it is a magnificent layout reminiscent of (and in my opinion surpassing) the grandeur of Washington's Capitol Hill. Once inside the ministry, however, we dodged pigeons flying down the halls on the way to our first military briefing. Designed in 1913 and completed in 1930, well before air conditioning, the building includes numerous openings to catch the breeze in a climate where temperatures can reach 115 degrees Fahrenheit. It seems that the ministry has not yet succeeded in enclosing the building.

When we sat down in an air-conditioned room, naval stewards served tea with milk and sugar before officers from India's Defense Planning Staff began an efficient audio-visual briefing, which proceeded like an order of battle.[5] First, a navy commander explained in rapid-fire fashion, with the aid of detailed geographic transparencies, that India has 7,600 kilometers (km) of exposed coastline where "enemies" could land and 15,000 km of inland borders abutting six other nations, as well as a maritime border with the island of Sri Lanka.[6] Of these neighbors, Pakistan's border perimeter is six times smaller than India's, while India's common border with China runs

[4] Sir Banister Fletcher, *A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method*, 14th ed. (London: Charles Scribners Sons, 1948), p. 866.

[5] India's Defense Planning Staff, created in 1986, is made up of senior officers from all three service branches. It is charged with developing overall national security strategy and advises India's Chiefs of Staff Committee, the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. See James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, eds., *India: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1996), p. 581.

[6] India shares land borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The island of Sri Lanka lies close to India's southeastern coast.

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3,440 km. China, the commander added, also illegally holds 40,000 square km of Indian territory as a result of its invasion in 1962. Although India enjoys good relations with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, all those states are dominated by the Chinese. Moreover, ballistic missiles have rendered virtually meaningless the Himalayas as a physical barrier between China and India. Finally, since China has close military relations with Pakistan and both countries possess nuclear weapons, India is caught in a "nuclear sandwich." Not surprisingly, therefore, Indians claim that they have no choice but to maintain a nuclear arsenal of their own. On a somewhat more reassuring note, the commander did add that India opposes any first use of nuclear weapons, supports a moratorium on future nuclear tests, and wants to pursue total nuclear disarmament. He also stated that India would never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. But that may be of little consolation, considering that the only non-nuclear flashpoint in the region is Sri Lanka.

Next, an army brigadier general advanced to the podium and described India's main immediate security threat: Pakistan and Pakistani-sponsored terrorism. Since achieving independence from Britain and partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars (in 1947, 1965, and 1971). Dozens of border clashes, the most recent of which occurred from May to July 1999 in the Kargil Heights of Kashmir, have also killed thousands on both sides. What is more, throughout its existence, and especially in the last two decades, Pakistan has fought proxy wars against India using Kashmiri Islamic fundamentalists bent on independence from India. They are trained in "terrorist incubators" on the Pakistani side of the so-called Line of Control (LOC) that separates the two countries in the Jammu and Kashmir regions,[7] supplied with matériel and logistics by Pakistan's army and intelligence service, and funded by the multibillion-dollar narcotics trade.[8] Next to Indonesia, stated the brigadier general, Pakistan has the largest Muslim population in the world, and the country makes no secret of its support of these "freedom fighters" whose crusade it is to liberate Indian Kashmir.[9] There are currently thirty to forty Muslim terrorist camps along Pakistan's LOC where 2,500 terrorists train. This no-cost war reflects Pakistan's hope of administering "death [to India] by a thousand cuts," said the general. In 1999 alone, 507

[7] The Simla cease-fire agreement that ended the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war created the present LOC. Both countries also agreed to resolve the border issue on mutually acceptable grounds.

[8] The two centers of the narcotics trade in South Asia are the Golden Crescent (the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan) and the Golden Triangle (the border area among Myanmar, China, and Thailand).

[9] Actually, India has a larger Muslim population than Pakistan. Muslims make up 14 percent of India's population (140,118,790) versus 97 percent of Pakistan's (133,979,640). The overall population of India is estimated to be slightly over 1 billion, and that of Pakistan 138 million. See the following pages at Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook 1999* (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/country.html#I and /factbook/in.html#people and /factbook/pk.html).

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Kashmiri terrorists from these camps were killed in India while carrying out attacks.

When asked about Pakistan's ultimate goal, all the officers agreed with army Major General S. C. Chopra of the Planning Staff, who said that Islamabad seeks "the Balkanization of India and the swiping off of Kashmir for itself." They also agreed, however, with my assessment that Pakistan could end up far worse off if it actually succeeded, because those radical fundamentalists might return and declare a jihad on their former sponsors in Pakistan, thus adding another dimension to the phrase "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter."

If the amount of Kashmiri independence propaganda that bombards congressional offices in Washington is any indication of the commitment and funding of these "freedom fighters," then Pakistani officials would do well to take heed. The office of Congressman Tom Campbell (R-Calif.) receives reams of it each month. For instance, *Kashmir Today*, a monthly publication put out by the Kashmir Liberation Cell in Muzaffarabad (just on the Pakistani side of the LOC), devotes page upon page to *mujahideen* who "embraced martyrdom" in the fight for Kashmiri independence, and displays gruesome statistics in easy-to-read tables. For example, the December 1999 body count broke down as follows: *mujahideen* "martyred" (122), injured (6), and arrested (18); Indian soldiers killed (196) and injured (131); and Indian vehicles destroyed (7). It also listed the number of Muslim women molested—presumably by Hindu Indians (106).[10]

One would think that the world's two largest democracies would be natural allies.

After the first Defense Planning Staff briefing ended, we dodged more pigeons on the way to a more hands-on briefing in a small, windowless room crammed with light weaponry confiscated from Kashmiri terrorists. There were Soviet grenade- and rocket-launchers and AK-47s, but also antique rifles that looked as if they were used in the Afghan wars of the nineteenth century. We were first invited to handle the arms, then seated around a small table covered with approximately one hundred pistols of various makes and designs, all neatly arranged so that their gun barrels pointed in one direction—mine. In particular, a Pakistani-made 7.93 millimeter automatic pistol lay directly in front of me with its hammer locked back, ready to fire. I cannot remember the substance of the briefing because I was afraid of being shot. Immediately afterward, I picked up the weapon and found that the safety was off. After slowly uncocking the pistol and placing it on safety, I was relieved to find both the chamber and clip empty, but was unimpressed by the Ministry of Defense's display of gun safety.

[10] "Data of Deaths, Arrests and Atrocities Suffered by the People of Jammu and Kashmir at the Hands of the Occupation Forces during the Month of December 1999," *Kashmir Today* (Muzaffarabad, Pakistan), Dec. 1999, p. 30.

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The "Tilt" and the Cold War

U.S.-Indian relations have always been peculiar. One would think that the world's two largest democracies, with a shared history as British colonies, would be natural allies. The American civil rights movement was heavily influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's political application of the Buddhist belief in *ahimsa*, the way of nonviolence. It was, and is, India's policy of nonalignment, however, that seems to be the basis of a certain mutual wariness.

John Kenneth Galbraith tried to overcome this wariness when he served as U.S. ambassador to India during most of the Kennedy administration. When reporters asked him where America stood on India's nonalignment policy, he would always reply that the question presupposed that there was "something extremely dangerous in being helped by the United States. We were, in fact, quiet and steadfast friends."[11] Few believed him. He would then add a sentence that drove Secretary of State Dean Rusk crazy each time he said it: "[W]e are no longer seeking military alliances in this part of the world."[12] The fact is, that is precisely what the United States was doing.

Nonalignment had no place in the zero-sum U.S. strategic planning inherited from the Eisenhower administration: nations were either on one side of the Iron Curtain or the other. To formalize the structure of containment of communism, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles augmented NATO with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in South Asia. One of the key hinges in the system was Pakistan, which became a member of both Asian pacts. Dulles's "pactomania" officially ended with the inauguration of President Kennedy, but the United States still attempted to woo India out of its nonalignment and was frustrated by its lack of success.

Membership in these Cold War pacts entitled a participating state to U.S. military aid, and India suspected that Pakistan, in the words of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, had "other more likely uses" for such arms.[13] During the Nixon and Ford presidencies, Kissinger in fact had much to do with sustaining the policy of strategic alliances by engineering America's "tilt" toward Pakistan, beginning with the war of 1971.

After partition from India in 1947, Pakistan's two Muslim components, West and East Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory dominated by Hindus. Kissinger's memoirs explain how "Pakistan's very existence was an affront to Indian nationalists," who wanted their nation to embrace all of the former British Raj in order to validate India's secular ideology. Pakistan, in turn, was by the early 1970s desperate to achieve

[11] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1969), p. 485.
[12] Ibid., p. 150.
[13] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 846.

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worldwide legitimacy, which it seemed to lack because no government had served out its term before being overthrown by a coup—a fact that still resonates today. Consequently, "Pakistan, conscious that even the lowest-class Hindus believed themselves part of a system superior to the Moslems, looked on its larger neighbor with fear, with resentment, and occasionally with hatred. . . . Few neighbors had less in common."[14]

By 1971, the ongoing political instability in Pakistan had resulted in an exodus of some 7 million Hindus from East Pakistan (Bengal) into India. This circumstance provided justification for India to mount an invasion of Bengal when West Pakistani armed forces raided Indian airfields on December 6, 1971. The war lasted twelve days, during which Indian forces overran all of East Pakistan. The new state of Bangladesh arose in its place, thanks largely to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's "Bismarckian sureness of touch" (in the words of the South Asia historian Percival Spear). "It is clear," Spear wrote at the time, "that the balance of power within the sub-continent has been altered."[15]

But to U.S. policymakers like Kissinger, geopolitical considerations outweighed the regional issues that led to the India-Pakistan war. Specifically, India's "assault" on Pakistan, which was made possible primarily by Soviet weaponry and training, was interpreted simply as a power play by Moscow to "unnerve" all U.S. allies, along with "China, and the forces for restraint in other volatile areas of the world."[16] The inclusion of China among the "forces of restraint" was especially important for Kissinger at this time. The war between India and Pakistan began almost a year to the day after Pakistan's president, Yahya Khan, had served as a back-channel intermediary to China and delivered to Kissinger Zhou Enlai's invitation for Nixon to visit Beijing. At that time, Pakistan was in the unique position of being the only country in the world allied to both the United States and China. Given the potential for a major breakthrough in Sino-American relations (which was achieved in February 1972, when Nixon flew to Beijing), it was in America's geopolitical interest to tilt toward the Pakistanis. After all, they made Nixon's trip possible and were now being threatened by a hostile India, which was in league with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger's second volume of memoirs points out, nevertheless, that in the near term this "tilt toward Pakistan" (a phrase used by him in a White House National Security Council meeting on December 3, 1971, and leaked shortly thereafter to columnist Jack Anderson) was displayed more in words than in deeds. The United States did not supply more arms to Pakistan, and instead imposed a total arms and partial economic embargo on both com-

[14] Ibid., p. 845.

[15] Percival Spear, *A History of India*, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (New Delhi: Pelican Books, 1965; reprint, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 264 (reprint).

[16] Kissinger, *White House Years*, vol. 1, pp. 913–14.

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batants during the 1971 war. Afterwards, the U.S. Congress blocked all but a token amount of military aid to Pakistan.[17] In subsequent years, however, Pakistan did receive substantially more U.S. military aid, while India continued to receive Soviet arms. In return, Pakistan remained a Cold War ally, providing valuable intelligence capabilities to the United States during the Soviet war in Afghanistan after 1979 and serving as the transit point for Stinger anti-aircraft missiles dispatched by the Reagan administration to the Afghan *mujahideen.*

The logic behind this partnership died along with the Soviet Union. If the United States today wishes to maintain friendship, let alone cooperation, with its old Cold War ally, that relationship must be based upon mutual recognition of a new security threat: the spread of radical Islamic terrorism. To be sure, Pakistan's current position regarding Islamic terrorism is at cross purposes with that of India and the West, but that can and must change. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many of the victorious *mujahideen* have joined with Kashmiri freedom fighters in their armed struggle for independence. Three major rebel groups, the Hizbul-Mujahideen, Harkat ul-Mujahideen, and Lashkare-Taiba, have formed a loose coalition to coordinate and execute terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, in India from their sanctuary in Pakistan.[18] General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's current military ruler, gives these organizations free rein to operate within Pakistan's borders, as did his predecessor, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (whom Musharraf overthrew in a coup in October 1999). While Musharraf condemns terrorism and maintains that Pakistan only provides "moral and political" support to its Kashmiri brothers, he nonetheless fans the flames of the separatist cause.[19] In February 2000, for example, he went to a Kashmiri refugee camp and declared: "India is committing the worst kind of atrocities and state terrorism in the occupied Kashmir. But I am sure that the day is not far when the Kashmiris will achieve their goal of freedom." He concluded his remarks with a raised fist of unity.[20]

The logic behind the U.S.-Pakistani partnership died with the Soviet Union.

This is precisely the type of gesture that encourages more terrorism. That is why it is difficult to believe that the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 in late December 1999 took place without Pakistani involvement, especially given that Maulana Masood Azhar, one of the radical Muslim leaders freed in exchange for the airline passengers (minus one passenger who was stabbed to death), received a hero's welcome on the streets of Islamabad

[17] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 677.

[18] Pamela Constable, "Radical Cleric's Message Alarms U.S., Pakistan," *Washington Post*, Feb. 21, 2000.

[19] Pamela Constable, "Pakistani Ruler's Reform Agenda Mired in Politics," *Washington Post*, Feb. 10, 2000.

[20] "Immediate Danger of War Ruled Out: Pakistan a Responsible Nuclear Power, Says CE," *DAWN* (Karachi), Feb. 6, 2000 (http://www.dawn.com/2000/02/06/top1.htm). See also Constable, "Radical Cleric's Message."

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three weeks later.[21] Preaching hatred and holy war against India and the United States, he was finally taken off the streets and into "protective custody" by the Pakistani authorities. Such short-term actions, however, do little to halt the spread of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan, much less advance efforts to solve the issue of Kashmir.

A region of unresolved status and unreconciled peoples, Kashmir remains, in the words of Professor Spear, "in a class by itself."[22] The population of its northwestern mountains and Kashmir Vale is overwhelmingly Muslim or Buddhist, while Hindus constitute a majority in the east. The Kashmir and Jammu region could have easily joined either Pakistan or India upon partition, but ended up in India on the understanding that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru would hold a plebiscite to determine its final status. Having never found an adequate formula to carry it out, however, he left critics and historians to divine his reasons for holding on to Kashmir so tenaciously. Did he fear that the loss of a large and heavily Muslim province would delegitimize India's claim to being a secular, multicultural democracy? Did he fear that the loss would spark widespread resentment and persecution of the remaining Muslim minority elsewhere in India? Did he retain the northern provinces as a buffer against a hostile China? No one knows for sure, but neither can anyone know, as Spear perceived as long ago as 1965, "whether the remedy of independence [for Kashmir] or Pakistan union would be worse than the present disease of troubled relations."[23]

A Jolt from Washington

The United States can help solve the Kashmir problem by pledging substantial time and resources toward mediation, thereby giving General Musharraf a pretext to pull the plug on the "terrorist incubators" that are now the source of cross-border attacks and threats of terrorist acts directed at the United States. A settlement of the dispute would then permit Pakistan, which is on record as accepting international mediation, to concentrate on rebuilding its appalling economy.

The peace process could also expand to include mutual nuclear disarmament talks—a stated goal of India's Defense Planning Staff and one that could include China as well. A nuclear peace accord, in turn, could allow

[21] According to the U.S. State Department's 1999 annual report on terrorist nations, "Credible reports continued to indicate official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism such as the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). The hijackers of the Air India flight reportedly belong to one of these militant groups. One of the HUM leaders, Maulana Masood Azhar, was freed from an Indian prison in exchange for the hostages on the aircraft in the Air India hijacking in December and has since returned to Pakistan." U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*, publication 10687 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2000), p. 8.

[22] Spear, *A History of India*, p. 241.

[23] Ibid., pp. 253–54.

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India to redirect all of its nuclear resources toward the eradication of the country's 11.5 percent average daily deficit in energy needs.[24] That deficit is real and immediate, as demonstrated by three day-long blackouts in New Delhi during the month before our visit.[25]

India could also devote more rupees and brainpower to its maturing space program. On May 26, 1999, India launched into orbit its first foreign satellite payload atop its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and is on its way to becoming a major competitor in commercial rocket launching. But technological barriers still limit the PSLV's payload capacity, off-setting India's advantage in offering the world's cheapest way into space.[26] A shift of financial and intellectual resources from nuclear to aeronautical and space research and development could overcome this obstacle.

No peace process can take place, however, until Pakistan ceases to sponsor radical Islamic groups, Kashmiri terrorists stop their cross-border attacks, and India relents on its fifty-year-long refusal to allow international mediation of the conflict. Having failed to achieve the first two goals despite multiple diplomatic missions within the two last years, the United States must take stronger action to convince its former allies in Islamabad to forswear the terrorist weapon and accept mediation. A refusal by Clinton to stop over in Pakistan on his South Asia tour of March 2000 could have served such a purpose. A pointed snub during the first presidential visit to that part of the world since President Carter's in 1978 might have sufficed to jolt Musharraf into starting a peace process and might have even persuaded him to set a date for elections to return the government to democratic control.

Critics claim that the only likely effect of a cold shoulder from Clinton would have been to drive the Pakistanis further away from American influence. But that argument only begs the question: toward what would it have driven them? Another war with India would be disastrous for Pakistan, and a closer embrace of Islamic fundamentalism would ostracize the country. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban, the followers of Osama bin Laden, the Kashmiri militants, and the tens of thousands of Muslim radicals currently residing in Pakistan are not well enough organized to overthrow the Pakistani government. They could be in the near future, however, unless a peace process is initiated. What is more, as historical "jolts" go, a Clinton snub would have been relatively minor compared, for instance, with the events that started the Middle East peace process in 1973: Anwar Sadat's Suez attack and the Yom Kippur War.

The other barrier to a South Asian peace process, India's resistance to

[24] See *Destination Tamil Nadu* (Chennai: Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. [TIDCO], 1998), p. 3. See also TIDCO web site (http://www.tidco.com).

[25] Rahul Gupta, "Power Blacks Out in Delhi Once Again," *Times of India*, Jan. 11, 2000.

[26] Virendra C. Sharma and Thierry M. Faure, "Indian Launchers Aim at Commercial Market," *Aerospace America*, Jan. 2000, pp. 14–19.

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international mediation in the Kashmir dispute, presents a serious but not insurmountable challenge. Until now, India has defied United Nations resolutions and years of international insistence that it permit the people of Kashmir to determine their own destiny. Delhi's excuse has been that Pakistan violated a troop-withdrawal schedule fifty years ago and thus derailed the "proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan."[27] But the end of the Cold War removed the overlay of geopolitical considerations in South Asia, and Indians are loath to put at risk the present economic boom that has resulted from the government's long-overdue rejection of state planning in favor of free enterprise. Finally, India's military remains adamant about the threat it feels from China. These combined interests and concerns ought to be sufficient to motivate India's leadership to stop pointing fingers at Pakistan over events that occurred half a century ago and to invite American mediation in exchange for closer economic and military ties to Washington. Diplomatic overtures from the United States could go a long way toward initiating that process.

Conclusion

Predictably, President Clinton's five-hour stopover in Islamabad on March 25, 2000, failed to yield any perceptible progress. A senior administration official said as much in a House International Relations Committee debriefing on Capitol Hill two weeks later. The State Department, he said, "does not know how this [the Islamabad stopover] will turn out. It is still swinging in the balance." And when asked whether the trip to Pakistan was "a wash," the official stated, "It tended to come out as it did before. At least we know where we stand. To our friends in Pakistan, Clinton showed recommitment." But the official also conceded that Islamic extremists there might have reached a different conclusion. He imagined them saying, "'Now we know where he stands—nowhere,' because Clinton did not deliver anything. 'Now we turn to our real friends: Afghanistan and China.'"

The same official offered an even gloomier outlook three months later in another Capitol Hill briefing. "The two countries are growing away from each other," he noted. "The number of those with memories of partition and pre-partition India are dwindling. They [Pakistanis] have a war attitude, and many worried Pakistanis have been telling me that this is Pakistan's last try at creating a stable, democratic nation."

Relations between India and Pakistan are more tense today than at any time since 1971. Musharraf shows no inclination to return the govern-

[27] *39 U.N. Security Council Official Records* (230th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/654 (1948), p. 5. See U.N. Security Council Resolutions 39 (1948), 51 (1948), 91 (1951), 96 (1951), and 98 (1952).

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ment to civilian control short of the three-year deadline set by Pakistan's Supreme Court on May 12, 2000. Massacres continue in Kashmir. The United States should make sure that twenty-two more years do not pass before another president has an opportunity to give India and Pakistan a jolt toward peace. For a positive U.S. role in a promising Indo-Pakistani peace process might at last allow India and the United States to become genuinely "quiet and steadfast friends."

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South Asia's Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy

by Mohammed Ayoob

Before he left on his trip to South Asia in March 2000, President Clinton referred to that region as "the most dangerous place" on earth. His comment was inspired by the perception shared by many in Washington that rising tensions over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, the world's latest nuclear powers, had created a volatile mix of fear and uncertainty that could have cataclysmic consequences.[1]

Indo-Pakistani tensions were heightened in 1999 when regular and irregular forces from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control (LOC) and infiltrated Indian-controlled Kashmir.[2] They succeeded in temporarily capturing some positions that the Indian army routinely abandons during the winter due to their great altitude. That incursion in the Kargil region threatened a strategic road connecting Leh, the capital of Ladakh in northeastern Kashmir, to Srinagar, the state's summer capital, and predictably led to a forceful Indian response when it was discovered in May. In July 1999 Indian military prowess and political determination on the one hand, and American diplomatic pressure on Pakistan on the other, forced the Pakistani-backed intruders to withdraw from the Indian side of the LOC.[3] The withdrawal defused the crisis, but left Pakistan's humiliated military leaders extremely bitter, and indeed contributed in no small measure to the military coup of October 1999

[1] President Clinton's comment reflected a National Intelligence Estimate prepared for him shortly before his trip. See Judith Miller and James Risen, "A Nuclear War Feared Possible over Kashmir," *New York Times*, Aug. 8, 2000.

[2] Despite Pakistani denials, it is now well established that the intruders were in overwhelming part regular soldiers of Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry (NLI), recruited primarily from the "Northern Areas" consisting of Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan. A Pakistani journalist documented this fact by meticulously researching over 500 war dead belonging to the NLI whose bodies were returned to the Northern Areas and buried without military honors in order to hide Pakistan's direct involvement in the Kargil incursions. See M. Ilyas Khan, "Life after Kargil," *Herald* (Karachi), July 2000.

[3] For details of the background to and the military operations in Kargil, see *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999).

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and the overthrow and incarceration of Nawaz Sharif, the civilian prime minister who had agreed to pull the Pakistani forces out of Indian Kashmir. He was replaced as head of government by one of the principal architects of the Kargil misadventure, General Pervez Musharraf, the army chief of staff. The Kargil episode also left the Indian political elite and military brass suspicious of Pakistani intentions, since the incursion was planned and executed to coincide with the Indian prime minister's goodwill mission to Pakistan in February 1999. The Indian press portrayed the operation as a brazen betrayal of the incipient peace process.

Indian anger at Pakistan's perceived duplicity increased when Pakistan-based militants hijacked an Indian Airlines plane on a flight from Kathmandu, Nepal, to Delhi in late December 1999. They demanded, and won, the release of three terrorists (two Pakistanis and one Kashmiri) from Indian prisons. While the Pakistani government denied any involvement, its connivance became clear when at least two of the freed terrorists turned up in Pakistan. One of them, Masood Azhar, enjoyed a hero's welcome in major cities there, and then publicly announced the creation of yet another terrorist organization in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to fight India in the Kashmir Valley. The free rein given by the Pakistan government to militant Islamic outfits augmented the perception of official Pakistani complicity in terrorism.

Any remaining doubts as to Islamabad's stance toward terrorism against India dissolved in the summer of 2000, when overt Pakistani pressure led one militant group, the Hizbul-Mujahideen, to end its recently declared cease-fire against Indian troops. Other militant groups carried out horrible massacres during the two-week period in which the Hizb's cease-fire had been operative in order to undermine it. The Hizb, under Pakistani pressure, was then forced to put forward conditions that were impossible for India to accept.[4] After the cease-fire was rescinded, further acts of savage terrorism in Srinagar buttressed the impression in India that Pakistan was not interested in curbing the activities of the terrorist organizations operating from its soil. It also put paid to all speculation about the resumption of bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. Indian leaders have insisted since the Kargil crisis that talks cannot begin until Pakistan stops, or at the very least drastically curtails, the cross-border infiltration of terrorists.

Clinton's Visit and American Policy

During his visit to India and Pakistan in the spring of 2000, President Clinton, while abjuring any intention of mediating between the two neigh-

[4] For a perceptive discussion of the Hizbul-Mujahideen's cease-fire offer and its precipitate withdrawal, see Jaideep E-Menon and Narayanan M. Komerath, "The Hizbul-Mujahideen Ceasefire—Who Aborted It?" *Bharat Rakshak Monitor*, Sept.–Oct. 2000 (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html).

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bors, exhorted them to resolve their conflict over Kashmir as a prelude to normalcy in South Asia. Official and unofficial rhetoric emanating from Washington before and during his visit constantly reiterated the advice to New Delhi that India could not play its rightful regional and global role until it had settled the Kashmir problem. The president's visit made it clear that Washington had decided to invest heavily in India both in economic and political terms. It also signaled that the United States had downgraded Pakistan's importance within its strategic framework. However, American policymakers still seem wedded to the idea that the two countries would be able to reach an amicable settlement of the Kashmir problem if only they, and particularly India, exerted themselves toward this end. This may well turn out to be a dangerous illusion that could inadvertently exacerbate the conflict in the Indian subcontinent by putting the status quo power (India) on a par with the power most opposed to the status quo (Pakistan), thereby encouraging the latter's destabilizing actions. Pakistan launched its Kargil campaign in the hope that alarm bells in Washington would lead to some form of American or other international involvement, for it is only through such intervention that Pakistan perceives a chance to extract from India the territorial concessions it seeks. In this sense, the American illusion about a negotiated settlement feeds the Pakistani delusion that it will be able to change the territorial status quo in Kashmir in its favor by manufacturing crises that threaten to escalate to nuclear confrontation.

To begin with, Washington needs to shed the simplistic notion that all conflicts can be resolved if only the parties to the conflict (and third-party mediators) are sufficiently reasonable and creative. Some conflicts, such as that over Kashmir, cannot be resolved to mutual satisfaction, because they are zero-sum games that go to the very heart of the national identity of the parties concerned. Any resolution of such a conflict will satisfy only one of the parties, namely, the one whose power is so great as to compel the other side to reconcile itself to an outcome it considers unjust. In accepting the outcome, the weaker party implicitly acknowledges its inability to change the balance of power in the medium or even the long term.

In the Middle East, it was precisely such a huge imbalance of power in favor of Israel that forced the Palestinians to come to the table in the 1990s and is currently forcing them to whittle down their demands even further. They realize that the alternative to negotiations could be an even worse outcome for them. In the case of the Kashmir dispute, one might have expected India, with its vastly superior strength, to have prevailed over Pakistan several decades ago. However, the regional balance of power has long involved far more than the inherent power of the two countries. As a result of external factors, primarily relating to the Cold War but also to the India-China equation, Pakistan was able to leverage its relationship with the United States (in the 1950s and 1960s, and again in the 1980s) and with China (from the 1960s onward) into an artificial balance with India that neutralized

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to a considerable degree the latter's superiority in the region. It is interesting to note that American involvement in the Middle East established and underwrote Israeli superiority, thus making a settlement feasible, whereas American involvement in South Asia made a regional settlement much more difficult by attenuating India's relative strength.

The United States, China, and the South Asian Order

Regional order can normally be maintained in one of two ways. One is for a pivotal or dominant power to act as the security manager for the region, legitimizing its hegemony by providing public goods for the other members of the regional system. In the North American regional system, for example, the United States acts as the legitimate regional hegemon. Alternatively, two powers of approximately equal strength can maintain stability by keeping each other's aspirations to regional predominance in check. Perceptions of shifts in the balance between them could destabilize such an arrangement, but moderate shifts would not threaten the overall order.

South Asia does not even approximate either of these ideal types. By any index of measurement, India is the preeminent and pivotal power in the region. It has long aspired to be the security manager of the entire subcontinent, an ambition most clearly embodied in the so-called Indira Doctrine enunciated at the beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war in 1983.[5] During the past dozen years or so India has also endeavored to act as the primary provider of public goods, both in economic and security terms, to its smaller neighbors. This policy has become enshrined in the Gujral Doctrine, which proclaims that India's approach to its neighbors in matters of vital interest to them will be based on the altruistic policy of nonreciprocity. In exchange, however, India expects the neighboring countries not to internationalize bilateral issues or support elements inimical to India's interests.[6] With this doctrine India strives to ensure that the smaller states of South Asia perceive its hegemony as benign, thus enhancing the legitimacy of its predominance in the region.

Unfortunately for India, a peculiar, even distorted configuration of power emerged in the Indian subcontinent from the 1950s through the 1990s and continues to cast its shadow on the region today. In substantial measure, it arose from American policies toward the region that were in turn dictated by Cold War considerations. In almost equal measure it was determined by intrusive Chinese policies that were (and still are) clearly based on Beijing's perception of India as a potential competitor in the wider Asian arena. Taken

[5] See P. Venkateshwar Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception," *Asian Survey*, Apr. 1988, p. 422.

[6] See Padmaja Murthy, "The Gujral Doctrine and Beyond," *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), July 1999, pp. 639–52.

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together, American and Chinese policies during the past fifty years thwarted Indian strategies aimed at translating Indian economic and military preeminence into legitimate predominance in South Asia.

The cumulative impact of these intrusive policies continues to be felt most strongly in the sphere of India's relations with Pakistan, which was the primary beneficiary of these policies. American military assistance, first from 1954 to 1965 and then in the 1980s in the context of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, helped Pakistan substantially to neutralize India's conventional military advantages in South Asia. Chinese transfers of arms and technology not only bolstered Pakistan's conventional capacity but, more importantly, provided Pakistan with the wherewithal for its nuclear weapons and missile programs.[7] Some sources have even alleged that China supplied Pakistan with the original design of the nuclear bomb China tested at Lop Nor in 1966, which resulted in Pakistan's carrying out one cold test in 1986 to verify the Chinese design.[8] Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs created a nuclear stalemate between India and Pakistan at least a decade before the tests of May 1998. During the 1980s, Washington's decision to turn a blind eye toward both Pakistan's incipient nuclear weapons capacity and the transfers of technology and material from China that made those programs possible provided Pakistan with the crucial window of opportunity to acquire a nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis India.

Arrested Unipolarity and India-Pakistan Relations

Taken together, Chinese and American policies toward South Asia created a situation of "arrested unipolarity" in the region. A genuine equilibrium between India and Pakistan could not, and cannot, be achieved because of the tremendous disparity in the inherent strength and resources of the two countries. Nevertheless, Pakistan's ability to acquire sophisticated conventional weaponry and strategic assistance for its nuclear and missile programs has led it to believe that it has achieved virtual parity with India. This has

[7] According to a congressional study commonly known as the Cox Committee Report, "The PRC reportedly supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7/M-11 mobile missile launchers and reportedly has provided Pakistan with the facilities necessary to produce M-11 missiles. The PRC provides Pakistan with assistance on uranium enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies that could be used in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program." *Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China*, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 3, 1999, HR 105-851, "General Overview," p. 37 of web edition (http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851). According to Robert J. Einhorn, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, American concerns about China's assistance to Pakistan "were specially acute in the 1980s but have continued even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992." U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 10, 1997, S.Hrg. 105-242, p. 8. See also Mohan Malik, "China Plays 'the Proliferation Card,'" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2000, pp. 34–36.

[8] Harold Hough, "Pakistan's Nuclear Status: Confusion or Strategy," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1995, p. 270.

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emboldened Islamabad to undertake policies to subvert the territorial and political status quo in South Asia, especially in Kashmir.

Arrested unipolarity is, however, an inherently unstable condition, because it encourages both India and Pakistan to pursue goals that are in direct conflict with each other. On the one hand, Pakistan aspires to convert the contrived equilibrium to a real balance of power by demonstrating that it can change the status quo in Kashmir without facing catastrophic results. On the other, India wants to ensure the stability and legitimacy of its regional predominance by proving that the Pakistani challenge to Indian power is based on false premises. New Delhi can do so credibly only if it can demonstrate that Islamabad's current posture of defiance and adventurism is based on transient and externally induced factors that are likely to disappear in the face of consistent Indian political and economic pressure.

Such Indian calculations may turn out to be correct in the long term, especially in light of Pakistan's domestic baggage: internecine conflict, ungovernability, and bankruptcy. In the short term, however, Pakistan's increasing audacity has brought India nothing but frustration. The continued infiltration of foreign mercenaries and terrorists into Kashmir and the deployment of Pakistani regular and irregular troops across the LOC into Indian-administered territory, which have escalated since the summer of 1999, may elicit a sharp response from New Delhi. It is now conceivable that India could take the conflict into Pakistani territory, first covertly and then overtly, with the explicit goal of hastening the process of Pakistan's disintegration.

An Indo-Pakistani conventional war could have a benign long-term effect.

It is important to point out in this context that until recently it was conventional wisdom in New Delhi that a stable and united Pakistan was in India's security interest. For two reasons, that consensus has now fractured. First, many security analysts and policymakers have come to the conclusion that given Pakistan's persistent belligerence, a fragmented Pakistan could not possibly pose any greater problem to Indian security than does the united country currently. Secondly, the disappearance of Pakistan itself from the political map of South Asia would explode the argument that the Muslim majority in Kashmir should accede to Pakistan on the basis of religion.

This erosion in the consensus among Indian strategists in favor of a united Pakistan removes a major barrier to an Indian decision to go to war with Pakistan should New Delhi decide that the situation in Kashmir has become intolerable. It is commonly assumed that an Indo-Pakistani conflict, even if limited to conventional arms, would have a terrible impact on regional stability. However, one can argue equally plausibly that by clarifying once and for all the fundamentals of the regional balance of power, such a conflict, limited to conventional warfare, may have a benign long-term effect on the construction and maintenance of regional order in South Asia. It may, in fact,

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turn out to be the only feasible way to resolve the two fundamental contradictions that have bedeviled India-Pakistan relations since 1947 and stymied all attempts to construct a stable and legitimate order in South Asia.

The Clash of Self-Perceptions

The first of these contradictions—New Delhi's and Islamabad's widely divergent conceptions of the subcontinent's optimal balance of power—has already been discussed. But an equally contradictory and dangerous element in the India-Pakistan relationship is the divergent self-perceptions expressed in the states' respective national identities. India's state-defined nationalism, despite the current challenge it faces from Hindu extremists, is principally based on the civic, territorial criteria of citizenship and equality of all citizens before the law. In the Indian political vocabulary, civic nationalism is termed secularism. The official version of Pakistani nationalism, on the other hand, is religio-cultural in its conception and privileges a particular religious group over all others. The majority religion, Sunni Islam, defines the contours of Pakistani nationalism. However, in the context of the universal Islamic *umma* (community of believers), Pakistani nationalism suffers from irreconcilable internal contradictions as well. This is the case because, in effect, the logic of the nation-state imposes territorial limits and because of its umbilical connections to Indian (rather than universal) Islam.

The important point to note is that the India-Pakistan conflict has an ideological dimension every bit as significant as considerations of the balance of power. The ideological contradiction is at least as difficult to resolve as the matter of the optimal power equilibrium in South Asia. The Pakistani military debacle in 1971 and the independence of Bangladesh should have settled the entire conflict, but, for two reasons, they did not. The first was India's unwillingness or inability to decimate the Pakistani military machine in the *western* sector during the 1971 war. The second was New Delhi's unwillingness, at the Shimla Peace Conference in June–July 1972, to force then–Pakistani president Z. A. Bhutto to accept immediately and unconditionally the LOC in Kashmir as the international boundary. Afraid of discrediting the new civilian regime in Islamabad and perhaps paving the way for the return to power of a revanchist military, India was unwilling to impose a victor's peace after the Bangladesh war. This reticence allowed the ruling elite in Pakistan to continue with the pretense, despite the loss of East Bengal, that Pakistan was created as a homeland for Indian Muslims and must therefore include all Muslim-majority areas inherited from British and princely India.

At the root of the dispute over Kashmir, and especially the Pakistani involvement in the insurgency and terrorism in the Kashmir Valley, is the fundamental opposition of Indian and Pakistani self-perceptions as nations. India can never again agree to concede territory on the basis of religion,

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because that would reopen all the wounds of partition and bring into question the loyalty of the approximately 130 million Muslims who presently reside in India. No government in New Delhi can afford to revisit the physical and psychological trauma of 1947. For its part, Pakistan, short of a convincing military defeat, cannot give up its claim to Kashmir without calling into question the very basis of its existence and the legitimacy of its ruling elite. It would appear, therefore, that only a war producing a clear winner and a clear loser might serve to resolve this impasse.

Nuclear Weapons and the Kashmir Imbroglio

Although the existence of nuclear weapons has raised the stakes of any war in South Asia, it would be wrong to suggest that the May 1998 tests nuclearized the subcontinent. India's first atomic explosion in 1974 demonstrated its rudimentary weapons capability, and leading Pakistani political and military figures publicly admitted their country's nuclear capabilities at least ten years before the 1998 explosions.[9] In the late 1980s, moreover, the Indian government, convinced both of Pakistan's nuclear capability and of China's crucial role in its development, decided to launch a full-scale nuclear weapons program and accelerate its indigenous missile program.[10] The tests of May 1998 merely confirmed to the outside world the capabilities possessed by both countries.

Nuclear deterrence, whether one called it "existential" or "recessed," had thus become a part of the South Asian security landscape by the time the first phase of the Kashmir insurgency reached its peak in the crisis of 1990. Some analysts even linked the restraint demonstrated by India and Pakistan at that time to the existence of this deterrence.[11] Others, however, have argued that Pakistan's decision to increase its support for the insurgents in

[9] The first credible statement appeared in March 1987 in an interview given to an Indian journalist by A. Q. Khan, the principal Pakistani scientist involved in enriching uranium to produce nuclear devices. According to Khan, "They told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we have done it." Kuldip Nayyar, "We have the A-Bomb, Says Pakistan's 'Dr. Strangelove,'" *Observer* (London), Mar. 1, 1987. Gen. Aslam Beg, then the Pakistani chief of army staff, confirmed this assessment in an October 1989 interview, and again in 1993. See Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan 'Responding to Change,'" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Oct. 14, 1989, p. 779; and "Pakistani Quoted as Citing Nuclear Test in '87," *New York Times*, July 25, 1993.

[10] According to K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian security analyst with personal knowledge of the Indian nuclear program over almost three decades, "The first Indian nuclear deterrent came into existence in early 1990." K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964–68: A Personal Recollection" in *Nuclear India*, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 44. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, the father of the Indian missile program, confirmed that assessment, with a slight variation in dates, and former Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao also confirmed that the Indian nuclear program was fully weaponized during 1992–94. *From Surprise to Reckoning*, p. 205.

[11] Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," *International Security*, Winter 1995/1996, pp. 79–115. For opposing views, see Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., *Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis*, Occasional Paper no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Apr. 1994).

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Kashmir was related to its possession of nuclear capability. According to them, Islamabad calculated that India would not be inclined to escalate the proxy war into a full-scale one for fear of nuclearizing the conflict. In other words, possession of nuclear capability may have in fact led Pakistan to raise the stakes in Kashmir and spark the crisis.

Whatever the merits of these positions, the real test of whether and how nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan will work is likely to come in the next year or two. The problem with nuclear deterrence lies first and foremost in its conceptual ambiguity. According to one interpretation, nuclear deterrence prevents all forms of war between nuclear powers, although not necessarily proxy wars such as those fought by the superpowers in Afghanistan or Angola. According to another theory, nuclear deterrence prevents nuclear war but still permits the conduct of conventional war between nuclear powers. The proponents of the first interpretation point to the successful avoidance of war between the superpowers during the Cold War. However, new evidence points to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were closer than most people imagined at the time to engaging in a nuclear exchange during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.[12] Those who favor the second interpretation point to the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and the Kargil conflict of 1999, which were fought with conventional weapons by states in possession of nuclear weapons.

The Indian nuclear doctrine, in abjuring the first use of nuclear weapons, takes its cue from this second interpretation. It rests on the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons deters their use. As a consequence, India does not need to use its nuclear arsenal in the context of a purely conventional conflict, which remains—even between nuclear powers—a real possibility.[13] Pakistan, on the other hand, seems to base its faith in the capability of nuclear weapons to deter *all* interstate war, conventional and nuclear, although localized proxy wars remain possible.[14] Pakistan's strategy with regard to Kashmir, therefore, relies on the calculation that nuclear weapons will deter India from escalating the low-intensity conflict in Kashmir, in which Pakistan enjoys inherent advantages, to a full-fledged conventional war, in which the advantages would favor India.

The United States, Nuclear Weapons, and Kashmir

These contradictory interpretations of the concept of deterrence make the current situation in South Asia extremely dangerous because they entail

[12] James G. Blight et al., *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).

[13] For details, see *Indian Nuclear Doctrine*, draft report prepared by the National Security Advisory Board, New Delhi, Aug. 17, 1999 (http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html).

[14] See the statement by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan's army chief of staff, in A. R. Siddiqui, "COAS Views on Relations with India," *Nation* (Lahore), Apr. 29, 1999.

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the constant risk of nuclear brinkmanship. Given the wide perceptual gap between New Delhi and Islamabad, either side could act in a manner consistent with its own understanding but provocative to the other party, thereby inadvertently escalating the crisis to the nuclear level. It is here that the American role becomes crucial. For unless the United States adopts a proactive policy toward South Asia, the competing interpretations of deterrence could be tested sooner than many people seem to realize.

As a result of Pakistan's continued unwillingness to stop the acts of violence and terror perpetrated by foreign and local militants who infiltrate the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region from its territory, the Indian government is under great pressure to take the battle to the enemy. It could do so by striking across the LOC or the international border at bases and camps where infiltrators and insurgents are trained and equipped. Borrowing a page from Israeli policy, some in New Delhi talk about creating a "South Lebanon"–type zone across the LOC and portions of the India-Pakistan border. So far, the Indian government has resisted the temptation to make forays across the LOC and the international border, both because it does not want to escalate the conflict and invite international intervention and because it still considers the economic and political price of the insurgency in Kashmir manageable.

How Pakistan would respond to an Indian counterstrike is the million-dollar question.

However, increasing acts of mayhem and carnage, such as the massacre in early August 2000 of more than one hundred civilians (most of them Hindu pilgrims from other parts of India on the way to the shrine in Amarnath), are likely to erode the government's will to resist popular pressure to launch counterstrikes in Pakistani-controlled territory. The Indian armed forces have also made it clear to the political leadership that they would prefer to counter future Pakistani incursions by crossing the LOC and/or the international boundary at locations of their choice. A major lesson that the Indian military learned from the Kargil conflict is that it is likely to suffer much heavier casualties by restricting its activities to the difficult terrain on the Indian side of the LOC and therefore needs to strike across the LOC or the international border to force Pakistan to withdraw from Indian-controlled territory.

How Pakistan would respond to an Indian counterstrike of that sort is the million-dollar question. Would Pakistan decide to use the ultimate weapon, knowing full well that it would be writing its own death warrant? Or would it decide to reduce its involvement in Kashmir and accept the LOC as the international boundary in order to terminate a conventional war short of a total Indian victory? While it is possible that the military leadership in Pakistan, trained in the "rational" art of Clausewitzian warfare, would adopt the latter course, that outcome cannot be guaranteed. Pakistan's increasing Islamization (with echoes of the Afghan Taliban) and the infiltration of a "jihadist" mentality into its armed forces make it very difficult to assume that

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Islamabad will react within a framework that others would consider rational. It is in this context that clear thinking and unambiguous articulation of policy on the part of Washington could tilt the balance decisively between war and peace, stability and disaster.

Washington must communicate clearly to Islamabad that the latter's brinkmanship over Kashmir is not going to pay any dividends. President Clinton spoke plainly in his televised address to the Pakistani people during his brief stopover in Islamabad in March 2000. But in order for the message to get through to Pakistan's rulers, it should be constantly and loudly repeated. The State Department, and especially the Pentagon, which has had long-standing and close relations with the Pakistani officer corps, must make it clear that pursuing the current posture on Kashmir will isolate Pakistan and turn it into a pariah state. Moreover, Islamabad must be told in no uncertain terms that if Pakistani provocations lead to Indian conventional retaliation across the LOC or the international boundary, Washington will consider such action to be justified. Above all, Islamabad must understand that any nuclear threats in the context of a conventional war with India will immediately bring a decisive American response, possibly even the forced denuclearization of Pakistan.

America's Stake in India

In addition, the United States needs to make it plain that its strategic and economic interests in India are too important to be jeopardized by Pakistani adventurism. India matters to the United States not merely as a large market and a provider of information-age goods and services. It matters because important U.S. strategic and political interests coincide with those of India. These include countering terrorism, managing nuclear proliferation, and containing China.[15] Indian and American interests have begun visibly to converge with regard to China, which most Indian strategic analysts perceive as the primary security threat to India and many in Washington consider the principal strategic competitor to the United States both in Asia and worldwide.[16]

The United States has, therefore, come to have a fundamental stake in the health of the Indian polity and economy and in India's capacity to provide a major counterweight to forces in Asia that are clearly antagonistic toward American interests. However, Washington has yet to realize that India can play the role of a major friendly power only if it is able to secure—and preside

[15] See Mohammed Ayoob, "India Matters," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2000, pp. 27–39.

[16] See the Cox Committee Report; Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., *The United States and a Rising China* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999); David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," *International Security*, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 52–79; and Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 2000, pp. 53–63.

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over—a stable and legitimate order in South Asia. This is a goal that Washington must come to share with New Delhi if it is to promote its own interests in Asia in the next half-century. A benign order in Asia can be achieved and maintained only on the basis of cooperation and strategic coordination among the United States, India, and Japan. This is especially the case since China's long-term interests appear to run contrary to those of the United States, as well as to those of India and Japan, in fundamental ways.

In light of these considerations, it is essential for the United States to neutralize Pakistan's capacity to continue making mischief in Kashmir lest it impede major American strategic objectives and ruin the prospects of maintaining the stability of Asia as a whole. If all else fails, Indian arms may eventually be able to put an end to Pakistan's adventurism—but not without increasing the threat of escalation to the nuclear level. It would be much safer for all concerned if the United States and its allies put pressure on Pakistan to desist from training and infiltrating mercenaries and militants into Indian Kashmir and eventually to accept the LOC as the international boundary between India and Pakistan.

It is difficult to see how the current scenario, which assumes Indian restraint in the face of Pakistani provocation, can endure indefinitely. Eventually, either Pakistan will have to disengage completely from its involvement on the Indian side of the LOC or India will be forced to take the battle into Pakistani-controlled territory and probably into Pakistan itself. The United States can play a crucial role in conveying the message to Islamabad that Indian patience is running out. By doing so, it would save the region and the world from a major crisis that could inadvertently turn nuclear. It is time that South Asia was moved close to the top of the American foreign policy agenda. There is too much at stake in the region, especially in India, for Washington to address problems there only fitfully and sporadically.

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Review Essays

Choosing Tragedy in Vietnam
by Francis J. Gavin

American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. By David E. Kaiser. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. 576 pp. $29.95.)

Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. By Fredrik Logevall. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 443 pp. $35.00.)

Historical analysis, at its best, tries to answer two fundamental questions about the past: why did certain events happen, and what agent or agents, be they persons, institutions, or impersonal forces, caused them to happen? This may sound like an easy task, but given the complexity of social and political interactions, ever changing over time, it is nearly impossible. The assignment of causality is further complicated by the natural human desire for the past to make sense and have a deeper logic. Hence, historians are expected to speak with authority, impose order, and discover patterns among infinitely varied and seemingly random human experiences. Finally, consumers of history invariably demand value judgments about the agents of historical change. Was John F. Kennedy an inspirational leader or a capricious scoundrel? Was industrial capitalism exploitative and polluting or the greatest force for human advancement? Such moral demands on the historian are made in the (perhaps naive) belief that by understanding the past we can avoid its mistakes in the future and find some sense of justice and reason where, at first glance, none exists.

Nowhere is this desire for understanding, order, and judgment stronger than when the origins of wars are at issue. Wars often seem to be entirely irrational acts. Innocent people are killed, wealth is destroyed, and rarely (in modern times) does any belligerent nation, even the winner, emerge better off than it was before the conflict. Why, then, do nations fight each other, and how can individual policymakers "choose" to risk or provoke war when to do so flies in the face of the national interest?

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Consider the historiography on the origins of the First World War. Since no convenient culprit such as a Hitler, Napoleon, or Stalin could be blamed for that tragic conflict, scores of historians have focused instead on impersonal forces beyond the power of human agency to control. Shifts in the balance of power, misperceptions, arms races, imperial ideologies, simmering domestic political forces, and even military railroad schedules have all been blamed for World War I, implying that policymakers were helpless to stop them from pushing Europe toward an inevitable or inadvertent conflagration. It all seemed as if Sir Edward Grey, Tsar Nicholas II, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, not to mention their dozens of advisers and the millions of citizens who cheered the declarations of war, did not want to fight, but were in no position to prevent war.

Many historians have likewise advanced structural explanations, broadly defined, to account for U.S. military policy in Vietnam, a war that almost everyone agrees was a debacle. Did America's domino theory about states' falling to communism, or the need to reinforce the "credibility" of Cold War commitments, or a racist ideology, or a capitalist quest for new markets, or some domestic political dynamic somehow "cause" U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia? All these and other impersonal forces have been suggested as the key to understanding what otherwise seems inexplicable—how an enormously popular and powerful president, seconded by the wisest and most talented men in the land, could initiate a tragic conflict in the very years when the Cold War appeared to be entering a more stable and less dangerous phase.

There is a certain appeal to these structural, impersonal explanations for war. The idea that a panoply of intelligent and democratically elected or duly appointed statesmen could consciously undertake, with the support of their citizens, actions that would bring the nation and their own political careers near to ruin is very unsettling. Furthermore, to focus on impersonal historical forces makes the evaluative part of the historian's job simpler. Putting capitalism, racism, or train schedules in the dock is much more comfortable than indicting Dean Rusk as a war criminal.

But structural, impersonal explanations simply cannot adequately explain U.S. military escalation in Southeast Asia. As an economic endeavor, the Vietnam War was an obvious disaster, begetting a decade of stagflation and decline. There was no real market worth fighting for in Southeast Asia, and no natural resource worth the cost. Japan, on whose economic behalf it is often claimed we fought the war, had already lost two more important markets (China and Russia) and reoriented its economy toward the American market with tremendous success. If racism were to blame, then why did the United States not insert ground troops or initiate massive strategic bombing campaigns in Africa during the Cold War? The credibility argument is also unconvincing, because America's European allies consistently *opposed* escalation, and even their fears of the Soviet Union were declining dramatically in the 1960s.

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Tragic Choices

These and other impersonal forces may well have played a role in America's policy in Southeast Asia, either as motivations or justifications. But as David Kaiser and especially Fredrik Logevall reveal, there was much more room for "contingency" and choice than previous histories have allowed. Obviously, the global Cold War against communism and the particular fears of its spread in the postcolonial world framed the options available to U.S. policymakers. However, both *Choosing War* and *American Tragedy* systematically undermine the argument that America's military escalation in Vietnam was in any way inevitable or necessary. Kaiser and Logevall even rewrite the traditional timelines of the U.S. descent into Vietnam, and in the process reassess the causal weight of the two events previously seen as key to America's military escalation: the overthrow of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in the fall of 1963 and the decision to send U.S. Marines to Da Nang in the spring of 1965. It has often been argued that the Kennedy administration's approval of the coup against Diem irrevocably bound the United States to supporting an increasingly hopeless struggle against the Viet Cong. But Logevall and Kaiser convincingly demonstrate that while this event was important, it was not determinative, and numerous opportunities existed to shift American policy away from increased military commitment throughout 1964. Similarly, both authors underplay the importance of the much-studied July 1965 discussions within the administration about escalating the conflict in Vietnam. They demonstrate that the decision for war had been taken much earlier, during the weeks and months after Johnson's landslide victory in the 1964 elections.

Fredrik Logevall's *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* is a major scholarly work that will become the touchstone for any future discussion of the origins of America's military escalation in Vietnam. The book is well written, accessible, and based on a wide array of new sources that place Vietnam policy in an international context. Logevall's concept of the "long 1964" (roughly from August 1963 through the summer of 1965) also provides a useful way to examine one of the great counterfactual questions of the Cold War: how would U.S. policy in Vietnam have evolved had Kennedy not been assassinated? Logevall's nuanced answer departs from both extremes in the "what if JFK had lived" debate. Kennedy was not committed to escalation after his government encouraged a coup against Diem; there was still enough room to maneuver for a negotiated withdrawal. On the other hand, Logevall does not believe that Kennedy had definitely decided to pull out of Vietnam completely. American policy would have been different, and escalation less likely, but beyond that it is unclear exactly what policies Kennedy would have pursued in 1964 and 1965 had he lived.

As it happened, Logevall contends that the Johnson administration's

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decision to go to war was the result of a series of discrete choices made by top American policymakers, and those choices were not forced on either the Kennedy or Johnson administration by domestic political pressures. Following the assassination of Kennedy, and especially after Johnson's own electoral landslide, the Democratic administration had a great deal of room to maneuver and in fact was more free than ever to shape American public opinion on Vietnam. Nor were Vietnam policies the distorted product of bureaucratic politics. The key people involved in those choices did not fool themselves. They understood that achieving victory in Vietnam would be extremely difficult even in the best-case scenarios (an admission made by Robert S. McNamara in his latest apologia).[1] The policymakers pursued escalation despite what they knew to be long odds against meaningful victory. Indeed, many people outside of the executive branch of the U.S. government, including important senators, most elite journalists, academics, and America's allies, all thought that escalation was a terrible idea. But not only did their warnings go unheeded, the Johnson administration went to great lengths to muzzle, muffle, or discount dissenting voices. Perhaps the most depressing of Logevall's arguments is that the most urgent task facing the United States during the "long 1964" was *not* defeating the Viet Cong or North Vietnam, but preventing the government of *South* Vietnam from ending the war. One of the terrible ironies of the Diem coup is that both the Minh and Khahn governments that followed seemed more inclined to pursue negotiations with the North than had Diem. The Johnson administration desperately wanted a stable government that would enthusiastically fight the Viet Cong. At the same time, no real Saigon government could survive for long if it was too closely associated with the United States and its policies. The Johnson administration eventually ended this dilemma when it shifted American policy away from stabilizing the South Vietnamese government toward escalating employment of U.S. military power.

The key people understood that victory in Vietnam would be extremely difficult.

There are other surprises in Logevall's thoughtful book. Senator Mike Mansfield and especially George Ball at the State Department are taken to task for not articulating their concerns about escalation more forcefully when opportunities arose. Ball, one of the heroes of Kaiser's account, is revealed by Logevall to be an ambitious schemer who willingly played the role of devil's advocate but never made a real effort to steer U.S. policy away from escalation. Furthermore, *Choosing War* paints a picture of American foreign policymakers as men obsessed with undermining French efforts to bring about negotiations. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations' almost pathological distrust of Charles de Gaulle prevented the United States from pursuing

[1] See Bruce Kuklick, "McNamara's Struggle for Understanding," *Orbis*, Winter 2000, pp. 166–74, a review of McNamara's *Argument Without End*.

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several respectable avenues out of the conflict. *Choosing War* proves that the costs of Franco-American acrimony were very high.

David Kaiser's *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War*, by contrast to Logevall's, is merely a good book. Kaiser effectively connects U.S. policy toward Laos with developments in Vietnam and gives a far more detailed account of military operations in Vietnam than does Logevall. He also makes an original argument to the effect that the incrementalism that characterized U.S. escalation was dictated by logistical constraints rather than the limited-war strategies supposedly associated with flexible response. Kaiser is far less restrained than Logevall on the "what if JFK had lived" counterfactual. For Kaiser, Kennedy alone tore off the blinders imposed by his generation's worldview to recognize that South Vietnam was not worth heavy American casualties.

While *American Tragedy* covers much of the same ground as Logevall's study and posits many of the same arguments, it has some shortcomings, not least a lack of humility. Kaiser claims to have "provided by far the most thorough and best-documented account yet of the American decision to go to war," but a footnote comparison makes it clear that Logevall would have been more justified in that boast. Logevall also does a better job of making a "thorough attempt to place the issues of Vietnam and Laos within a broader international and domestic context," though it is Kaiser who makes that claim (p. 7). In any case, it is probably asking for trouble to compare oneself, as Kaiser does, to Thucydides.

Such self-promotion only makes genuine flaws less excusable. For instance, Kaiser lays most of the blame for the Vietnam War, after Johnson, at the foot of Dwight D. Eisenhower. This seems unfair, since Eisenhower essentially inherited a U.S. commitment to Vietnam that began in 1950, when the Truman administration decided to recognize the government of Bao Dai and provide massive assistance to the French military effort in Vietnam. Furthermore, that commitment must be seen in the context of the early and mid-1950s, when Japan was still weak, the Korean Peninsula was explosive, and the United States was pressing France to accept the distasteful medicine of West German rearmament. None of those factors was as potent by the time Johnson came to power. While Eisenhower's policies were not beyond reproach, he did in the end avoid a war in Southeast Asia, and the restraint he demonstrated during the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis would have served the country well during the "long 1964."

Kaiser likewise writes about Eisenhower's nuclear policy as if he were unaware of the scholarship that provides a more nuanced view of the New Look,[2] and on several occasions confuses contingency plans for policy. The

[2] For an excellent analysis of Eisenhower's complex and evolving ideas of nuclear weapons while president, see Andrew Erdmann, "'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution," in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, ed. John Lewis Gaddis

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mere existence of plans, either to use nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia or to pull troops out of South Vietnam, does not mean that they constituted the actual policy of the administration involved. During the 1920s and 1930s, the United States even had contingency plans for wars against the United Kingdom and Canada, but those plans hardly reflected true policy. As Eisenhower himself often pointed out (citing Helmuth von Moltke the elder), at the time of decision "plans are nothing, but planning is everything."[3]

On balance, however, Kaiser has written a compelling and important study that has already provoked much discussion. At a time when historical examination of high-level foreign policymaking is held in disrepute in some circles and political scientists dominate scholarly discussions of international relations, we should be grateful for *American Tragedy* and *Choosing War.* Both reveal how detailed historical work can bring to life the contingent and time-bound nature of policymaking and the sovereignty of policymakers, however imperfect, in the face of impersonal forces.

The Discipline of Responsibility

In fact, it is just that conclusion that renders Kaiser's and Logevall's accounts of American military escalation in Vietnam so deeply disturbing, and for reasons that go beyond the death, destruction, and injustice that besmirch all wars. Pursuing a military solution in South Vietnam was not in America's national interest, as realists such as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morganthau pointed out at the time. Kaiser and Logevall convincingly argue that the war was *not* forced on Lyndon Johnson by bureaucratic, domestic political, economic, balance-of-power, or other structural factors. Domestically, those on the far right were politically impotent. America's Cold War policies to stabilize Western Europe and Japan had succeeded beyond the wildest hopes and dreams of leaders in the late 1940s. The Sino-Soviet split was an open secret, and the only thing preventing its full fruition was U.S. policy in Vietnam. Soviet foreign policy was a shambles, and China was entering the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution. Why, then, did Lyndon Johnson and his advisers "choose war," especially since many of these same advisers had worked diligently in 1962 to avoid nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis and helped initiate a "mini-détente" with the Soviets through the signing of the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963? These were not, after all, mindless warmongers or ideologues.

Perhaps the answer to this apparent puzzle lies precisely in the fact that Vietnam was *not* so important. Consider that throughout the Cold War U.S. policymakers showed remarkable restraint and good judgment during crises over issues that really mattered, that is, crises in which a blunder could

and Jonathan Rosenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[3] Quoted in Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, foreword to *Waging Peace: Eisenhower's Strategy for National Security*, by Richard Immerman and Robert Bowie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. vii.

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have undermined core American interests or sparked a large-scale war with the Soviet Union. When forced to concentrate and weigh real risks, American strategists exercised what might be called a "discipline of responsibility." Hence, in policy toward Germany and Japan, European reconstruction, arms control, the Berlin crisis, the missile crisis, and the end of the Cold War—that is, truly important questions—U.S. policymakers achieved excellent outcomes and advanced national interests while minimizing the risk of war. But for every Cuban missile crisis successfully surmounted there was a Bay of Pigs adventure utterly botched. For every test-ban or nonproliferation treaty wisely concluded, there was a half-baked coup such as that against Diem. For every stunning opening to China, there was an ill-conceived bombing of Cambodia. What is more, the same dynamic seems to be at work in U.S. foreign policy today. Since no life-or-death issues or balance-of-power constraints serve to enforce the discipline of responsibility, the United States has entered willy-nilly into military commitments in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and South America for a mixture of transitory and minor reasons. Whenever the stakes are small, it seems, American foreign policy comes unhinged.

No vital Soviet or American interest was threatened in Vietnam. No matter what he claimed, LBJ had to understand that the conflict in Vietnam presented almost no danger of global war. What is amazing in retrospect is how unimportant Vietnam was to the United States, how in geopolitical terms it did not matter whether we won or lost. By 1979 the United States was allied with the Chinese, who were themselves at war with the Vietnamese. To be sure, Laos and Cambodia went communist, but the other dominoes, instead of falling, became very wealthy. The implications of *American Tragedy* and *Choosing War* are not easy to take. No great historical force compelled U.S. escalation in Vietnam, and one searches in vain for a deeper logic, larger meaning, or convenient moral to draw from the American experience there. Kaiser and Logevall, by confronting such disturbing realities head on, remind us that good history can, and perhaps should, confront deeply troubling questions that elude easy answers.

Radios, Rebels, and Rollback
by Kevin J. McNamara

Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain. By Peter Grose. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. 256 pp. $25.00.)

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Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956. By Gregory Mitrovich. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000. 235 pp. $34.95.)

Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. By Arch Puddington. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000. 416 pp. $27.50.)

In the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy uttered the old chestnut to the effect that "victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan." Historians of the Cold War, however, have often turned that notion on its head. Why the U.S. victory in the Cold War has largely been orphaned by the history establishment is perhaps traceable to the sudden and unexpected dénouement of the conflict, but is more likely due to the hostility, since the late 1960s, of most intellectuals toward the Cold War. Arch Puddington, vice president for research at Freedom House and author of one of the books under review, recently made the same point: "It is by now clear that an amendment must be added to the adage that history is written by the winners. It would read: 'Except for the Cold War.'"[1]

To be sure, some leading historians have begun to offer a more dispassionate assessment of the Cold War, as did John Lewis Gaddis, for example, in *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.*[2] Yet revisionist works disparaging the West's efforts to resist Soviet aggression and influence continue to appear, as demonstrated by Frances Stonor Saunders's new book, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.*[3] Saunders resurrects the story, first revealed in the late 1960s, of covert CIA support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a clearinghouse for the literary and cultural activities of anticommunist intellectuals in the West, and a counterweight to the agitprop fomented by Cominform, which was created by Stalin in 1946 to disrupt the Marshall Plan in Western Europe. The Grose and Mitrovich volumes reflect these old and new views, respectively, on the Cold War and for that reason are the most interesting. Both are based on recently declassified materials and cover the period roughly between 1946 and 1956 during which a bold policy of "rolling back" Soviet power was conceived and launched. Spanning the longer period of 1949–91, Puddington's work is a more conventional and balanced history, a heavily documented examination of perhaps the most successful, yet controversial, Cold War agencies, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), for which he once worked.

The Cold War was a new type of conflict—total, but somewhere between peace and war—and encompassed all imaginable forms of national competition, from the "kitchen debate" to the Cuban missile crisis, from cultural exchanges to commando raids. It also demanded a new approach to

[1] "Sulking above the Fray," *American Spectator,* June 2000, p. 71.
[2] London: Oxford University Press, 1997.
[3] New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

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international relations. By the 1960s, the Englishman who "wrote the book" on traditional diplomacy came to appreciate that the old rules no longer applied. "Compared to the present struggle between West and East," wrote Sir Harold Nicolson in an epilogue he added to his 1939 classic, *Diplomacy*, "the rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sink into insignificance. Today we are faced, not with a clash of interests, but with a fight between ideologies, between the desire on the one hand to defend individual liberties and the resolve on the other hand to impose a mass religion. In the process the old standards, conventions, and methods have been discredited."[4]

New methods, however, would have to give practical application to concepts of competition, such as nonmilitary conflict and ideological hostilities, that remain difficult to define. Since most Western security and intelligence operatives at the dawn of the Cold War were veterans of the Second World War, and in particular veterans of the Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services, it was perhaps inevitable that they would try to deploy against the Soviet Union some of the tools that had been helpful in the fight against Nazi Germany. Behind the Iron Curtain, this meant propaganda (both "white" and "black"), economic warfare, sabotage, demolition, and assistance to underground resistance movements. In the West, it included aid to refugee organizations and like-minded cultural and political activists such as those associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Too strong for traditional diplomacy and too weak for conventional warfare, this mix of tactics forms the foundation on which judgments continue to be made about U.S. Cold War policies.

Grose and Mitrovich throw fresh light on this subject by revealing just how wrong conventional wisdom has been regarding the Soviet policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. According to that textbook account, the Truman administration pursued containment, which eventually proved successful, whereas the Eisenhower administration's policy of "rollback" or "liberation" failed. In many ways, Grose and Mitrovich show, the reverse was the case.[5]

The Continuities in U.S. Strategy

To be sure, Truman's advisers declared and believed in containment. However, they simultaneously launched a comprehensive campaign to roll back Soviet power, and the necessary secrecy surrounding this initiative lay the groundwork for much irony and confusion. While the Truman adminis-

[4] (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 137.

[5] Although Grose and Mitrovich provide more detail and evidence than the existing literature, much the same story can be found in works a decade old. See, for instance, Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1991).

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tration openly declared its Cold War policy to be containment, behind the scenes, Truman aide George F. Kennan, who was publicly identified as the architect of containment, was actually designing aggressive covert military, political, and psychological-warfare initiatives designed to roll back Soviet power. The irony was compounded in the 1952 presidential election, when Republicans, who publicly advocated rollback or liberation and were unaware of Kennan's secret plans, criticized the Truman administration for the essential passivity of containment. The ironies multiplied when President Eisenhower and his aides, having taken the White House, discovered that their predecessors had been conducting just the kind of bold operations they themselves had been advocating. They also learned, however, that these tactics were not producing quick or tangible results inside the Soviet bloc and that the new and growing Soviet nuclear arsenal made covert operations much more dangerous than before. Irony led to tragedy and embarrassment for the Eisenhower administration when, after vowing to roll back the Soviets, it failed to assist the Hungarians, who perhaps expected American aid when they rebelled in 1956.

Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rightly come in for criticism on this point. The covert policies of the Truman administration were designed to work outside the normal channels of state-to-state relations. To the extent that they remained covert, these methods never had to be acknowledged. Indeed, Mitrovich points out that the phrase "plausible deniability" was born in the Truman White House (p. 21). "By publicly associating American policy with liberation efforts behind the Iron Curtain," Mitrovich says,

> the Eisenhower Administration turned a covert policy originally designed to disassociate the United States from its clandestine activities into an overt policy which clearly placed the administration at the focal point for Eastern European resistance. This undermined potential resistance forces by making them seem to be acting on behalf of the United States and placed the United States in the position of assuming responsibility for the events that transpired (p. 175).

When the Hungarians rose up against the Soviet occupation forces, the White House was forced to put up or shut up, with the result that little was said publicly about liberation or rollback after 1956.

Of the Grose and Mitrovich volumes, the latter is more academically rigorous and will have more value for scholars, even though it focuses almost exclusively on the making of policy inside government buildings. The action described is thus limited to occasionally spirited exchanges of views, but the study does lay bare one of the central weaknesses of the rollback initiative: infighting among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense over which of them would control the program. For an account of how rollback actually proceeded in the field, Nicholas Bethell's *Betrayed* is perhaps the best history of the joint U.S.-British paramilitary effort to foment unrest in

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Albania by inserting trained Albanian commandos into the country over many years.[6] The book's title is a credit to one of the singular achievements of Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer and Soviet spy who undermined the operation by keeping Moscow informed of the details, thereby sending dozens of brave men to their deaths.

Still, Mitrovich clarifies something that close readers of recent diplomatic history have long suspected: "[T]he United States initiated offensive action against the Soviet Bloc independently of and simultaneously with the inauguration of containment" (p. 180). A comparatively young scholar, Mitrovich readily rejects the now-aging "New Left" revisionist accounts of the Cold War, making the point that U.S. motivations behind the more aggressive tactics of liberation policy were largely defensive in character and "do not demonstrate that American efforts to subvert the Soviet Bloc were part of a broader effort to establish global hegemony" (p. 179).

Grose's volume, on the other hand, is closer to previous revisionist accounts, perhaps because the author spent a lifetime in the trenches as a *New York Times* correspondent and executive editor of *Foreign Affairs*. As a result, his book reflects the charged partisan politics of the Cold War era. Though he attempts to appear even-handed, Grose approaches his subject with a world-weary cynicism that allows him to remain in the favor of those intellectuals who continue to disparage America's Cold War aims, in particular by ridiculing figures identified with the Right. Grose's tone, if not the text itself, lends support to the discredited claim that Washington was at least as responsible as Moscow for the Cold War, the kind of thinking that Mitrovich refutes. Largely because recent revelations from the Soviet archives leave him no choice, however, Grose slips into the text the occasional acknowledgment that "left-wingers" were often engaged in espionage on behalf of Moscow, either wittingly or unwittingly.[7] Overlooked is the fact that leading figures of the Left openly defended the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and found fault with America and the West instead. Grose also advances the tired notion of moral equivalence between Washington and Moscow with a drumbeat of ridicule directed at the still-unfashionable Right. He describes advocates of a more aggressive U.S. policy as "right-wing partisans," "anti-communist zealots," and "the rampant right wing" (pp. 198, 199, 210). On one page alone, "right-wing ideologues" are in cahoots with

[6] New York: Times Books, 1984.

[7] See Thomas Powers, "The Plot Thickens," *New York Review of Books*, May 11, 2000. Powers writes, "An important factor in the escalation of McCarthyism from an aberration to a genuine crisis of democracy was the denial (mostly by the left), and the furious response to that denial (mostly by the right), of what was characteristic of many Soviet spies in the 1930s and 1940s—they were of the left generally, they supported liberal causes, they defended the Soviet Union in all circumstances, they were often secret members of the Communist Party, they were uniformly suspicious of American initiatives throughout the world, they could be contemptuous of American democracy, society, and culture, and, above all, their offenses were too often minimized or explained away by apologists who felt that no man should be called traitor who did what he did for the cause of humanity."

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"right-wing journalists" to advance "the right wing's program" (p. 151). What was by most accounts a courageous, imaginative, bipartisan, and, yes, flawed effort to counter Moscow's imperial absorption of Eastern Europe becomes, in Grose's account, "the whole sorry episode" (p. 8). The weary tone, however, tends to get in the way of a clear-eyed account of history. Grose misses the point, for example, that the individuals he so insistently identifies as "right-wingers" and so readily ridicules are today found on the "right side" of history.

More importantly, Grose muddies the water regarding Kennan, whom he strongly admires, when he vainly tries to draw distinctions between the originator of rollback and the conservatives who later advocated the same policy. Covert operations are evidently acceptable, but public advocacy of them is cynical and partisan. "Kennan had never imagined," Grose writes, "that his strategy of clandestine political warfare would mutate into the conservative battle cry of Rollback" (p. 210). Yet if rollback was not an exercise in clandestine political warfare, then what was it? Kennan and his colleagues could send men forth to kill and be killed in the cause of anticommunism, and Grose sagely nods his approval, but as soon as that effort is linked to conservatives, Grose, the outraged moralist, emerges to do battle. On this issue, as on so many others, Mitrovich's perspective is refreshing and clear. After pointing out how influential Kennan's early work was for all subsequent covert operations on behalf of rollback during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Mitrovich states that "Kennan never provided . . . anything more than vague guidance as to how the United States could exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. This led to significant confusion as to what strategy he actually supported" (p. 7). Unfortunately for Kennan, given his later opposition to the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War, this could become his epitaph. More importantly, such disparate views regarding Kennan and his role in this affair reaffirm that much of the debate over rollback reflected disputes over methods rather than the final goal. Sending Americans to fight guerrillas in the rice paddies of South Vietnam, in other words, was not what at least one of the formulators of rollback had in mind.

The Rebellions in Eastern Europe

Focused as they are on policies designed to foster rebellion against communist rule, it is odd that neither Mitrovich nor Grose pays sustained attention to the dozen or so anticommunist outbreaks that took place in Eastern Europe. Those events proved beyond doubt that, even in its most crude form, rollback was hardly a right-wing fantasy. In the Baltic nations and Ukraine immediately following the Second World War, for example, guerrilla armies fought the Soviet occupiers for several years. The authors mention these events, but skip over the details of significant anticommunist revolts

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that violently shook the foundations of communist power in East-Central Europe, the main theater of operations for rollback. In East Germany in 1953, Czechoslovakia in 1953 and 1968, Hungary in 1956, and Poland in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980, large-scale demonstrations and riots erupted in dozens of cities, shaking communist control.[8] Resistance to communist rule was both widespread and determined. During the 1956 uprising in Budapest, which saw five days of pitched street battles between civilians and security forces, about 50,000 Hungarians were killed in just one day, and another 150,000 fled to the West. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the re-Stalinized leadership in Prague felt it necessary to purge 400,000 Communist Party members, and 35,000 of their countrymen fled to Hungary. More than 300 people were killed in one day in December 1970 as rioters in Gdansk and other Polish cities fought security forces.

Many of these uprisings were prompted by wage cuts, increases in food prices, or other economic hardships, but others were launched with overtly political demands for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In virtually every case, moreover, the demonstrations became openly anticommunist. In the June 1953 uprising in East Germany, which was sparked by tens of thousands of striking workers, demonstrators demanded free elections and ripped down the red flag from the Brandenburg Gate. That same month, when a workers' protest at the Lenin Works in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, led to riots and spread to other Czech cities, workers trampled on the Soviet flag and pictures of communist leaders and hoisted U.S. and British flags.

Readers new to this subject will gain little understanding or appreciation of the size, intensity, and political symbolism of the few uprisings Grose and Mitrovich briefly note. Admittedly, some of these events occurred after the period covered by these studies. In addition, with the exception of Hungary in 1956, when it was alleged that Radio Free Europe egged on the resistance with implications of U.S. assistance, there is little evidence of direct U.S. involvement in these uprisings (though much intelligence material from this period remains classified). Nevertheless, major events so central to their subjects should have been accorded more attention in what are two rather slender volumes. Their absence is especially noticeable in Grose's book, which devotes an entire section to "aftermath," including a chapter on the legacy of rollback. Grose gives more space to the influence of Polish-American voters in U.S. presidential elections than to the causes and consequences of a half-dozen uprisings in Poland, which leads the reader to conclude that the allegedly cynical motivations of U.S. policymakers are more important to him than a genuine yearning for freedom in Eastern Europe.

To be sure, covert military operations were not about to oust the

[8] The details that follow were taken from Thomas S. Arms, *Encyclopedia of the Cold War* (New York: Facts On File, 1994).

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Soviets from Eastern Europe and were thus removed from the arsenal of options early rollback planners considered, but the propaganda activities begun by the early Cold Warriors continued well into the 1970s and 1980s and helped to erode the foundations of communist rule throughout Eastern Europe and even Russia itself. It is yet another irony of this episode in history that the instruments of liberation policy became more effective, not less, as they shifted along the continuum from military action to the mere sharing of information. This paradox is at the heart of Puddington's contribution, *Broadcasting Freedom*, whose findings regarding the effectiveness of radio broadcasting as a Cold War weapon are echoed in a number of recent studies of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.[9]

Launched in the early 1950s as covert programs of the CIA, the radio broadcasts served as surrogate domestic radio stations for each of the Soviet bloc nations to which they transmitted. Radio Liberty broadcasts were aimed at the Soviet Union, while Radio Free Europe targeted Eastern Europe; the Voice of America (VOA), by contrast, broadcasts news about America. By broadcasting in native languages and using Soviet bloc émigrés as journalists, RFE/RL pierced the silence behind the Iron Curtain that was a key element of communist authorities' control over their populations. Communist and other dictatorial regimes are strongest along the barricades that defiantly mark their borders, but weakest at home, where their own people view them as illegitimate. More than any other instrument of U.S. foreign policy, radio broadcasts applied pressure on this weak point. By communicating directly with the people who lived under those regimes and telling them the truth about events inside their own countries, RFE/RL formed bonds of trust and understanding with the subjects of communist rule that their own leaders, who had to lie to span the gap between the dream and reality of communism, could not achieve. In his analysis of the collapse of Soviet communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that "the loss of communist monopoly over mass communication is the key to the breakdown of communist totalitarianism."[10] Virtually every dissident and anticommunist leader who emerged from the rubble of the Soviet bloc, from Václav Havel to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, agreed that RFE/RL, the BBC,

Dictatorships are strongest at their borders, but weakest at home.

[9] The most recent studies include Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–61* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); George R. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998); James Critchlow, *Radio Hole-in-the-Head: Radio Liberty: An Insider's Story of Cold War Broadcasting* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1995); Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and Alvin A. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War* (New York: Arcade Publishers, 1995). A broader perspective is offered by Scott Shane in *Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994).

[10] *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), p. 254.

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and Deutsche Welle were effective and significant agents in the erosion of communist influence and power at home.

Puddington's history is important precisely because Americans are largely unaware of the widespread use of short-wave radio abroad, not to mention the foreign radio broadcasts aimed at them. The variety and plenitude of domestic radio stations, and the relative provincialism of the average American, perhaps account for the fact that few in the United States listen to foreign radio stations. Yet because they were unheard and thus unappreciated at home, U.S. and other radio broadcasts to the Soviet bloc proved more effective than either liberals or conservatives imagined possible. Compounding the lack of first-hand contact with the broadcasts and their impact behind the Iron Curtain, conservatives tended to overestimate the power of communist regimes to suppress popular dissent, while liberals stubbornly refused to acknowledge the breadth and depth of that dissent.

Instead, the "freedom radios" were attacked from left and right, criticized almost as much by officials in Washington as by those in Moscow. RFE/RL even weathered the assassination of several staff members, as well as the bombing of its Munich headquarters in 1981 by Carlos, the international terrorist, who apparently acted on behalf of Romania's Ceausescu regime. What hurt the agencies most at home, however, was the fact that the CIA's covert support of RFE/RL was hidden behind a public lie to the effect that the radios were private organizations supported by contributions from corporations, foundations, and individuals. Fundraising did generate a modest level of support for the radios, but the bulk of their funds came from the CIA, which funneled money to them through a combination of fictitious and genuine foundations. The CIA's covert support for RFE/RL and a host of other organizations, including the Congress for Cultural Freedom, was first exposed by the media in 1967.[11] Senator Clifford Case, a liberal New Jersey Republican, officially confirmed the CIA's support for RFE/RL in 1971. Linked to the CIA and to the now-tainted word *propaganda*, RFE/RL was politically vulnerable. In 1972 Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas Democrat who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, launched a sustained effort to kill RFE/RL. "Mr. President," he said in a speech on the Senate floor, "I submit that these radios should be given an opportunity to take their rightful place in the graveyard of cold-war relics."[12] Fulbright finally lost his battle in 1973, when the stations were placed under the Board for International Broadcasting, joining the legions of other government agencies that receive congressional appropriations and thus public scrutiny.

[11] In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the Foreign Policy Research Institute was one of many organizations identified in press reports at that time as having received CIA assistance.

[12] Quoted in Henry Kamm, "Listening in on Radio Free Europe—The Station That Fulbright Wants to Shut Down," *New York Times Magazine*, March 26, 1972, p. 36.

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The Triumph of the Airwaves

Arguments on behalf of the effectiveness of Cold War broadcasting rest on the thesis that the Cold War was essentially an ideological conflict. Puddington declares, "In the war of ideas between communism and democracy—and this, after all, was the central conflict of the Cold War—the freedom radios proved to be one of democracy's most powerful weapons" (p. 313). This argument, although it has not gone unchallenged, is nevertheless persuasive. Even John Foster Dulles, who was notorious for his advocacy of rollback, argued extensively against the militarization of the Cold War and on behalf of more peaceful means to influence hearts and minds. For his part, Grose echoes the "New Left" historians when he writes, "'Rollback,' used as a battle cry, is most often associated with the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles, a bland international lawyer for most of his career, who ultimately became the indispensable statesman for the Republicans as they took charge of the Cold War" (p. 193). Yet this characterization is itself rhetorical, for it ignores much of what Dulles actually said. While Dulles's speeches may have carelessly (or shrewdly) implied a desire to use armed force, his most detailed policy views emphasized the value of propaganda, which at the time was not viewed as a dirty word, to extend America's influence directly to Soviet bloc peoples. In his book *War or Peace*, Dulles was clear and specific regarding his preferences:

> We have been concentrating almost exclusively on preparation for a "hot" war, which may never come. Top policy decisions have been influenced too much by the military, whose duty it is to think primarily in terms of a shooting war. Meanwhile, we can lose the "cold" war. There is imperative need for an over-all strategy that takes account of all the realities, the non-military as well as the military. . . . At the moment, we have little in the way of influence to project into the vast fields which lie beyond the reach of our military or economic power. We are not generating the dynamic faith, the ideas, needed to touch the spirits and to arouse the hopes of the peoples of the world who are the prey of predatory Communism.[13]

Dulles also perceived the inherent vulnerabilities of the communist governments and how best to attack them.

> Even today the Communist structure is over-extended, over-rigid, and ill founded. It could be shaken if the difficulties that are latent were activated. "Activation" does not mean armed revolt. The people have no arms, and violent revolt would be futile. Indeed, it would be worse than futile, for it would precipitate massacre. . . . There is, however, a duty to prevent whole peoples from being broken in mind and spirit, which is what Soviet Communism seeks. . . . Soviet Communism cannot consolidate its position or extend its sway except as it can monopolize the physical means of

[13] John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 176–77.

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> access to men's hearts and minds. To break that monopoly is to break the most potent weapon of that despotism.[14]

In this vein, Dulles mentioned the emerging plan to establish Radio Free Europe. Dulles was also consistent in these beliefs. Three years after his book appeared, he discussed his ideas regarding rollback in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was considering his nomination as secretary of state. "It must be and can be a peaceful process," Dulles argued, "but those who do not believe that results can be accomplished by moral pressures, by the weight of propaganda, just do not know what they are talking about."[15]

Future historians of the Cold War may continue to surprise us with new information and perspectives, but the Cold War itself was a series of surprises from its largely unanticipated beginning to an ending unexpected by nearly all. Indeed, the eventual victory of freedom depended in significant part on the actions of a handful of individuals whose early lives and careers revealed not a hint of the decisive role they would come to play, let alone of their ultimate triumph. In the years immediately following the Second World War, when the next global threat was still only dimly perceived, who could have predicted the importance of a plump, sad-looking former Soviet spy working in Manhattan as an editor at *Time*; a decorated former Red Army officer serving an eight-year sentence in the gulag; and a politically liberal Hollywood actor who, with his film career behind him, aspired to lead the Screen Actors Guild? Yet Whitaker Chambers, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Ronald Reagan were critical to the victory of the West.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty carried their ideas about freedom and communism into the heart of the Soviet bloc, even into the hearts and minds of the communist leaders, slowly sapping their will to defend a system in which they eventually lost faith. This is the most plausible reason why the Soviet Union collapsed by relatively peaceful means. The key role of broadcasting explains why some of the bloodiest battles that did occur between 1989 and 1991, for instance in Vilnius and Bucharest, were fought over control of television facilities.[16] The otherwise largely peaceful Soviet collapse provides a stark contrast to the willingness of Chinese leaders to slaughter student demonstrators in defense of their power and position. Or is it merely a coincidence that, until Radio Free Asia went on the air in 1996,

[14] Ibid., pp. 247–48.

[15] Quoted in Bennett Kovrig, *The Myth of Liberation: East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 122.

[16] John Kifner, "Rumanian Revolt, Live and Uncensored," *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1989; Michael Dobbs, "Soviet Troops in Lithuania Launch Attack on TV Tower," *Washington Post*, Jan. 13, 1991; Francis X. Clines, "Lithuanians, Improvising, Resume TV Broadcasts," *New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1991.

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Washington had not sustained a surrogate Chinese-language broadcasting system on the model of RFE/RL since 1953?[17]

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty still provide a necessary corrective to media in Russia and Eastern Europe, where strong-arm tactics against an emerging free press and weak democratic traditions leave free expression in peril. According to a Russian correspondent for *Time*, the fire that destroyed Moscow's Ostankino television tower in August 2000, wiping out television reception for the city, "sent Muscovites back through a 25-year time warp. In those days, a familiar scene was a family huddling around their antiquated transistor radio, trying to tune in to the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, or Deutsche Welle, and swapping the latest political jokes," wrote Yuri Zarakhovich. "One difference between now and then is that Soviet-era jamming equipment is no longer used to block foreign stations. . . . Nor do the Russians have to hide the fact that they listen to foreign stations, or fear a midnight knock on the door. Well, not yet anyway—a hint of such an eventuality hangs in the smoky Russian air."[18]

Some of the blunter instruments of rollback, such as paramilitary efforts to foment insurrections inside the Soviet bloc, decidedly failed due to Soviet espionage in the West and coercion in the East. But the subtler methods of political activity and cultural influence deployed by Washington and other Western capitals over a longer period clearly deserve a good deal of credit for rolling back communism not only in Eastern Europe, but in Russia itself.

Intelligence Reform, The Third Act
by Bruce Berkowitz

Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. By Arthur S. Hulnick. (New York: Praeger, 1999. 222 pp. $65.00; $19.95, paper.)

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. By Mark M. Lowenthal. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Books, 1999. 276 pp. $28.95, paper.)

On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World. By Robert David Steele. (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 2000. 495 pp. $34.95.)

Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. By Amy B. Zegart. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999. 342 pp. $45.00.)

[17] See Kevin J. McNamara, "Radio Free Asia Takes Aim," *The World and I*, Aug. 1997.

[18] "Happy Days Are Here Again: Muscovites Find Ways to Amuse Themselves in a World without TV," *Time Europe*, Sept. 6, 2000.

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Perhaps the most remarkable thing about efforts to reform U.S. intelligence collection and analysis is simply how long the nation has been working on it. The campaign for intelligence reform is an enterprise spanning almost three decades, or long enough to fill the entire career of a public official, academic, reporter, or pundit. This seemingly endless process has evolved through three phases to date. The first began around 1973, when the press reported widespread allegations of illegal or improper activities by U.S. intelligence agencies. The resulting controversy led to the Church and Pike Committee hearings, which in turn led to the establishment of the congressional oversight system we have today.

Phase Two began roughly in 1986 with the Iran-Contra affair. Relations between the congressional overseers and the intelligence community had been tense throughout the administration of Ronald Reagan. Thanks to issues such as covert action and U.S. support for the Nicaraguan anticommunist resistance, the oversight committees and the director of central intelligence, William Casey, regarded each other with deep suspicion. It did not help that Americans were sharply divided over how to wage the Cold War (a fact that has been obscured over time). Disclosure of the arms-for-hostages deal brought the conflict to a head and led to congressional investigation and a legal prosecution.

These investigations became a quest to link top administration officials to illegal acts and sparked an effort to establish tighter rules for notifying Congress before a covert operation could be undertaken. Both efforts failed. Casey fell ill just as the investigations began and died soon after. The convictions of Oliver North and John Poindexter, the two other officials most closely linked to the scandal, were overturned on legal technicalities, whereupon the investigations ran into a dead end. When Congress passed legislation that would have tightened the rules requiring the president to notify Congress before undertaking covert action, President Bush vetoed the bill and legislators lacked the votes to override him. Investigators then dropped their prosecution of the legal case, and Phase Two ended with senior intelligence officials' simply promising to work more closely with Congress. The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 probably also defused the confrontation, as it gave the Democratic Party control of both the presidency and majorities in the House and Senate. Several of the congressional staffers who took part in the investigations were appointed to positions in the intelligence community during the new administration, further easing tensions about oversight.

We are now in Phase Three, punctuated in turn by the Aldrich Ames espionage case and several glaring intelligence failures (notably, the Indian nuclear tests and a North Korean missile test), along with several lesser gaffes. The National Reconnaissance Office was charged with using funds improperly. The CIA was criticized for using agents guilty of human rights violations in Guatemala. Former director of central intelligence (DCI) John Deutch was criticized for using an unsecure computer to do classified work at home, and

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several top CIA officials were accused of failing to investigate the matter aggressively once it had been discovered.

But the biggest challenge in Phase Three has been figuring out what the intelligence community should do in the post–Cold War world and how it should do it. Several government and private commissions began to study this question in the mid-1990s. The most notable was the Commission on Intelligence Missions and Capabilities, better known as the Aspin-Brown Commission after its two chairmen, the late Les Aspin and his successor, Harold Brown. The commission's report (combined with the findings of studies by the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees) led to several organizational changes, including the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which consolidated several offices responsible for processing satellite imagery. Another was the creation of new positions: a deputy director of central intelligence for managing intelligence-community programs, and two assistant directors of central intelligence (one responsible for collection, the other for analysis). In addition, President Clinton issued an executive order (Presidential Decision Directive 35) establishing intelligence priorities.

Even so, many experts still harbor concerns that the U.S. intelligence community remains ill suited to perform its most important function in the Information Age: providing officials with the information they need, when they need it. Little wonder that books on intelligence reform continue to appear—including the four reviewed here.

Mark Lowenthal provides a systematic and thorough analysis in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Previously a State Department intelligence analyst, a staffer at the Congressional Research Service, and staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Lowenthal currently works on intelligence issues at the private firm SRA International. Lowenthal has previously written several books and articles about intelligence.[1] Like his earlier work, this book is especially well written and even occasionally reflects a sense of humor. Lowenthal identifies and explores the major issues that intelligence reform needs to address.

One of the best features of this study is its explanation of how the intelligence community really works. Lowenthal begins with the formal organization charts, but goes on to show how one can think of the community in terms of who collects information, who processes it, who analyzes it, and who deploys the people and machinery to support these operations. He also explains how the budget process works, both in principle and in practice—an important issue, because most intelligence controversies revolve at least in part around the question of resource allocations.

Much of the rest of the book provides an insider's perspective on

[1] See, for example, Mark M. Lowenthal, *U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy*, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

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specific issues that obsess intelligence policy junkies today. These include such questions as whether the intelligence community really failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, why the intelligence community failed to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and whether the government should disclose the intelligence budget. Lowenthal does not, however, offer a systematic menu of reforms, which is ironic given his previous efforts within government. As staff director for the HPSCI, he led a research effort (the "IC21" study) that proposed a top-to-bottom corporate restructuring of U.S. intelligence. IC21 would have gathered the current agencies scattered through the Defense Department, CIA, and elsewhere into mega-organizations responsible for planning and conducting collection, analysis, and other functions. One might infer that, having already offered a grand design only to witness modest results, Lowenthal is now content to identify problems, suggest goals, and let the political system do its work.

Back to the Drawing Board

Robert David Steele, in contrast, pulls no punches. His *On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* essentially recommends scrapping the intelligence community as we know it. Steele would replace it not with a new organization, but with an entirely new mode of operation, one in which intelligence consumers used mainly public, unclassified sources of information. This bold argument rests on several observations. First, sources of intelligence data in the Information Age have exploded in number, and commercial, unclassified sources are often—perhaps usually—more useful than government-run, classified sources. Secondly, the kinds of information that officials need have changed. The Soviet Union—a closed, hard-to-penetrate target—is no longer the prime threat, and U.S. security in the future will be affected mainly by vast economic, demographic, and political developments. Thirdly, the private sector can usually cover these trends better than a closed, classified intelligence operation. No classified intelligence service is likely to provide the broad-based information support that officials need.

To say that Steele has a broad vision of how intelligence should operate and how it fits into the total security of the country would be an understatement. He writes:

> Where do we start? I see intelligence as part of a continuum, of a larger national construct, which must also include our formal educational process, our informal cultural values, our structured information-technology architecture, our informal social and professional networks for information exchange, our political governance system extending not only internationally, but down to the state, local, and citizen level; and, as traditionally defined, as an integral element of the federal bureaucracy (p. 76).

Steele, who has served as an analyst and operator in the field, does not claim to be the first to propose a new intelligence paradigm emphasizing open

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sources, but he may be its most vigorous proponent. Indeed, he puts his money where his mouth is. Steele is the founder and chief executive officer of Open Source Solutions (OSS), a company that specializes in providing commercial, open-source intelligence support. He delights in showing how analysts using open-source methods can often produce answers even to esoteric questions faster than the intelligence community can. OSS also holds seminars and classes to promote open-source intelligence and uses Steele's book as a text in one of them.

Steele has the main arguments exactly correct, but his implementation raises questions of its own. He often seems to imply that one can fix the intelligence community by fiat: to improve planning, appoint a director of long-range planning; to improve the use of open sources, pass legislation mandating their use. That approach underestimates the cultural change that is needed by both intelligence producers and consumers. A more troubling problem, however, is that, having demonstrated the importance of unclassified information, Steele almost completely neglects the role of secret, government-operated information sources. Classified sources may be important only at the margin in the Information Age, but that margin can be critical. The intelligence community is responsible for managing the connection between the open-source and classified worlds, and we need to understand how that link should work.

Unless intelligence agencies can tap the private sector, they will become irrelevant.

Nevertheless, if one overlooks these minor lapses and takes in the big picture, Steele provides a good view of the future of intelligence—if intelligence is to have a future. He notes that in the future, U.S. national security will depend critically on how our leaders understand the tidal economic and demographic forces that underlie current foreign threats. What is more, as the private sector dwarfs the government in the size of its purse and the depth of its talent pool, intelligence agencies will need to rethink the manner in which they develop intelligence and security policy. Unless they can tap the unclassified, private sector effectively, they will not just fail, they will become irrelevant.

In sum, officials in the incoming administration ought to study Lowenthal's book for tactics and warnings of the sorts of problems that they will immediately face. For vision, however, they should read Steele.

One only wishes that Arthur Hulnick had a more persuasive case for being included in the collection. Hulnick, a retired intelligence officer, attempts to answer the question "Is the machine broken?" by looking at each of the major activities the community performs: human intelligence collection and analysis, satellite imagery, signals intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action. He then grades the community on its performance in each area, concluding that the recent record is mixed.

When Hulnick draws observations from his own experience, the

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results are informative. But his study misses the really big question as to the goals and ideals that the U.S. intelligence community should pursue. The result is a frustrating book. For instance, Hulnick describes the CIA's procedures for coordinating analytic reports and muses, "Fear of failure has led to a process in which some analysts hardly ever see their analyses appear in print the way they wrote it. Everything written in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence seems to have been written by the same nerd" (p. 58). Apparently, Hulnick has read a lot of DI reports, or perhaps more than he would have read if left to his own devices. But his difficulty with DI analysis reflects a greater problem, namely, the underlying model of intelligence that the CIA follows. In fact, it is not hard to discern the origin, if not the identity, of the CIA "nerd" Hulnick cites. As Robert Gates, the DCI in the final years of the Bush administration, told a CIA audience shortly after assuming his post:

> We do produce a corporate product. If the policymaker wants the opinion of a single individual, he or she can (and frequently does) consult any one of a dozen outside experts on a given issue. Your work, on the other hand, counts because it represents the well-considered views of an entire directorate and, in the case of National Estimates, the entire Intelligence Community. . . . Analysts must understand and practice the corporate concept. They must discard the academic mindset that says their work is their own, and they must take into account the views of others during the coordination process. . . .[2]

In other words, if intelligence reporting sounds like corporate mush and fails to reflect individual insight, it is not by accident, but by design. The prevailing model of intelligence assumes that coordinated intelligence is better than the analysis of individuals. Yet, having noted this bureaucratic plague, Hulnick does not offer any remedy. Why not, for example, assign individual analysts directly to as many intelligence consumers as practical? The answer is that such an approach runs counter to how intelligence is "supposed to work." The traditional model dictates—adamantly—that coordinated intelligence is better than individual insight, and Hulnick's study never questions that model.

A second example of Hulnick's avoiding the larger underlying issues is his discussion of covert action. He states that experts disagree on just what covert action is and when it should be used. Yet in reality, covert action has a precise definition (which the author acknowledges) that is even codified under law. Covert operations are activities in which the U.S. government hides its responsibility—period. This is important, because it drives the central concern raised by all covert action: when, if ever, should the U.S. government act in a deniable fashion? If one believes that the United States

[2] Robert M. Gates, Address in the CIA Auditorium (Mar. 16, 1992), reprinted as "Guarding against Politicization," *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 36, no. 5 (1992), pp. 5–15. Also see Bruce Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 94.

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should never hide its hand, then one must proscribe all covert operations and prosecute anyone who violates the ban. If, on the other hand, one grants that situations will sometimes require American agents to act covertly, then the government needs to establish an effective oversight process, develop the organizations with the requisite skills, and confront all of the issues that covert operations raise for accountability, rule of law, and democracy. That is a daunting assignment, but it is also the inescapable challenge facing anyone intent on conducting covert action on behalf of a democracy.

Instead of dealing with these problems and how they might be manifested in the years ahead, Hulnick appears to assume that future covert operations will resemble those of the past. He asks whether the intelligence community has allowed its covert capabilities to atrophy, and whether the United States needs a specific organization to develop ideas for new covert operations. In fact, atrophy might not be a bad thing if the United States needs an entirely new set of capabilities for covert action in the Information Age. It may even be impossible for a single organization to have responsibility for covert operations, because the need to act covertly may arise in a variety of circumstances, demanding a range of expertise that no single organization could possess.

If the net result is something of a letdown, it is even more so because Hulnick has been known to take on these larger issues in other venues, such as the courses he teaches at Boston University. This was his first effort as a policy analyst in academia; one hopes he is more aggressive in his next attempt.

A Political Scientist's Model

The fourth book reviewed here is completely different from the other three. Amy Zegart, a recent Stanford graduate currently teaching at UCLA, has written an academic study of national security politics within the top levels of government, focusing on the National Security Council and the intelligence community. The book is based on her doctoral thesis, which received the American Political Science Association's annual award for the best dissertation on public administration.

Zegart proposes a "national security agency model" that explains how governments develop policies (despite the label, the model has nothing to do with the National Security Agency, other than that it might explain the agency's operation as it would other organizations). Zegart draws a sharp contrast between her model and the "realist" model, which treats nations as rational, unitary actors and assumes that agencies act to promote the national interest. She also departs from the "bureaucratic politics" model, in which organizations compete in their own interests rather than those of the nation. Finally, she distinguishes her approach from the "new institutionalist" model, which it in fact most closely resembles.

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New-institutionalist models focus on the relationships between agencies and interest groups. Zegart agrees with their proponents that such models can explain national security policy, but argues that national security affairs have a special twist that requires a modification in the model. Specifically, she notes that the president is more autonomous, Congress is more isolated, and interest groups are less capable than existing models recognize. As a result, national security organizations are less susceptible to change and, by implication, more prone to failing to serve the national interest.

Even taken on its own terms—that is, as a proposal for a new way to analyze the national security policy process—problems are evident in this book. Most notably, regardless of how telling Zegart's critique of realist models is, she does not make a convincing case that her own proposal is significantly better than traditional bureaucratic-politics models. She claims that the traditional models are inductive and thus do not offer testable hypotheses, and that they amount to simple tautologies such as "agencies act in their own best interest." Citing Graham Allison's analysis of bureaucratic politics in the Cuban missile crisis,[3] she writes:

> How John F. Kennedy approached the Cuban missile crisis sheds little light on how Jimmy Carter handled the Iranian hostage crisis. The old aphorism "Where you stand depends on where you sit" captures something about bureaucratic behavior. But the far more important questions are "How did you come to sit there in the first place?" and "What power will you bring to the table tomorrow?" (p. 21)

In fact, however, these are just the kinds of questions that Anthony Downs and other scholars have examined in their studies of bureaucratic politics. Downs, for example, described how individuals seeking careers in bureaucratic organizations sort themselves on the basis of their attitude toward risk, and how the choices of these individual shape the nature of their organizations. He proposed explanations and testable hypotheses of these agencies' evolution over time. He also examined how such agencies gain power and curry support from other organizations, outside supporters, and legislators. Indeed, like Zegart, Downs focused on agencies in the national security community.[4]

Moreover, one can readily think of several counterexamples to her argument. For example, Zegart observes that national security organizations have special characteristics that distinguish them from domestic agencies. The White House has more independence in managing its operation (given the president's power as commander in chief), officials are better able to control the flow of information (through classification), and relations with Congress are more highly channeled. These quirks of national security agencies, according to Zegart, can lead to bad outcomes, with Iran-Contra being

[3] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
[4] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

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one example. While all of that is true, sometimes these same quirks in the national security policy process yield positive outcomes. The *Polaris* submarine program, often cited as a model of efficiency in public administration, is one example. The navy was able to isolate the *Polaris* program from would-be critics, and program managers had a great deal of autonomy. Zegart's model would lead one to the conclusion that this situation was a recipe for an agency to run amok. In reality, the program was executed with remarkable effectiveness and is a well-known example of bureaucratic success, although Zegart does not cite Harvey Sapolsky's analysis of it.[5]

In other words, sometimes isolation and independence lead to failure and sometimes to success. Whether one proposition is true more often than the other is a matter of long-standing debate. Indeed, when questioned by congressional investigators, the instigators of the Iran-Contra fiasco claimed that they were acting in the tradition of Henry Kissinger, whose "Lone Ranger" diplomacy led to the breakthrough in relations with China. Was the success of one and the failure of the other mere chance? Similarly, tightly compartmentalized special-access programs are sometimes models of efficiency (such as the CIA's U-2 aircraft) and sometimes examples of mismanagement and ineffective oversight (such as the navy's A-12). What accounts for the different outcomes? A social-scientific model needs to explain the variable that causes these diametrically opposite results. Zegart tries to identify this variable in her analysis of one case of success, the defense reforms that culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Many experts believe these reforms led to the improvement in U.S. military capabilities that were evident in Operation Desert Storm. Zegart argues that defense reform laws were passed because Barry Goldwater, Les Aspin, Sam Nunn, and other legislators took a personal interest in the issue and assembled bipartisan support. She adds that President Reagan implicitly facilitated reform by not offering support to its opponents within the Defense Department.

Unfortunately, this amounts to saying that defense reform succeeded because it was supported by a coalition consisting of a majority of legislators and the president. This is not only quite similar to a traditional bureaucratic-politics explanation, but it also happens to be the definition of "how a bill becomes a law" that one finds in civics textbooks. The shortcomings in Zegart's analysis become clearer when she describes the White House's actions:

> The second reason reform succeeded was that President Reagan stayed out of the political fray. He made no grand public stand, issued no strong personal appeals, and invested no major presidential capital in either opposing or promoting Pentagon reorganization. Why the President preferred the role of observer to actor on this issue is unclear. . . . He may have felt, as [Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger did, that

[5] Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

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> reform would only codify existing practices and consequently had no "monumental significance or importance." One thing is clear: Reagan was never a large part of the political equation. Whether he intended it or not, Reagan's apparent indifference to reform undercut the Defense Department's position, giving Congress room to maneuver without fear of a presidential veto (pp. 146–47).

Why Reagan preferred the role of observer may be unclear to Zegart, but it is worth noting that presidents have been trying to figure out how to manage the army since the time of George Washington. Sometimes the most effective way to intercede is, ironically, to do nothing. To think the Reagan White House staff paid no attention to defense reform as it moved through Congress is naive. No major piece of legislation is signed into law that way. Congress could never maneuver without the fear of the presidential veto because Reagan always had the power to exercise it if he and his staff thought their own political objectives were in jeopardy. A better explanation is that there was a calculated, if implicit, quid pro quo: the White House worked the issue it cared about most (increasing defense spending to rebuild the U.S. military), and Congress worked the issue it cared about most (reforming defense acquisition and the command and control structure). Both sides got their way, and the country was better off as a result.

Yet even if her analysis contains flaws, Zegart does offer important advice about intelligence reform. Forget the blue-ribbon commissions and epic campaigns to solve the intelligence community's problems through the formal process of passing legislation. Effective intelligence reform will require deft bureaucratic maneuvering and a more sophisticated understanding of the political process than has been demonstrated up to now. Moreover, presidential support, tacit or otherwise, is a necessary condition for intelligence reform. It is worth keeping that in mind as the new administration takes office.

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